Brown v. Seal

• Decision Date: 24 October 2005
• Parties: Kathy BROWN, et al. v. Clint SEAL, et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 481

179 S.W.3d 481

Kathy BROWN, et al. v. Clint SEAL, et al.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section, at Knoxville.

January 27, 2005 Session.

April 21, 2005.

Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court October 24, 2005.

Douglas T. Jenkins, Rogersville, Tennessee, for the Appellants Kathy Brown, Deanna Trent, Rodney Seal, Norman Seal, Tener Clemons, Louise Welch, and Dennis Davis.

Floyd W. Rhea, Sneedville, Tennessee, for the Appellees Clint Seal, Tony H. Seal, and Patricia G. Seal.

OPINION

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.

In the 1940's, Tyler Seal received a life estate interest in a parcel of land with the remainder going to his heirs at law upon his death. In 1968, Tyler Seal conveyed his interest in the property to his brother, Clint Seal, via a deed which purported to convey a fee simple interest. This deed was not recorded until 1991. Tyler Seal passed away in March of 1996. Clint Seal deeded the property in fee simple to his son and daughter-in-law, Tony and Patricia Seal, the following year. This lawsuit was filed by various persons claiming an interest in the land because they were remaindermen. Suit was brought against Clint Seal as well as Tony and Patricia Seal ("Defendants"). Defendants claimed they were the rightful record owners of the property or, alternatively, that they were entitled to ownership of the property based on adverse possession. The Trial Court concluded Defendants were entitled to ownership of the property because they had adversely possessed the property for the requisite number of years and further that Plaintiffs' seven year statute of limitations to file suit had expired. We reverse.

Background

This lawsuit involves a dispute over ownership of a parcel of land located in Hancock County, Tennessee. A chronology of the mostly undisputed facts shows that on March 15, 1941, the last will and testament of Penn Seal was admitted to probate. The will conveyed to Tyler Seal a life estate interest in a particular tract of land with the following language:

Ninethly (sic), I give and bequeath [the land] to my son Tyler Seal for his life, and then to his heirs if he has any, if no heirs at his death then to my heirs to share equally and alike. . . .

Hop Seal was Penn Seal's brother. On March 11, 1946, Hop Seal deeded an interest in another tract of land to Tyler Seal. The deed was recorded in the Register's Office for Hancock County on March 12, 1946. The deed describes the land and then makes the following handwritten provision, which we quote:

Accorde to the will that Penn Seal and Mima Seal mad to Tyler C Seal that the Said Mrs Penn Seals is to have her Suport from the Land willed to Tyler C Seal it is further agred that Said Tyler Seal has no hears this property Goes to the other hears at his Deth

It is the land obtained in the 1946 deed which is the subject of this lawsuit. With regard to this property, on November 12, 1968, Tyler Seal conveyed his interest in this property to his brother, Clint Seal, via a deed which purported to convey a fee simple interest. The 1968 deed from Tyler Seal to Clint Seal was not recorded in the Register's Office for Hancock County until August 1, 1991.

Tyler Seal passed away on March 4, 1996. Tyler Seal had no spouse and no children.

In 1997, Clint Seal conveyed the property to his son and daughter-in-law, Tony and Patricia Seal. The deed purported to convey a fee simple interest and was duly recorded in the Register's Office for Hancock County in 1999.

Kathy Brown, Deanna Trent, Rodney Seal, Norman Seal ("Plaintiffs") and others are some of Penn Seals' heirs. In May of 2001, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit claiming an interest in the subject property. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that Tyler Seal had only a life estate interest in the property and when he died without a spouse or any children, the property reverted to the heirs of Penn Seal, i.e., Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued Clint Seal as well as Tony and Patricia Seal.

Defendants filed an answer and denied that Tyler Seal had only a life estate interest in the subject property. Defendants claimed that Tony and Patricia Seal were the rightful record owners of the property. Defendants further claimed that even if they had not properly obtained ownership of the land through the deed from Tyler Seal to Clint Seal, they had nevertheless adversely possessed the property for the requisite number of years and, therefore, were entitled to retain ownership.

Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment which was partially granted by the Trial Court in December of 2003. After reviewing the pertinent facts, which were undisputed, the Trial Court held:

In light of the circumstances surrounding both the last will and testament of Penn Seal and the warranty deed from Mr. and Mrs. Hop Seal to Tyler Seal in 1946, this Court determines that the intentions of the respective testator and grantors were to convey to Mr. Tyler Seal a life estate interest in the real property, with contingent remainder to his lineal descendants. However, as the will and deed of conveyance did not include terms such as "heirs of the body", "bodily heirs" or "bodily issue", the term "heirs" which was included, demands a different result. By virtue of the language contained in both the last will and testament of Mr. Penn Seal and the deed of conveyance from Mr. and Mrs. Hop Seal, Mr. Tyler Seal was vested with a life estate interest in the real property and upon his death, his heirs at law as defined by the rules of intestate succession in Tennessee comprised the class of remaindermen. . . .

One of the issues the Trial Court reserved for later determination was whether Defendants could claim entitlement to the property through adverse possession. The Trial Court then conducted a hearing on this issue and although the record contains no transcript from this hearing, a Statement of Evidence has been provided.

Tony Seal testified at the hearing that he and/or his father, Clint Seal, have farmed the property at issue since 1984. Tony and his father fenced in the property and used the barn for storage for the last twenty years. Similarly, Tony and his father have paid the property taxes since 1980. The Statement of Evidence also contains the following with regard to Tony Seal's testimony:

I have the deed for the property from my father in 1997 and recorded in 1999.

My father, Clint Seal, had a deed from Tyler Seal in which Tyler Seal may have kept a life estate—I don't know.

Tyler Seal had a life estate I guess. He stayed with my mom and dad then he went into a nursing home the last two years of his life. He was not able to do anything on the land. . . .

Tyler Seal was paid rent for the place early on. Later, Tyler Seal's rent for the place was the taxes and the care that my mom and dad gave to him. Tyler Seal died March 1996. We have continued to farm the place after Tyler Seal's death. I have paid the taxes myself since 1984 or 1985. I have farmed it all that time.

In May of 2004, the Trial Court issued a Memorandum Opinion which resolved the remaining issue regarding Defendants' claim of adverse possession. After reviewing the relevant facts, statutes, and case law, the Trial Court concluded:

The Defendants have established by clear and positive proof that their possession of the subject real property has been exclusive, uninterrupted, actual, open, notorious and adverse since at least 1991. The Defendants hold said property by virtue of color of title which purports to convey an estate in fee. As no action at law or in equity was commenced within seven years of Defendant Clint Seal's acquisition of title, this Court concludes that the Defendants Tony Seal and wife, Patricia G. Seal, are vested with good and indefeasible fee simple title. As such, they are protected from any claim of title by Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs appeal raising one issue. Although not stated exactly as such, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' possession of the property could not be considered "adverse" until Tyler Seal died in March of 1996. Therefore, in Defendants' "`best case scenario' they can only show 5 years [of adverse possession] after Tyler died and before suit was brought." Because the relevant statute requires seven years of adverse possession, Plaintiffs claim the Trial Court's decision must be reversed.

Discussion

The factual findings of the Trial Court are accorded a presumption of correctness, and we will not overturn those factual findings unless the evidence preponderates against them. See Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d); Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721, 727 (Tenn.2001). With respect to legal issues, our review is conducted "under a pure de novo standard of review, according no deference to the conclusions of law made by the lower courts." Southern Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. Of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn.2001).

On appeal, neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants challenge the Trial Court's conclusion that because of the language in the deed by Hop Seal to Tyler Seal, Tyler Seal was vested only with a life estate interest in the property and, upon his death, "his heirs at law as defined by the rules of intestate succession in Tennessee comprised the class of remaindermen." We will, therefore, assume this conclusion is correct and our resolution of the issues on appeal in no way alters this finding.

Plaintiffs rely on Quarles v. Arthur, 33 Tenn.App. 291, 231 S.W.2d 589 (1950) in support of their claim that Defendants' possession of the subject property could not have been adverse until Tyler Seal died in March of 1996. Quarles involved, inter alia, a claim of adverse possession and one of the issues was when the statute of limitations began to run. According to the Court in Quarles:

As to the application of the statutes of limitations, a reading of the statutes appears to us a sufficient answer. By their terms it is only...