Brown v. State
| Decision Date | 01 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2D18-2743 |
| Parties | Jarrail Chauencey BROWN, DOC #D14173, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Robert D. Rosen, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and C. Todd Chapman, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Jarrail Chauencey Brown appeals his judgment and sentences for two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer and one count of resisting an officer with violence. Because the evidence did not establish that the deputies who detained Brown had been engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty, we reverse and remand for the trial court to instead adjudicate and sentence Brown on two counts of simple battery, a first-degree misdemeanor, and for entry of a judgment of acquittal on the charge of resisting an officer with violence.
Around 11:00 p.m. on June 1, 2017, Deputies Inesmary Velasquez and Michael Vivian were dispatched to a motel in Lee County. The deputies were advised only that the motel's owner had reported a "disturbance" at the motel and had provided a description of a male subject. Within minutes of the dispatch call, Deputy Velasquez arrived at the motel in her patrol car and observed Brown walking alone in the parking lot from the direction of the motel office. Because Brown matched the description of the subject, Deputy Velasquez began to walk over to him.
As Deputy Velasquez approached Brown, a woman who was later identified as the owner of the motel came out of the office and pointed at Brown. Deputy Velasquez, who was dressed in full uniform, asked Brown, who was obviously agitated, for identification. Brown complied with the deputy's request, but he became irate as the deputy began to inquire about the reported disturbance. Brown began yelling profanities, and he attempted to walk away several times, indicating that he wanted to gather his belongings and leave the motel.
Approximately three minutes after Deputy Velasquez's arrival at the motel, Deputy Vivian arrived and observed Deputy Velasquez and Brown talking to one another. As Brown spoke to Deputy Velasquez, he swayed back and forth, clenching his fists. According to Deputy Vivian, Brown appeared "like he was ready to approach [Deputy Velasquez] in an aggressive manner." Deputy Vivian joined them, and shortly after, Brown began to walk away, indicating again that he wanted to leave.
The deputies ordered him to stop, informing him that he was being detained for an investigation. Deputy Velasquez admitted at trial that when she and Deputy Vivian had ordered Brown to stop, she had been unsure whether a crime had been committed, understanding only that a disturbance had taken place:
Deputy Vivian also admitted that he had not known whether Brown had committed a crime but testified that he had detained Brown in part because he had been concerned for his and Deputy Velasquez's safety.
In spite of the deputies' verbal commands to stop, Brown continued to walk away from them. The deputies followed, instructing him to place his hands behind his back. When Brown did not comply, Deputy Vivian grabbed Brown's arms in an attempt to handcuff him, and Brown began swinging his arms to avoid being cuffed. In that struggle, Brown hit Deputy Vivian's mouth with his elbow. Deputy Velasquez then reached for her taser and tased Brown. Brown fell to the ground, continuing to swing his arms. Deputy Velasquez attempted to tase Brown a second time, but Brown temporarily blocked her by grabbing her hand and then grabbing her taser. Brown was eventually apprehended and arrested. He was charged with two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer and one count of resisting an officer with violence.
At trial, Brown timely but unsuccessfully moved for a judgment of acquittal on all three counts, arguing that the evidence had not established that the officers had been engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty. The jury found Brown guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to a total of five years' imprisonment followed by five years' probation.
On appeal, Brown argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because the State did not meet the "lawful execution" element of the crimes for which he was convicted. We agree.
We review de novo the trial court's denial of Brown's motion for a judgment of acquittal. See Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002). This court will not reverse a conviction if it is supported by competent substantial evidence. Id. "If, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction." Id.
To support Brown's convictions for battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence, the evidence had to establish that the deputies had been engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty when the offenses occurred. See § 784.07(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017) (); § 843.01, Fla. Stat. (2017) (); Tillman v. State, 934 So. 2d 1263, 1266 n.2 (Fla. 2006) (), superseded by statute on other grounds, § 776.051(1), Fla. Stat. (2008).
To prove that Deputy Velasquez and Deputy Vivian had been engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty when they detained Brown, the evidence "had to show that the [deputies] had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity—'a reasonable suspicion that [Brown] ha[d] committed, [was] committing, or [was] about to commit a crime.' " See McClain v. State, 202 So. 3d 140, 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (quoting Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. 1993) ). "For reasonable suspicion justifying a detention to exist, 'the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.' " Tillman, 934 So. 2d at 1273 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ). "Whether an officer's suspicion is reasonable is determined by the totality of the circumstances which existed at the time of the stop and is based solely on facts known to the officer before the stop." Exantus-Barr v. State, 193 So. 3d 936, 939 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Slydell v. State, 792 So. 2d 667, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) ).
In this case, the evidence did not establish any basis for the deputies to reasonably suspect Brown of any criminal activity. Initially, the dispatch call that sent the deputies to the motel was based on information that a "disturbance" had occurred at the motel and that a man matching Brown's description had been involved. Standing alone, the information the deputies learned from the call did not provide them with reasonable suspicion to detain Brown because the call did not indicate that the "disturbance" had involved any criminal activity. See Davis v. State, 973 So. 2d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
In Davis, two police officers were dispatched to a restaurant to investigate a "suspicious incident." Id. at 1278. The officers arrived at the restaurant wearing their police uniforms, and they spoke to the employees who had reported the incident. Id. Davis was seated at a table, and the employees pointed him out to the officers. Id. When the officers approached Davis, they asked him if he could move from the table where he was sitting to a closed off portion of the restaurant. Id. Davis became agitated, and the officers told him to relax and stay put. Id. Davis then jumped out of his seat and pushed one of the officers into some tables. Id. At trial, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the evidence did not establish that the officers had been engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty when they detained Davis because the officers had not had reasonable suspicion to support the detention. Id. at 1278-79. The trial court denied the motion, and we concluded that was error. Id. We explained as follows:
We reject the State's argument that it established the element of a lawful execution of a legal duty with testimony that the officers were responding to a complaint by the employees of the Green Room Restaurant. The fact that an employee on private property makes a complaint to the police does not vitiate the requirement that a detention to investigate the complaint be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Here, just as in Davis, the information that the deputies learned from the call lacked details about the nature of the incident they were sent to investigate. Although upon their arrival at the motel, the deputies were able to ascertain that Brown matched the description of the subject involved in the disturbance, th...
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