Brown v. Sanders

Decision Date18 September 1931
Docket Number20875.
Citation160 S.E. 542,44 Ga.App. 114
PartiesBROWN et al. v. SANDERS.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Right of way at intersections of vehicle traveling along traffic boulevard is relative only.

Driver of automobile attempting to cross traffic boulevard held not as matter of law guilty of negligence causing his death, under evidence of improper operation of defendant's automobile.

The evidence authorized the inference that defendant's automobile was being operated negligently along the traffic boulevard at an illegal rate of speed on the left side of the road, and that the driver failed to slacken his speed upon observing deceased's automobile, and that exercise by former of due care would have permitted deceased to cross boulevard in safety.

In action by mother for son's death, charge held sufficient to require finding of dependency as condition to recovery (Civ. Code 1910, § 4424, as amended by Laws 1924, p 60).

Instruction permitting recovery of full value of deceased's life held not erroneous as misleading jury with reference to comparative negligence.

Instructions in death action held not objectionable as failing to provide method for ascertaining damages, where court, in connection with mortality tables, authorized consideration of causes decreasing earnings.

The court instructed the jury that the mortality tables were not binding on them, and that in arriving at the value of deceased's life the jury should consider his feebleness of health, actual sickness, loss of employment, voluntarily abstaining from work, dullness in business, reduction in wages, increasing infirmities of age, with corresponding diminution of earning capacity, and other causes which might contribute in decreasing the gross earnings of a lifetime and to take these matters into consideration in arriving at cash value of life of deceased.

Error from City Court of Floyd County; John W. Bale, Judge.

Action by Vastie Sanders against J. M. Brown and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error.

Affirmed.

Wright & Covington, of Rome, for plaintiff in error.

Porter & Mebane, of Rome, for defendants in error.

Syllabus OPINION.

STEPHENS J.

1. Although vehicles traveling along a street which has been designated by law as a traffic boulevard have the right of way over vehicles coming into the boulevard from intersecting streets, this right is not absolute under all circumstances and conditions, but is relative only, and is determinable by the relative positions of the approaching vehicles, their relative speed, and other attending circumstances. A vehicle, therefore, when crossing such a traffic boulevard at an intersecting street, may, under some conditions, have the right of way over vehicles approaching on the boulevard, and therefore not be guilty of negligence or of a violation of law, in attempting to cross the boulevard in front of the approaching vehicle, but, in crossing the boulevard, may, when considering the relative positions of both vehicles, their relative speed and other circumstances, be in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence. 42 C.J. 974, 978, 985, 989; Thrapp v. Meyers, 114 Neb. 689, 692, 209 N.W. 238, 47 A.L.R. 585, 589; Salmon v. Wilson, 227 Ill.App. 286, 288; Primock v. Goldenberg, 161 Minn. 160, 200 N.W. 920, 37 A.L.R. 484; Lachance v. Myers, 98 Vt. 498, 503, 129 A. 172; Collins v. Liddle, 67 Utah 242, 247 P. 476, 478; Barnes v. Barnett, 184 Iowa 936, 169 N.W. 365; Ward v. Gildea, 44 Cal.App. 380, 186 P. 612; Schneider v. Rolf, 211 Ky. 669, 278 S.W. 100; Sutton v. Quaker City Cab Co., 87 Pa. Super. Ct. 291, 293; Taxicab Co. v. Ottenritter, 151 Md. 525, 135 A. 587; Hughes v. Hudson-Brace Motor Co., 111 Kan. 397, 207 P. 795; Pline v. Parsons, 231 Mich. 466, 204 N.W. 131; Jacobs v. Richard Carvel Co., Inc., 95 Misc. 252, 159 N.Y.S. 196; 21 A.L.R. 982.

2. Where in a suit against the owner of an automobile, which was traveling along a traffic boulevard upon which vehicles traveling have the right of way over automobiles approaching from intersecting streets, it was sought to recover damages for the homicide of the operator of an automobile attempting to cross the boulevard from an intersecting street, resulting from a collision between the two automobiles, it could not be said as a matter of law that the operator of the automobile attempting to cross the boulevard was guilty of negligence or that, if he were guilty of negligence in attempting to cross the boulevard, such negligence was the proximate cause of the homicide, when the evidence authorized the inference that the defendant's automobile, while traveling along the boulevard approaching the intersecting street, was being operated negligently and at an illegal rate of speed, and on the left side of the road, contrary to law, and that the driver failed to slacken the speed after...

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