Brown v. Roland

Decision Date18 January 2012
Citation357 S.W.3d 614
PartiesSheila BROWN v. Rico ROLAND.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Brian Dunigan, Goodlettsville, Tennessee, (in this Court), and Eric Beasley, Goodlettsville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Sheila Brown.

David J. White, Jr., Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.

OPINION

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CORNELIA A. CLARK, C.J., JANICE M. HOLDER, GARY R. WADE, and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.

This appeal involves the amount of damages a plaintiff may seek on a de novo appeal from a general sessions court to a circuit court. The plaintiff filed suit in the Davidson County General Sessions Court seeking damages sustained in an automobile accident. She also notified her uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier of her suit. After deciding that her damages exceeded the general sessions court's jurisdictional limit, the plaintiff requested the general sessions court to dismiss her suit. The general sessions court obliged, and the plaintiff perfected a de novo appeal to the Circuit Court for Davidson County. After the plaintiff accepted the defendant's $25,000 settlement offer, the plaintiff's insurance carrier moved to dismiss the plaintiff's underinsured motorist claim because her settlement with the defendant equaled the amount of damages she had sought in general sessions court. The trial court granted the insurance company's motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint increasing the amount of her damages claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Brown v. Roland, No. M2009–01885–COA–R3–CV, 2010 WL 3732169 (Tenn.Ct.App. Sept. 23, 2010). The plaintiff filed a Tenn. R.App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal, asserting that she was not limited to the amount of damages she sought in general sessions court after she perfected a de novo appeal to the circuit court. We disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

I.

On the evening of December 1, 2006, Sheila Brown 1 was driving on Murfreesboro Pike in Davidson County. She was followed closely by a vehicle driven by Rico Roland. When Ms. Brown slowed down, Mr. Roland was unable to stop quickly enough to avoid striking the rear of Ms. Brown's vehicle. Ms. Brown was injured, and her vehicle was damaged. Her medical bills amounted to $21,970.80, and her lost wages totaled $2,173.20.

Ms. Brown retained a lawyer and, on November 26, 2007, filed a civil warrant in the Davidson County General Sessions Court seeking to recover “under $25,000.00” from Mr. Roland for “painful personal injuries, medical bills, lost wages, and pain and suffering.” She also notified her insurance carrier, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company (“State Farm”), of her suit. Ms. Brown's insurance policy included uninsured/underinsured coverage.

At the trial in general sessions court on August 21, 2008, Ms. Brown's lawyer announced that he did not plan to present any evidence and requested the general sessions court to enter a judgment against his client. The court obliged and dismissed Ms. Brown's case without prejudice. On August 29, 2008, Ms. Brown perfected a de novo appeal to the Circuit Court for Davidson County. On October 28, 2008, Mr. Roland filed an answer denying that he had acted negligently and raising several affirmative defenses.

On December 18, 2008, Mr. Roland offered to settle with Ms. Brown for $25,000—the limits of his Permanent General Assurance Company policy. On the same day, Ms. Brown's lawyer notified State Farm by letter that Ms. Brown had accepted Mr. Roland's $25,000 settlement offer and that Ms. Brown and Mr. Roland had agreed that Ms. Brown would “submit her uninsured motorist claim to BINDING ARBITRATION pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 56–7–1206.” In a separate letter to State Farm, Ms. Brown's lawyer stated that Ms. Brown would settle her underinsured motorist claim for $120,000.

State Farm made its first formal appearance in the case on March 17, 2009, when it filed a motion to dismiss Ms. Brown's claims. The motion relied on two grounds. First, State Farm insisted that Ms. Brown could not appeal from the dismissal of her claim by the general sessions court because she requested the dismissal. Second, State Farm argued that there was nothing further to adjudicate in the circuit court because Mr. Roland's $25,000 settlement offer, which Ms. Brown had accepted, matched the amount that Ms. Brown had sought in general sessions court.

On March 20, 2009, Ms. Brown filed a motion in the circuit court seeking to cut off further discovery and to compel State Farm to arbitrate. On March 27, 2009, Ms. Brown filed a response to State Farm's motion to dismiss. She insisted that she had not voluntarily dismissed her case in general sessions court and, citing Ware v. Meharry Med. Coll., 898 S.W.2d 181 (Tenn.1995), that she [was] no longer bound to the jurisdictional limits of her general sessions warrant” once she perfected a de novo appeal to the circuit court. Despite State Farm's pending motion, Ms. Brown did not file an amended complaint increasing her claim for damages.

The trial court conducted a hearing on all pending motions on April 3, 2009. Even though Ms. Brown's trial counsel believed that his client's damages exceeded $25,000,2 he steadfastly declined to file an amended complaint increasing the damages beyond the amount requested in the general sessions warrant. Despite the trial court's repeated cues during the April 3, 2009 hearing, Ms. Brown's counsel continued to insist that amended pleadings were unnecessary. Following argument by counsel, the trial court granted State Farm's motion to dismiss Ms. Brown's underinsured motorist claims against State Farm. The court explained:

[T]he point is, you've got a pleading that says you're suing for $24,999.99. That has been appealed.

... And since August of last year, when this case was appealed, there's never been any attempt to increase the [ad damnum], to change it, to fairly alert the defendant....

* * *

... If you had amended your complaint and asked for $100,000, or whatever you wanted to ask for, then they would have been put on notice that they were subject to potentially having to pay more....

Now, granted, you can still make an oral motion sometime, and I would have to make a ruling on that. To this date, though, there's never been any motion to amend.

* * *

Ware [ v. Meharry Medical College] is very clear, and it says that you're not bound by the amount that you sought at the General Sessions level.... On the other hand, when you appeal a matter from General Sessions Court ..., the only pleading we have is the civil warrant. The allegation of facts that's contained within the civil warrant is what we base the action on and the [ad damnum].

... I am granting the motion to dismiss on the grounds that it's shown clearly that the full amount sued for has been tendered and accepted by the plaintiff[ ], and there's no further exposure to State Farm Insurance.

I respectfully deny the motions for arbitration and discovery cutoff as being moot.... ... [E]ven as of today, no motion to increase the [ad damnum] has been made. And [you] could have had the right at any time to file a motion had you done—It frequently happens, when you come up out of General Sessions, a lot of times people will sue for that, and they'll come up and say, We're [going to] change this, it's [going to] be a $100,000 case now instead of a $25,000 case, and they file a motion to increase their [ad damnum], and as soon as it comes up, they're usually granted without any issue, frequently, not even opposed.

There's never been a motion made on this. You are limited, I find ... that the [ad damnum] stated in the General Sessions' warrant is binding at the Circuit level until and unless a motion to amend is made to modify that. And ... [t]hat being the case, you ... actually ... recovered more than you sued for, one penny more.

* * *

There is no exposure to State Farm. There is no cause of action ... against State Farm Insurance, because the full amount sued for has been tendered and accepted.... [Mr. Roland's insurer] tendered 25,000, and you've accepted it. You sued for $24,999.99.... [Y]ou've been made whole for what you've sued for, and, therefore there's no exposure on the part of the uninsured motorist because you didn't sue for any more than that.

On April 29, 2009, the trial court filed an order predicated on the same rationale, dismissing State Farm from the case and denying Ms. Brown's motions to cut off discovery and to compel arbitration.3

On May 1, 2009, Ms. Brown filed a motion to alter or amend or in the alternative to request permission to pursue a Tenn. R.App. P. 9 interlocutory appeal. She also filed a belated motion to increase her claim for damages to $125,000. While Ms. Brown conceded that none of her correspondence with State Farm could be construed as an amended complaint or an amended claim for damages, she insisted that the correspondence put State Farm on notice that she was seeking additional damages. She also insisted that the burden was on State Farm, not her, to clarify the amount of damages being sought in the trial court following the de novo appeal from the general sessions court. The trial court denied Ms. Brown's motions on June 16, 2009.

On June 18, 2009, Mr. Roland moved to enforce his settlement agreement with Ms. Brown. Ms. Brown did not dispute that she had agreed to settle with Mr. Roland but requested that the order of enforcement state that it was without prejudice to her efforts to seek binding arbitration with State Farm. On August 7, 2009, the trial court entered an order enforcing the settlement agreement with Mr. Roland.

Ms. Brown appealed to the Court of Appeals, asserting that the trial court had erred by dismissing her claim against State Farm and by declining to compel...

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    • 1 Octubre 2012
    ...not raised in the trial court or in the intermediate appellate courts may be deemed waived when presented to this Court. Brown v. Roland, 357 S.W.3d 614, 620 (Tenn.2012); see also In re Adoption of E.N.R., 42 S.W.3d 26, 32 (Tenn.2001); Alexander v. Armentrout, 24 S.W.3d 267, 273 (Tenn.2000)......
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