Brown v. Pearson
| Citation | 483 S.E.2d 477,326 S.C. 409 |
| Decision Date | 06 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 2643,2643 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
| Parties | Colin BROWN, Tanya Brown, Jeannie Crittenden, Richard Crittenden and Nancy Bryson (fka Nancy Sinnott), Appellants, v. John C. PEARSON and South Carolina Conference of the United Methodist Church, Respondents. . Heard |
Susan Ingles; Roy F. Harmon, III, and Julie M. Bondura, Greenville, for appellants.
Edward R. Cole, of The Ward Law Firm, Spartanburg, for respondents.
Church members Colin Brown, Tanya Brown, Jeannie Crittenden, Richard Crittenden, and Nancy Bryson brought this action against the South Carolina Conference of the United Methodist Church ("the Conference") and its district superintendent, John C. Pearson, for claims arising out of alleged sexual harassment and abuse perpetrated by a pastor. The trial judge granted summary judgment for the defendants and the church members appeal. We affirm.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants, the record reveals the following. Appellants Tanya Brown, Jeannie Crittenden, and Nancy Bryson ("Female Appellants") alleged Reverend Jerry Brunson sexually harassed and abused them while he was minister of Lee Road United Methodist Church ("the Church"), a member church of Respondent Conference, over a period of months in 1989 and 1990. 1 Appellants Richard Crittenden and Colin Brown are married to Jeannie Crittenden and Tanya Brown, respectively.
Respondent John Pearson, district superintendent of the Conference, learned of the allegations in the summer of 1990. As a result of these allegations, Female Appellants were asked to appear before the Lee Road Staff Parish Relations Committee ("the Committee") on August 2, 1990. Each complainant was required to voice her allegations at this meeting, which Brunson attended. The complainants were not allowed to hear Brunson's responses, nor were they allowed to hear the other complainants' statements.
After hearing the accusations against Brunson, the Committee gave Brunson a vote of "no confidence" and decided it had to forward the charges to the Church for a joint review of Brunson's conduct. Brunson then Brunson spoke to the Church congregation the following Sunday, August 5, 1990, and explained he was taking a paid vacation. Brunson had telephoned members of the congregation to gain support in response to Appellants' charges. Furthermore, the tone of Brunson's voice, as he spoke to the congregation, made it appear that he had been falsely charged. No one from the Conference hierarchy attended the service.
requested six weeks' paid vacation followed by a leave of absence, and the Committee granted his request.
Pearson visited the Church the following two Sundays to explain Brunson's leave of absence. Pearson told the congregation allegations had been made but did not reveal the true nature of the complaints or that any investigation was being conducted.
Before the charges against him were reviewed, Brunson resigned from the Conference. The Conference accepted Brunson's resignation as a "withdrawal under complaint or charges." Upon Brunson's resignation, the Conference discontinued its investigation into Female Appellants' allegations. Pearson knew of Brunson's resignation before his second visit to the Church, but failed to publicly disclose that Brunson had resigned under complaint.
Shortly thereafter, the Conference provided each victim with $400 for counseling. Pearson referred Tanya Brown, the only victim who had requested counseling, to a Methodist pastoral counselor, but Brown saw him only twice because she believed he was unprofessional and unresponsive to her needs. Brown did not request further counseling from Pearson until the fall of 1992 because she believed additional funds were unavailable.
Appellant Richard Crittenden wrote Pearson and Bishop Joseph Bethea a letter in September 1990 in which he shared his concerns relating to the Brunson incident and its impact on him and his wife. He also made suggestions to improve the Conference's method of investigation. Bishop Bethea stated in his response that he would keep in touch with Pearson and the Crittendens and that Richard Crittenden's suggestions would be given serious consideration.
Reverend Tom Pietila became the Church's pastor in January of 1991. Approximately one year later, Appellants approached Pietila and requested help in resolving the Brunson situation. Pietila subsequently informed Pearson Appellants were still experiencing problems.
Pearson requested $4,000 from the Conference, and in October 1992 the Conference approved the expenditure for training for pastors in handling sex abuse allegations and for Female Appellants to attend a Survivors of Clergy Sexual Abuse retreat. Pearson notified Female Appellants of the approved funding and of the Conference's development of a sexual ethics policy. The sexual harassment training began in November 1992.
Jeannie Crittenden and Tanya Brown attended the sexual abuse retreat in March 1993. The Conference gave the unused balance of the money allotted for the retreat to Crittenden to help pay her individual counseling expenses.
On November 17, 1992, Appellants met with Bishop Bethea to discuss their disappointment with the Conference and Pearson's handling of the Brunson situation. Appellants complained the Conference was not following through on its responsibilities to them. Colin Brown told the Bishop they did not want to bring a lawsuit against the church but wanted the situation resolved. Bishop Bethea assured Appellants someone in the Church would write a letter to the Church congregation explaining what really happened between Brunson and Female Appellants. He also assured them they would have input in the establishment of the sexual ethics policy that was to be presented at the 1993 Annual Conference. At this meeting, the Bishop gave Appellants a copy of the proposed sexual ethics policy and asked for their comments. Appellants told the Bishop the proposed policy was a start but had a long way to go. Nevertheless, that policy was adopted at the June 1993 Annual Conference. No one ever wrote the letter to the congregation explaining what actually happened On July 30, 1993, Appellants filed this lawsuit alleging negligence, gross negligence, invasion of privacy, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and clergy malpractice. As a result of discovery, Appellants learned ministers in the Conference knew Brunson had previously acted inappropriately toward women while ministering at another church but "swept it under the rug."
between Brunson and Female Appellants. 2
Claiming the limitations period had expired, Respondents moved for summary judgment. By order dated July 5, 1994, the Honorable Charles B. Simmons denied the motion, determining that a jury should decide whether Respondents' actions should estop them from relying on the statute of limitations. After the parties had conducted further discovery, the Honorable L. Henry McKellar reopened the statute of limitations issue, and by order dated March 8, 1995, granted summary judgment to Respondents. He determined that the limitations period had expired on Appellants' negligent hiring and supervision claims and that the record revealed no actionable conduct by the Respondents in relation to Appellants' other substantive claims.
Appellants contend the trial judge erred when he granted summary judgment to Respondents based on the statute of limitations when a previous judge determined a jury should decide whether the limitations period bars the action. We disagree.
A denial of a motion for summary judgment does not establish the law of the case, and the issues raised in the motion may be raised later in the proceedings by a motion to reconsider the summary judgment motion or by a motion for a directed verdict. Ballenger v. Bowen, 313 S.C. 476, 443 S.E.2d 379 (1994); see also Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1121 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 856, 100 S.Ct. 116, 62 L.Ed.2d 75 (1979) (); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 149 at 183 (1990) (). The decision whether to reconsider a motion for summary judgment is within the trial judge's discretion. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Orangeburg Paint & Decorating Ctr., Inc., 297 S.C. 176, 375 S.E.2d 331 (Ct.App.1988).
Here, Judge McKellar asked if there had been additional discovery since Judge Simmons's order that "would allow us to get to the bottom of this question[.]" Respondents stated there had been, and Appellants did not indicate otherwise. Appellants acknowledged in a motion filed with the court in connection with defendants' motion for summary judgment that "substantial discovery has been conducted since that time by the defendants." We therefore find Judge McKellar did not abuse his discretion by considering the renewed motion.
Appellants also assert the judge erred in granting summary judgment because Respondents' motion failed to provide notice that the statute of limitations issue would be reargued. We disagree.
An error not shown to be prejudicial does not constitute grounds for reversal. JKT Co. v. Hardwick, 274 S.C. 413, 265 S.E.2d 510 (1980). In response to Appellants' initial objection that they had no notice the statute of limitations issue would be reargued, the trial judge gave Appellants four days to submit cases supporting their argument, and Appellants did not complain the time would be insufficient. Accordingly, Appellants have failed to show they were prejudiced by the judge's ruling.
Appellants also contend even if the trial judge...
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