Brown v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 04 March 1931
• Citation: 175 N.E. 269,275 Mass. 55
• Parties: BROWN v. ROBINSON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

275 Mass. 55

175 N.E. 269

BROWN

v.ROBINSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

March 4, 1931.

Appeal from Third District Court of Bristol.

Action by Mabel A. Brown against Leslie Robinson. Finding for plaintiff, and, from an order dismissing the report, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.Charles W. Deasy, of New Bedford, for appellant.

Francis A. Doyle, of New Bedford, for appellee.

RUGG, C. J.

This is an action of tort to recover compensation for personal injuries received by the plaintiff, while driving an automobile at the rate of about ten miles an hour, through collision with an automobile negligently driven by the defendant. The trial judge found that the plaintiff had entered the area forming the intersection of two streets before the defendant reached it, and was therefore entitled to the right of way under G. L. c. 89, § 8, as amended by St. 1928, c. 357, § 4, and St. 1929, c. 147, § 1, and that the defendant thereafter entered that area, ran into the automobile driven by the plaintiff and tipped it over. The due care of the plaintiff and the negligence of the defendant were thus established.

The sole defense argued rests on these facts: The automobile driven by the plaintiff was owned by her husband through purchase in 1924, and was thereafter registered in his name; in 1926 the motor was removed and a new motor installed, but the old motor number was continued in the registration of the automobile and was not changed to the number of the new motor until after the accident here in question. There was evidence tending to show that the owner of the car reads very little English and his wife attended to most of the details concerning the automobile, and that she was well aware of the change of the old motor for the new one. The defendant contends that the automobile driven by the plaintiff was not properly registered and was a trespasser on the highway. At the time of the accident St. 1928, c. 187, § 1, amending G. L. c. 90, § 9, was in force, whereby ‘a motor vehicle * * * shall be deemed to be registered * * * notwithstanding any mistake in so much of the description thereof contained in the application for registration as relates to the engine, serial or maker's number thereof.’ We assume, as have the parties in argument, that the word ‘engine’ in this statute means the same thing as ‘motor’ in the report. Perhaps judicial notice might be taken of this identity of meaning. It is plain that, prior to the effective date of said chapter 187, the automobile driven by the plaintiff would not have been properly registered and would have been an outlaw upon the highway. Staley v. Wilbur, 258 Mass. 481, 155 N. E. 659;Wallace v. New Bedford & Onset Street Railway Co., 259 Mass. 20, 155 N. E. 660;Di Franco v. West Boston Gas Co., 262 Mass. 387, 389, 160 N. E. 326;Rosenthal v. Liss (Mass.) 169 N. E. 142, and cases cited. The canon of interpretation applicable to said chapter 187 is that its words are to be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the pre-existing state of the law, the mischief to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished. Duggan v. Bay State Street Railway Co., 230 Mass. 370, 374, 119 N. E. 757, L. R. A. 1918E, 680;In re Bergeron, 220 Mass. 472, 475, 107 N. E. 1007, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 549. It is a permissible inference that said chapter 187 was enacted to remedy the strictness of the previous provisions of law brought to light by...