Brown v. State

• Decision Date: 09 October 1939
• Docket Number: 4137
• Citation: 132 S.W.2d 15,198 Ark. 920
• Parties: BROWN v. STATE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

132 S.W.2d 15

198 Ark. 920

BROWN v. STATE

4137

Supreme Court of Arkansas

October 9, 1939

Appeal from Marion Circuit Court; Garner Fraser, Judge; reversed.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded for new trial.

Luther H. Cavaness, Virgil D. Willis and W. F. Reeves, for appellant.

Jack Holt, Attorney General, and Jno. P. Streepey, Asst. Atty General, for appellee.

OPINION

SMITH J.

Appellant was tried upon a charge of murder in the first degree, alleged to have been committed by killing his father-in-law, John R. Stovall, by striking him with a skein from a wagon axle on the morning of March 16, 1939, and from the judgment sentencing appellant to a term of twenty years in the penitentiary is this appeal. Only one question is raised on the appeal, and that is whether error was committed in the admission of an alleged confession.

Appellant had only recently married Stovall's youngest daughter, and lived with Stovall as a member of his family. There was no evidence of any ill will between appellant and deceased. On the day of his death Stovall arose about 5 a. m., and went to his lot to feed his mules. A few minutes later appellant arose, and went to the barn to milk the cows, five in number. Stovall returned to the house, and, after staying there a few minutes, again left the house. Appellant testified that he had milked three of the cows, when his wife came out of the house to assist him with the milking, and she discovered an object lying near the yard gate. She ran to the horse lot gate and called appellant, who examined the object which his wife had seen, and discovered that it was the dead body of Mr. Stovall, who had evidently been killed by being struck with the skein. There had been no quarrel, and Mrs. Stovall testified that the only noise she had heard was that of the barking of the dog.

Appellant was naturally suspected, for the reason that apparently no other person had the opportunity to kill Mr. Stovall. Appellant realized that he would be suspected, and there was testimony to the effect that before he had been accused he expressed the hope that no one would think that he had killed "Pop," as he called Mr. Stovall. After discovering Mr. Stovall's body appellant went into the house and told Mrs. Stovall that her husband was dead. Appellant assisted in giving the alarm and in notifying the neighbors. The sheriff and coroner were sent for, and after a large number of persons had assembled some one suggested that bloodhounds be sent for, when appellant said he did not see of what service the dogs would be after so many people had been around the dead body. Stovall and appellant operated a dairy, and appellant had bought a truck used in delivering the milk. A witness testified that he had heard appellant say a down payment would soon be due on the truck, and that he had only two dollars, and that "Something has to happen between now and then (the day the payment would be due) or I won't have the money to pay it." There was no other testimony tending to show any motive for the crime. Appellant was a high school graduate, and was 26 years old at the time of Stovall's death and a number of the neighbors testified that appellant's reputation was not only good, but was excellent.

Owen Fudge, a member of the State Police Department, was called upon to investigate the crime, and it is apparent from his testimony that he immediately concluded that appellant had killed Stovall, and his subsequent conduct was based upon that assumption. Appellant was arrested, but was not carried to Yellville, the county seat of Marion county, in which county the crime had been committed, but was taken to Harrison, the county seat of an adjoining county.

That night appellant was carried to the office of the prosecuting attorney, where Fudge began his investigation, in which he was assisted by the prosecuting attorney, the sheriff of the county, the chief of police of Harrison, and others. This investigation continued until about 3 or 4 o'clock the following morning. No one was allowed to see appellant except the investigators. His father was denied his request to see his son, and appellant's wife was not permitted to see him. She was, however, permitted to send appellant a note reading as follows: "Dear Harold: I still love you, and believe in you."

After the investigation had proceeded for some time without producing the proper result, the prosecuting attorney came into the office and gave the sheriff a pistol and remarked as he did, "Don't let anyone in," and the sheriff answered, "I have stopped one or two mobs, and I can stop another." This byplay was obviously intended to make appellant believe that he was about to be lynched. As a matter of fact, there was no show of mob violence, but appellant was allowed to remain under the contrary impression.

Fudge explained his method of investigating as follows: "Q. Tell the court in your own way how you handled him? A. A crime of this nature is usually handled different to ordinary felony or grand larceny. My experience and observations of the smarter investigators than I am is that an investigation administered to a suspect of that nature would be to keep the crime constantly on his mind and hold it there with a moral conversation. That was the procedure taken with this crime. Q. Did you talk kindly or roughly? A. Kindly. When he would ask to change the subject, someone would throw the murder right back in his face, and the normal proceeding was taken in leading up to it."

Upon being asked what this normal proceeding was, the witness testified as follows: "A. For instance, I would tell him, 'Harold, you explain to us who else could have killed Mr. Stovall. Who could have? Who was out there?' He would say: 'It don't look like any one else could.' And I would ask him if Mr. Stovall had not been good to him and he would say that he had been a father to him. I would tell him that he knew he had made a mistake, and didn't he know that he would feel better if he would tell the truth. He would say, 'I am telling the truth.' Q. You necessarily had to accuse him in the line of questioning? A. Yes, sir, in the investigation. Q. That started immediately after you got up to Harrison? A. Yes, sir, I say immediately after dark that night. Q. Didn't you constantly accuse him and hold the accusation before him? A. We asked him to tell the truth throughout. Q. He said he was telling the truth? A. We suspected him. Of course we didn't know. Q. He said he was telling the truth? A. Yes, sir. Q. After he would tell you boys that he was telling the truth didn't it necessarily follow that you would tell him that he was telling a story about it? A. Naturally. Had to hold the crime before him and keep it constantly impressed upon his mind more or less, and accuse him of it; started in soon after dark and continued until about 4 o'clock the next morning."

The night long investigation having proved ineffective to procure a confession, it was decided to take appellant to Little Rock, for the reason assigned that there were better facilities for investigation and better investigators in Little Rock, and after having had but little sleep appellant was brought to Little Rock the following day.

The investigation was resumed that night in a room within the walls of the Old Penitentiary Building, used by the State Police as headquarters.

We have not stated, and unless so indicated, will not state any of the testimony of appellant relating to the circumstances under which he finally made his confession, for the reason that the jury may have disregarded his testimony as untrue.

The investigation was resumed in a room filled with...