Brown v. Raymond Bros. Motor Transp.
| Decision Date | 10 June 1932 |
| Docket Number | No. 28939.,28939. |
| Citation | 243 N.W. 112,186 Minn. 321 |
| Parties | BROWN v. RAYMOND BROS. MOTOR TRANSP., Inc. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; James C. Michael, Judge.
Action by I. G. Brown against Raymond Brothers Motor Transportation, Incorporated. Verdict for the plaintiff. From an order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, the defendant appeals.
Order affirmed.
Cobb, Hoke, Benson, Krause & Faegre and Tracy J. Peycke, all of Minneapolis, for appellant.
Morphy, Bradford, Cummins & Cummins and Silver & Ruttenberg, all of St. Paul, for respondent.
Defendant appeals from the order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.
Defendant's counsel present the sole proposition, on this appeal, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in running into the rear end of defendant's moving truck. It is necessary to state certain facts, some of which are sharply disputed but which the jury could find in plaintiff's favor. On the 12th of December, 1930, plaintiff driving a Chevrolet car, and defendant, by its servant, driving a truck, traveling south on paved trunk highway No. 27, had reached a point about 4 miles south of Rice, shortly after 6:30 p. m., when the Chevrolet overtook and crashed into the rear end of the truck, injuring plaintiff and damaging his car. The night was very dark. The 18-foot pavement was dry. There was evidence that the truck was operated with no lights; that the truck weighed 4½ tons and had a load of 3½ tons, was 10 feet high and about 7 feet wide, inclosed or covered, the rear end closed by a tan colored curtain, behind which upon the tailboard were strapped some chicken crates; that the appearance of the truck to one approaching from the rear blended with the pavement; that when 200 to 250 feet from the truck plaintiff, in meeting a northbound car, put on the dimmers, the driver of which car reciprocated the favor; that about 100 to 125 feet behind the first car came another with glaring lights and swung somewhat to plaintiff's side of the road; that plaintiff in passing these two cars had reduced his speed from 45 miles to 30 or 35 miles an hour; that when the glare of the last car prevented plaintiff from seeing ahead, the latter threw on his full lights and watched the side of the road so as to swing to the extreme right thereof out of the way of the second car; and that as he was passing this second car the truck loomed up so suddenly and at so short a distance ahead that the collision was inevitable although he slammed on the brakes. The chief contention is that plaintiff in continuing to drive for 62 feet, just before discovering the truck, at the speed of 30 to 35 miles per hour knowing that he could not see ahead, because blinded by the lights of the second car, must be held contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Plaintiff admitted that he was blinded so far as looking ahead was concerned, but that he could look down to the side so as to be sure that he kept as far from the center line as possible in order to avoid contact with the second car which he observed swing towards him. But with the admission came these questions and answers on cross-examination:
In other words, plaintiff looked ahead before being blinded by the headlights of the second car and was unable to discover the presence of the truck because of the absence of the customary red lights or any lights thereon. In that situation it seems to be a jury question, and not one for the court, whether or not an ordinarily prudent person should stop instantly or would proceed 62 feet at the speed he was going, he knowing that he was on the proper side of the road. It is estimated that it took only 1 1/3 seconds to travel those 62 feet, if the jury believed plaintiff as to speed. The jury could also conclude that, as an ordinarily careful person, he could assume that any motor vehicle traveling ahead of him would be disclosed by its rear red lights as soon as he came within 500 feet of it. Subdiv. e, § 2720-48, Mason's Minn. St. 1927. Defendant suggests that the lights of the two north-bound cars as they passed the truck would reveal its presence to plaintiff. But to what extent such lights might disclose the truck to plaintiff is a question of fact. It certainly cannot be assumed as a proposition of law that plaintiff could or should have discovered the truck from those lights. Defendant points...
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