Brown v. State
| Decision Date | 24 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-2261 |
| Citation | 172 N.E.3d 1273 |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
| Parties | Kennic T. BROWN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff |
Attorney for Appellant: Kristina L. Lynn, Lynn Law Office, P.C., Wabash, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Caryn N. Szyper, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Kennic Brown is charged with battery against a public safety officer, a Level 6 felony. He moved to dismiss the charge against him on the basis that double jeopardy bars this criminal prosecution because he has already been subject to administrative sanctions by the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") for the same actions that give rise to this charge. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and this court granted Brown's motion for interlocutory appeal. On appeal, Brown raises a single issue: whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the criminal prosecution constitutes double jeopardy. Concluding the administrative punishment does not preclude a subsequent prosecution, we affirm the trial court's denial of Brown's motion to dismiss.
[2] In 2019, Brown was an inmate at the Miami Correctional Facility. Brown allegedly fought with and scratched an on-duty prison guard on February 9, 2019. In March, the DOC held a disciplinary hearing regarding the allegation that Brown violated conduct code A-102, assault/battery, a Class A offense, as a result of this incident. Brown was found to have committed the conduct violation and the following discipline was imposed: 360 days in the restrictive housing unit, a 45-day commissary restriction, deprivation of 180 days of credit time, and demotion of one credit class. His appeal to the warden was denied.
[3] Also in March, the State charged Brown with battery against a public safety officer based on the February 9 incident. In May 2020, Brown filed a motion to dismiss the charge, arguing that the prosecution is barred by state and federal principles of double jeopardy because he was already punished by the DOC through its administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same conduct. The trial court held a hearing on the motion in September.
[4] Brown testified that although there are certain prison offenses for which one can earn back deprived credit time, assault on staff is not one of them. See Transcript, Volume II at 10. He also testified that he had served his 360 days in the restrictive housing unit, which means that he was in a cell by himself for nearly a year and he was unable to communicate with other inmates except when he was in the recreational cage. DOC rules state that inmates in the restrictive housing unit are to get one hour outside the cell five days per week, see Appellant's Appendix, Volume II at 71, but Brown testified that he got that time only about two days a week, see Tr., Vol. II at 12. Other inmates "acting up" or short staffing can affect the recreational time. Id. Brown testified that his time in restrictive housing "messed with [his] mind" and "just sitting in there thinking about getting punished twice about something [he] didn't do" made him suicidal. Id. at 13. In support of his motion to dismiss, Brown also submitted several articles about the effects of solitary confinement and its restrictions. See Appellant's App., Vol. II at 74-101.
[5] Brown also submitted to the trial court sections of the DOC's Manual of Policies and Procedures, including section 02-04-101, the Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders, see id. at 31-66, and section 02-04-102, the Use and Operation of Adult Offender Disciplinary Restrictive Status Housing, see id. at 67-73. Specifically, Brown cited to section IX.E.9.a.3 of the Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders that states a guilty finding on conduct code A-102 (or any Class A offense) "shall constitute the ineligibility of restoration with regard to any and all deprived credit time which occurred during the current commitment period." Id. at 55-56. And Brown argued to the trial court that Tr., Vol. II at 31 (emphasis added); see Appellant's App., Vol. II at 19.
[6] The trial court issued an order on October 2, 2020, concluding that "the administrative sanctions imposed by the [DOC] against Mr. Brown did not constitute double jeopardy barring criminal prosecution" and denied the motion to dismiss. Appealed Order at 1, ¶ 3. Brown now appeals that decision.
[7] Generally, we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for abuse of discretion. State v. Durrett , 923 N.E.2d 449, 453 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). However, whether a prosecution is barred by double jeopardy is a question of law, State v. Allen , 646 N.E.2d 965, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied , and we therefore apply a de novo standard of review, Austin v. State , 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1039 (Ind. 2013).
[8] Brown contends that the criminal prosecution for battery must be dismissed because otherwise, he will be subjected to multiple punishments for the same act due to the disciplinary action already taken by the DOC. See Appellant's Amended Brief at 15. Pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, a defendant has a constitutional right to not be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.1 But the United States Supreme Court has Hudson v. U.S. , 522 U.S. 93, 98-99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (citations omitted).
[9] Every United States Circuit Court to consider the issue has held that "prison discipline does not preclude a subsequent criminal prosecution or punishment for the same acts." Garrity v. Fiedler , 41 F.3d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases), cert. denied , 514 U.S. 1044, 115 S.Ct. 1420, 131 L.Ed.2d 303 (1995). Likewise, courts of this state have held that "[a]n administrative punishment by prison officials does not preclude a subsequent prosecution arising out of the same act." Williams v. State , 493 N.E.2d 431, 432 (Ind. 1986) ; State v. Mullins , 647 N.E.2d 676, 678 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). As explained in Lyons v. State :
The [DOC] is authorized to administratively punish acts done within the prison walls by imposing disciplinary sanctions. The [DOC] may not, however, lengthen a convict's term in the prison. The [DOC] functions to insure [sic] peace and order inside the prison. On the other hand, the State is required to insure [sic] the safety and well-being of those outside the prison walls and has been authorized by statute to punish those who attempt [or commit a crime] by extending the length of their term.
475 N.E.2d 719, 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), trans. denied.
[10] Nonetheless, Brown argues that the deprivation of good time credit and placement in restrictive housing are sanctions that are so punitive in nature they constitute a jeopardy. Brown relies heavily on the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Halper , in which the Court applied the Double Jeopardy Clause to a sanction without first determining that it was criminal in nature, instead focusing on the proportionality of the sanction. 490 U.S. 435, 448-49, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) (). Halper raised the question of whether prison disciplinary sanctions "might ever be considered sufficiently excessive to constitute criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes." U.S. v. Mayes , 158 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied , 525 U.S. 1185, 119 S.Ct. 1130, 143 L.Ed.2d 123 (1999). But circuit courts distinguished Halper in this context and continued to reject prisoners’ double jeopardy challenges. Id. (collecting cases). And the Supreme Court subsequently disavowed Halper due to its "ill considered" and "unworkable" "deviation from longstanding double jeopardy principles[.]" Hudson , 522 U.S. at 95, 101, 118 S.Ct. 488. Instead, Hudson reaffirmed the previously established rule requiring the court to first ask whether the legislature indicated a preference that a particular sanction be civil or criminal and, in cases where the intent was to establish a civil penalty, to then consider whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to transform what was intended as a civil penalty into a criminal penalty. Id. at 95, 118 S.Ct. 488 (citing United States v. Ward , 448 U.S. 242, 248-49, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) ). We will consider Brown's arguments in this context.
[11] As for the legislative intent, we look to Indiana Code chapter 11-11-5, which addresses conduct and discipline within the DOC. The chapter authorizes DOC to "adopt rules for the maintenance of order and discipline among committed persons." Ind. Code § 11-11-5-2. The chapter also clearly contemplates the possibility that violations of the conduct code could result in criminal prosecution, as it includes a provision regarding the admissibility in court of statements made by the prisoner during the course of a disciplinary investigation. Ind. Code § 11-11-5-5(d). Given the non-punitive purpose ("maintenance of order") of the disciplinary provisions, the clear acknowledgement that criminal prosecution could follow, and the delegation of disciplinary authority to an administrative agency, the statutory scheme indicates a preference that the sanctions...
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