Brown v. State

• Decision Date: 16 December 1887
• Parties: BROWN v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

4 S.E. 861

79 Ga. 324

BROWN v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

December 16, 1887

Error from superior court, Whitfield county; FAIN, Judge.

Indictment for assault with intent to commit murder. Plea of former jeopardy. Demurrer to plea was sustained, and defendant sued out writ of error.

I. R Jones, for plaintiff in error.

J. W Harris, Jr., Sol. Gen., (by R. J. McCamy,) for the State.

BLANDFORD J.

Brown was indicted in the superior court of Whitfield county for assault with intent to murder. He pleaded to the indictment that he had been tried for an assault by the mayor of Dalton who he claimed had jurisdiction, and that the assault was part and parcel of the offense embraced in the indictment, and was the same transaction. This plea was demurred to by the solicitor general, and the court sustained the demurrer; and to that ruling of the court the plaintiff in error excepted, and the case was brought here for review.

Whether this man had been placed in jeopardy before for this crime would depend largely upon the fact whether he had been carried before a court of competent jurisdiction to try him. The jurisdiction of the mayor of Dalton to try persons for assault arises, it is claimed, under an act of the legislature, approved February 24, 1874, the title to which is as follows: "An act to consolidate, amend, and codify the various acts incorporating the city of Dalton, in the county of Whitfield, and the various acts amendatory thereof, and to define the duties of the mayor and council and other officers of said city." This act contains 24 sections relating to the city of Dalton, defining the corporate limits, the duties of the mayor and council and other officers, and the mode of their election; providing for the collection of taxes, and prescribing other powers incident to municipal corporations. But the twenty-fifth section contains the following language: "The mayor, or three members of council, in the absence or disqualification of the mayor, shall be a court for the trial of offenders in the following class of cases, under the restrictions hereinafter imposed, when said offenses have been committed within the corporate limits of said city: (1) Simple assault; (2) batteries; (3) riots; (4) affrays; (5) using opprobrious or abusive language tending to provoke a breach of the peace, or using obscene or vulgar language in the presence of a female," etc. There is no indication in the title...