Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Trust

• Citation: 732 F.2d 726
• Decision Date: 03 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-3865,83-3865
• Parties: 34 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1201, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,338 Sybil BROWN, Anne Caldwell, and Sally McRae, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PUGET SOUND ELECTRICAL APPRENTICESHIP & TRAINING TRUST, Defendants-Appellants. Sybil BROWN, Anne Caldwell, and Sally McRae, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PUGET SOUND CHAPTER NATIONAL ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION, a corporation; and, Local 46, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 726

732 F.2d 726

34 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1201,

34 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,338

Sybil BROWN, Anne Caldwell, and Sally McRae, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PUGET SOUND ELECTRICAL APPRENTICESHIP & TRAINING TRUST,

Defendants-Appellants.

Sybil BROWN, Anne Caldwell, and Sally McRae, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PUGET SOUND CHAPTER NATIONAL ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS

ASSOCIATION, a corporation; and, Local 46,

International Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 83-3865.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 3, 1984.

Decided May 3, 1984.

Abraham Arditi, Seattle, Wash., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Hugh Hafer, Hafer, Cassidy & Price, Seattle, Wash., for defendants-appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington.

Before WRIGHT, TANG, and ALARCON, Circuit Judges.

ALARCON, Circuit Judge:

The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local No. 46 [Local] and the Puget Sound Chapter of the National Electrical Contractors Association [NECA] appeal from the judgment awarding back pay, costs, and attorney's fees to Sybil Brown, Anne Caldwell, and Sally McRae [Appellees] in a Title VII action. We are asked to decide whether the district court was correct in adopting the special master's conclusion that "the veterans age credit here violated Title VII ...." and was the cause of Appellees' injuries.

PERTINENT FACTS

In 1969, Local and NECA formed the Puget Sound Electrical Joint Apprenticeship and Training Trust [JATC] for the purpose of supporting programs to train electrical apprentices and journeymen. Applicants to the JATC's construction electricians apprenticeship program were considered eligible on the basis of age between their 18th birthday and their 26th birthday.

In compliance with standards first suggested by the federal government in 1945, the JATC adopted an age credit exception for veterans. In 1966 and 1971, after Title VII was enacted, the Department of Labor's Bureau of Apprenticeship Training notified JATCs around the country that standards for admission to their apprenticeship programs could contain a veterans' age credit. In 1971, the Bureau of Apprenticeship Training approved National Apprenticeship and Training Standards which included an age credit for veterans. In this respect, the Special Master found that "[i]n establishing and maintaining its veterans age credit policy, the JAC relied in good faith on policies endorsed by the federal government."

The JATC adopted the age credit because it agreed with the federal government's position that persons who served their country might be foreclosed from apprenticeship training because of their age. Young men and women who joined the armed forces would be unable to apply to the JATC program during their military term. Therefore, they would have fewer years to apply to the program than men and women who remained in the civilian labor force until they were 26 years of age. The JATC attempted to give veterans an equal opportunity to apply for apprenticeship training by allowing them to deduct one year from their age for each year spent in military service. This age credit, however, was limited to a maximum of four years. A veteran with more than four years of service thus would still have fewer years to apply for an apprenticeship than would non-veterans.

The following examples illustrate the impact of the veterans' credit on applicants to the program.

One. A 22 year old veteran with four years of service would have no more than eight years to apply.

A 22 year old non-veteran would have a total of eight years to apply.

Two. A 25 year old veteran with eight years of service would have a total of four years to apply.

A 25 year old non-veteran would have had a total of eight years to apply.

Three. A 29 year old veteran who entered the armed services at age 25 and served four years would have no more than a total of eight years to apply.

Sybil Brown and Sally McRae did not apply for admission to the construction electricians apprenticeship program until they were over 25 years of age. Anne Caldwell applied when she was 25, but failed to complete the application before her 26th birthday. Appellees had not served in the armed forces prior to filing their application. Thus, they did not qualify for an age credit. Their applications were denied.

In 1977, Appellees filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] against Local, NECA and the JATC [Appellants] claiming the age credit afforded to veterans had a disparate impact on women.

In 1978, the JATC abolished its veterans' age credit and raised the maximum age for all applicants to 29. Brown and Caldwell then reapplied to the construction program and were accepted. McRae reapplied to the construction program and was placed at number 34 on the waiting list. In 1978, a male who was number 108 on the list was offered admission to the apprenticeship program before McRae. She filed no charge with the EEOC over the incident.

After receiving right to sue notices from the EEOC regarding their disparate impact claim, Appellees brought a consolidated action in federal court. McRae additionally raised a discriminatory treatment claim based on the waiting list bypass. The evidence in this case was presented to a magistrate sitting as a special master. Appellants raised jurisdictional objections to the lower court's entertaining either Appellees' disparate impact claim or McRae's discriminatory treatment charge. The special master rejected the jurisdictional objections, and recommended that the district court find for Appellees on both the disparate impact and discriminatory treatment allegations. He also recommended finding the JATC the agent of Local and NECA, and assessing attorney's fees and back pay against Appellants. The district court adopted the special master's recommendations. Because we conclude that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over McRae's discriminatory treatment claim, and that the veterans' age credit was not the cause of Appellees' alleged injuries, we reverse.

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction of the District Court

We first address Appellants' attack on the jurisdiction of the district court to enter judgment in this matter. Appellants present two arguments in support of their request that we dismiss the Appellees' claims.

First. Appellees filed their claims in the district court prematurely in violation of the 180-day waiting period prescribed by statute.

Second. McRae's claim of discriminatory treatment in 1978 was not reasonably related to her 1977 EEOC charges of disparate impact.

1. Validity of the Right to Sue Notice

Title VII places primary responsibility for disposing of employment discrimination complaints with the EEOC in order to encourage informal conciliation of employment discrimination claims and foster voluntary compliance with Title VII. Ong v. Cleland, 642 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir.1981). Title VII plaintiffs must therefore exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief from discriminatory action. Id. at 320. Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1) to protect aggrieved individuals from undue delay. This statute provides that if the EEOC has neither filed a Title VII action nor entered into a conciliation agreement to which the complainant is a party within 180 days from the date the charge is filed, the complainant must be notified that he or she may now bring a civil action. If specified EEOC officials determine it is improbable that the EEOC will take such final action within 180 days, 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1601.28(a)(2) authorizes the EEOC to issue a right to sue notice before 180 days elapse.

The EEOC issued Appellees a right to sue notice prior to the expiration of 180 days, pursuant to section 1601.28(a)(2), based on their disparate impact charge against the JATC. Appellants argue that the Regulation authorizing early right to sue notices is invalid. They maintain that the 180-day period provided for in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1) is a mandatory requirement designed to assure the EEOC's primary role in handling employment discrimination claims. This court upheld the validity of right to sue notices issued prior to the expiration of 180 days in Bryant v. California Brewers Ass'n., 585 F.2d 421 (9th Cir.1978), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 444 U.S. 598, 100 S.Ct. 814, 63 L.Ed.2d 55 (1980). See also Saulsbury v. Wismer & Becker, Inc., 644 F.2d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir.1980) (right to sue notice issued before 180 days elapsed was valid). Therefore, under the law of this circuit, the district court did not err in assuming jurisdiction over Appellees' disparate impact claim.

2. Reasonable Relation of the Discriminatory Treatment Claim

When an employee seeks judicial relief for incidents not listed in his original EEOC charge, a federal court may assume jurisdiction over the new claims if they are "like or reasonably related to the allegations of the EEOC charge." Oubichon v. Northern American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir.1973). If closely related incidents occur after a charge has been filed, additional investigative and conciliative efforts would be redundant. " 'To require a second "filing" by the aggrieved party ... would serve no purpose other than the creation of an additional procedural technicality.' " Ramirez v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 586 F.2d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir.1978) citing Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526, 92 S.Ct. 616, 618, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972).

Where claims are not so closely related that agency action would be redundant, the EEOC must be afforded an opportunity to consider disputes before federal suits are initiated. Bypassing the administrative process under such circumstances frustrates the policy of encouraging informal conciliation and fostering voluntary compliance with Title VII. McRae filed the following charge with the EEOC:

The respondent discriminates against...