Brown v. State, s. 05-95-01491-CR
| Decision Date | 20 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 05-95-01491-CR,s. 05-95-01491-CR |
| Citation | 960 S.W.2d 772 |
| Parties | Jeffrey Don BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. to 05-95-01496-CR. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Robert Udashen, Dallas, for Appellant.
Sue Korioth, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, for Appellee.
Before CHAPMAN, MORRIS and HANKINSON, JJ.
Appellant Jeffrey Don Brown challenges the manner in which the trial court handled the issue of his competency to stand trial. After reviewing the record in these causes, we conclude that because the evidence presented during the guilty plea hearing did not raise a bona fide doubt as to appellant's competence, the trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing and empanel a jury pursuant to article 46.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, because the trial court was presented with conflicting evidence regarding appellant's competence at the motion for new trial hearing, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motions. Finally, in light of our conclusions regarding the issue of appellant's competency, we conclude appellant has not satisfied his burden of showing his guilty pleas were involuntary. Consequently, we overrule appellant's three points of error and affirm the trial court's judgments.
On January 10, 1994, appellant Jeffrey Don Brown pleaded guilty, without benefit of plea bargain agreements, to five aggravated robberies and one aggravated assault. During the punishment phase of the plea hearing, several witnesses testified that appellant had learning and emotional difficulties. None of these witnesses suggested that appellant was incompetent to stand trial, and consequently, the trial court did not conduct any type of competency hearing. Instead, the trial court sentenced appellant to imprisonment and a fine in each case.
Appellant then filed a motion for new trial in each case, claiming he was incompetent when he entered his guilty plea. For the first time, appellant offered expert affidavit testimony suggesting he was not competent to stand trial when he entered his guilty pleas and the trial court sentenced him. The trial court denied appellant's motions for new trial without a hearing, and appellant appealed to this Court. We set aside appellant's notices of appeal and the trial court's orders denying the motions for new trial and remanded these causes so that the trial court could hold a hearing on appellant's motions. Following a hearing at which each side presented evidence about appellant's competence, the trial court again denied appellant's motions for new trial. The trial court then entered new judgments. Appellant now appeals, raising three complaints.
First, appellant argues the trial court erroneously refused to hold a competency hearing during the plea hearing because the evidence sufficiently raised a bona fide doubt regarding his competency. Next, he contends his convictions violate due process because he was incompetent to stand trial and thus the trial court erroneously overruled his motions for new trial. Finally, appellant argues that because he was not competent, he did not freely, voluntarily, and intelligently enter his guilty pleas. To support each argument, appellant relies both on testimony introduced at the punishment hearing and at the hearing on his motions for new trial. Each point of error, however, relates to trial court conduct at different stages in the proceedings and, consequently, presents a different issue for review. The first issue involves the scope of this Court's review of the trial court's action in not conducting a hearing and empaneling a jury to determine competency. The second issue concerns the standard the trial court is to apply in deciding whether to empanel a jury to determine competency. Once we answer these questions, we can turn to the merits of each point of error.
A person is legally incompetent if he lacks either (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. 1 Article 46.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure sets out the procedure a trial court must follow to evaluate a defendant's competency to stand trial when that issue is raised before or "during trial." 2 Under article 46.02, section 2(b), if the competency issue is not raised before trial, in certain circumstances, the trial court must address the issue during trial:
Sec. 2. (b) If during the trial evidence of the defendant's incompetency is brought to the attention of the court from any source, the court must conduct a hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine whether or not there is evidence to support a finding of incompetency to stand trial. 3
Section 2(b) requires the trial court to conduct a hearing if evidence from any source raises a bona fide doubt as to a defendant's competency. 4 Evidence capable of creating a bona fide doubt about a defendant's competency may come from the trial court's own observations, known facts, evidence presented, motions, affidavits, or any other claim or credible source. 5 If, at the section 2(b) hearing, the defendant presents more than a scintilla of evidence that would rationally lead to the conclusion of incompetency, the trial court must empanel a jury to determine the defendant's competency. 6
In his second point of error, appellant asserts the trial court erroneously refused to hold a section 2(b) hearing and then empanel a jury to determine his competency when he pleaded guilty. Appellant asks this Court to consider the evidence adduced at both the plea hearing and the motion for new trial hearing when reviewing the trial court's actions. Because we hold that, when evaluating the trial court's application of article 46.02, we may ordinarily only consider evidence presented before sentencing, we disagree.
The plain language of section 2(b) compels this conclusion. Section 2(b) only requires a hearing "[i]f during the trial evidence of the defendant's incompetency" is brought to the court's attention from any source. 7 According to this statutory dictate, the motion for new trial hearing must have occurred "during trial" if this Court is to consider the evidence offered during that hearing. But the phrase "during trial" is not broad enough to encompass proceedings, like a motion for new trial hearing, that occur after sentencing.
Section 2(b) does not define "during trial" or that phrase's scope. We must therefore give the term its plain meaning. 8 Typically, the term "trial" refers to the portion of criminal proceedings that begins when the parties pick a jury, continues through the evaluation of the defendant's guilt, and ends when the defendant, if guilty, is sentenced. Reinforcing the common perception that sentencing ends a trial, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held recently that for competency proceedings' purposes, "sentencing marks the final act of the trial stage." 9 Further bolstering this conclusion, the court of criminal appeals in another case refused to conclude that competency evidence presented at a hearing on an application for writ of habeas corpus raised a bona fide doubt of competency requiring a section 2(b) hearing because the evidence was not presented to the trial court when the appellant pleaded guilty. 10 Moreover, the court of criminal appeals has previously stated that the motion for new trial hearing is not part of the trial. 11 We therefore conclude that postsentencing proceedings occur after, and not during, trial. 12
Although this Court can envision few cases in which an appellate court can consider postsentencing evidence to determine whether the trial court erred in not conducting a section 2(b) hearing during trial, we acknowledge that this kind of situation may arise-- for example, when evidence presented at a motion for new trial hearing serves to explain or define evidence of incompetence that was already before the court during trial. 13 This is not such a case, however. Appellant filed his motion for new trial and related evidence after sentencing, raising evidence that was not brought to the trial court's attention during trial as required by section 2(b). This new evidence did not serve to explain or define evidence already before the court during trial. Thus, we conclude that we cannot consider the postsentencing evidence presented in this case in evaluating whether the trial court erroneously failed to hold a section 2(b) hearing.
Having determined the scope of our article 46.02 review, we now address the merits of appellant's second point of error. We review the trial court's actions under section 2(b) for an abuse of discretion, 14 viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party with the burden of securing the finding, disregarding contrary evidence and inferences. 15 At the time appellant entered his guilty pleas, the trial court did not conduct any type of hearing regarding his competency. Appellant now complains that evidence adduced during the punishment phase raised a bona fide doubt as to his competency; thus, the trial court should have conducted a section 2(b) hearing and then empaneled a jury to determine his competency. But if the evidence before the trial court through sentencing was not sufficient to require a section 2(b) hearing, the trial court did not err. 16
Appellant testified on his own behalf when he entered his guilty pleas. Nothing in the responses he gave to the questions asked of him raised a bona fide doubt as to his competence to stand trial. Nor did any witness who testified during the punishment phase of the plea hearing raise a bona fide doubt about appellant's competency.
Bethany Quinn testified first. She stated that she was a former Dallas Independent School District (DISD) p...
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