Brown v. State

• Decision Date: 01 April 1929
• Docket Number: 27702
• Citation: 153 Miss. 737,121 So. 297
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: BROWN v. STATE. [*]

121 So. 297

153 Miss. 737

BROWN v. STATE. ^[*]

No. 27702

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 1, 1929

Division B

APPEAL from circuit court of Newton county, HON. G. E. WILSON Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

J. D Brown appeals. Reversed and remanded.

R. S. Majure and W. I. Munn, for appellant.

James W. Cassedy, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.

OPINION

GRIFFITH, J.

A review of the long line of the written opinions of this court will disclose that, from the beginning of its history, it has been consistently committed to the doctrine that the best and most practical means for the ascertainment of truth upon disputed facts, in that great range of controversies which have their settings in the general and ordinary affairs of life, is to submit them to a jury; and every member of the present court gives firm and sympathetic adherence to that principle, which, of course, embraces criminal as well as civil cases. At the same time we are not to permit ourselves, nor did our predecessors, to become so visionary in respect to that subject, or so forgetful of the lessons of mature observation and experience in such matters, as to assume, variously encompassed and variously affected as jurors often are, that their judgments are invariably infallible, that their verdicts are not sometimes infected with the errors and imperfections which afflict all other human agencies, particularly those which are purely local in their operation and selection. So that, while it is the thoroughly well-established general rule that the judge--and this includes the supreme court--is not to interfere with the findings of the jury on questions of fact, there is the equally well-established and imperatively essential exception to that rule that, although the court is reluctant to do so, the verdict is reviewable when manifestly it is without the substantial support of any competent evidence, or is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

We understand, of course, that we have stated nothing in the foregoing sentences which has not, in other words, been stated over and over again in this court, and that we add nothing new when we say that it is not within the province or purpose of this court to retry the facts in any case on appeal. It is because we wish these principles could be better and more definitely understood than seems to be by many at the bar that we make this resume of them. And we extend the resume further to repeat, and particularly to give point to its application to the case here in hand, that while we do not pretend or assume to retry any case here on the facts, we are none the less under duty to see to it, so far as lies within our discernment and understanding of each record, that when error is appropriately assigned, every verdict of conviction shall have substantial support in the record, and that, as measured by established legal standards, it shall not be contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. This, although reluctantly, we must do in civil cases, and none the less should we be watchful in criminal prosecutions. And we add further that the watchfulness of the court in cases of extreme doubt upon the evidence is challenged, not only by what is in...