Brown v. State

Decision Date09 May 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action ELH-19-2176
PartiesTYRUS TYRONE BROWN, Petitioner, v. STATE OF MARYLAND Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ellen L. Hollander, United States District Judge.

Petitioner Tyrus Tyrone Brown, a Maryland prisoner, has filed a Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF 1 (the “Petition”). Respondent is the Maryland Attorney General, who filed an answer to the Petition, asserting that the claims are without merit. ECF 9. The submission includes several exhibits. Petitioner filed a reply. ECF 10.

No hearing is required. See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts and Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2021); see also Fisher v. Lee, 215 F.3d 438, 455 (4th Cir. 2000) (petitioner not entitled to a hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)). For the reasons that follow, I shall deny the Petition. And, a certificate of appealability shall not issue.

I. Background

Brown was charged in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County in a thirteen-count indictment related to a murder, which occurred on April 21, 2013. ECF 9-1 at 4. On April 28, 2016, pursuant to a plea deal, Brown entered a guilty plea to the charge of second degree murder (Count 1) and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence (Count 3). ECF 9-2 (Tr. of 4/28/16).

The State summarized the factual basis of the plea. On April 21 2013, officers from the Annapolis Police Department responded to a reported shooting in the 200 block of Victor Parkway in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. ECF 9-2 at 17-18. Officers located the victim, John Donnell Ray, who was deceased from a single gunshot wound to the chest. Id. at 18. Donnell was seated in the driver's seat of a gold Lexus. A witness told officers that he heard a gunshot and saw three black males running from the area of the gold vehicle. Id. at 18-19. The witness also saw one of the males drop a handgun on the pavement and stop and pick it up. Id. at 19. The witness's descriptions of the three males he saw matched the description of Tyrus Brown Tahzay Brown, and Todd Brown. Id. at 18-19.

Police learned that the victim used drugs and had been drinking the night before the homicide and on the morning of the homicide. Id. at 19. Using a friend's phone, the victim arranged to purchase drugs from Tahzay Brown in the Victor Parkway area. Id. at 20. Video footage shows that Tahzay Brown, Todd Brown, and Tyrus Brown met in the neighborhood.[1] Id. However, the video did not capture the shooting.

The evidence showed that the three men met with the victim, who took the narcotics from Tahzay Brown. When the victim sat down in the vehicle, Tyrus Brown shot him in the chest. Id. at 21. Tahzay Brown, Todd Brown, and Tyrus Brown cleaned up the scene and fled. Id. at 22.

The police conducted controlled calls to Tyrus Brown. Id. at 23. He stated on a call that he planned to admit that he committed the murder. Id. If the case proceeded to trial, the State intended to elicit testimony from the participants that Tyrus Brown was the person who killed John Donnell Ray. Id. at 23-24.

Brown was sentenced on June 6, 2016, to an aggregate term of thirty years of imprisonment. ECF 9-3 (Tr. of 6/6/16). In particular, for second degree murder, Brown received a sentence of 30 years, with all but 25 years suspended. For use of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, Brown received a sentence of 20 years, with all but 5 years suspended. The sentences were imposed consecutively. ECF 9-1 at 12-13; 9-3. Per the plea deal, all other charges were dismissed. Id.

Brown filed an application for post conviction relief with the circuit court on November 11, 2016. ECF 9-1 at 17-32. The circuit court initially denied Brown's application because he failed to comply with Maryland Rule 4-402. ECF 9-1 at 33-44. However, Brown timely refiled a compliant application on January 5, 2017. ECF 9-1 at 35-41. On Brown's behalf, counsel submitted a supplemental application on March 27, 2018. ECF 9-1 at 43-54. Brown's post conviction claims included: (1) the guilty plea to the firearm charge was not knowing and voluntary because he was not advised of the elements of the crime, (2) the guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he did not understand the sentence imposed, (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because she failed to disclose the co-defendants' recorded jail calls, and (4) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because she failed to file a motion for modification of sentence. ECF 9-1 at 35-41; ECF 9-1 at 43-54.

The circuit court held a hearing on Brown's post conviction application on July 17, 2018. ECF 9-4 (Tr. of 7/17/18).[2] Brown and his trial counsel, Catherine Woolley, testified at the hearing. The circuit court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order dated January 15, 2019. ECF 9-1 at 55-71.[3] The circuit court granted partial relief by permitting Brown to file a belated motion for modification of sentence. All other claims were denied on the merits. Id.

Thereafter, on February 6, 2019, Brown filed an application for leave to appeal with the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. ECF 9-1 at 72-84. It was denied on June 14, 2019. Id. at 8688.

The habeas petition followed. ECF 1. Brown asserts two claims in his timely federal habeas petition: (1) the guilty plea to the firearm charge was not knowing and voluntary because he was not advised of the elements of the crime, and (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because she failed to disclose the co-defendants' recorded jail calls. ECF 1 at 7.

II. Standard of Review

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). In Larry v. Branker, 552 F.3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2009), the Court said: [I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”

“The role of a federal habeas court is to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not to apply de novo review of factual findings and to substitute its own opinions for the determinations made on the scene by the trial judge.” Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 276 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In Nicolas v. Atty. Gen. of Maryland, 820 F.3d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 2016), the Fourth Circuit explained (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2294(d)):

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires a federal court reviewing a habeas petition that has already been adjudicated on the merits in state court to give considerable deference to the state court decision. A federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court arrived at “a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, ” or “a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

This Court “must presume that the state court's factual findings are correct unless the petitioner rebuts those facts by clear and convincing evidence, ” and this court “cannot disturb the state court's ruling simply because it is incorrect; it must also be unreasonable.” Nicolas, 820 F.3d at 129; see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100-01 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). “Where the state court conducted an evidentiary hearing and explained its reasoning with some care, it should be particularly difficult to establish clear and convincing evidence of error on the state court's part.” Sharpe v. Bell, 593 F.3d 372, 378 (4th Cir. 2010). This is especially true where the state court has “resolved issues like witness credibility, which are ‘factual determinations' for purposes of Section 2254(e)(1).” Id.

For a state court's decision to be contrary to established federal law, the state court must have arrived at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law, or must have confronted facts that are “materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court case but nevertheless arrived at the opposite result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000); see Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 238 (4th Cir. 2014); Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2005). Notably, ‘a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.' Lovitt, 403 F.3d at 178 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 411). Rather, the state court's application of federal law ‘must also be unreasonable.' Lovitt, 403 F.3d at 178 (citation omitted); see Barnes, 751 F.3d at 238-39 (state court's decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when the state court identifies the correct governing principle but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts).

Under section 2254(d)(2), “a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290 301 (2010). [E]ven if reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question, ” a federal court may not conclude that the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Id. This standard was ...

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