Brown v. State ex rel. Brune, 1--876A136

• Decision Date: 31 January 1977
• Docket Number: No. 1--876A136,1--876A136
• Citation: 359 N.E.2d 608,172 Ind.App. 31
• Parties: Paul BROWN et al., Appellants (Defendants below), v. STATE of Indiana, ex rel. William J. BRUNE, Prosecuting Attorney for the FirstJudicial Circuit, State of Indiana, Appellee (Relator below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 608

359 N.E.2d 608

172 Ind.App. 31

Paul BROWN et al., Appellants (Defendants below), v. STATE of Indiana, ex rel. William J. BRUNE, Prosecuting

Attorney for the FirstJudicial Circuit, State of

Indiana, Appellee (Relator below).

No. 1--876A136.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, First District.

Jan. 31, 1977.

Robert John, Evansville, for appellants; Bunner, John & Heathcotte, Evansville, of counsel.

John D. Clouse, Evansville, for appellee.

LYBROOK, Judge.

The Vanderburgh County Council (Council), defendant-appellant, brings this appeal from an order mandating it to appropriate substantial sums of money to plaintiff-appellee, William Brune, as Prosecuting Attorney for said county. These funds were for expanded operation of the Vanderburgh County prosecutor's office.

The record reveals that Brune had held the office of Prosecuting Attorney of Vanderburgh County since 1971. Brune testified that he had followed an aggressive program of prosecution which had resulted in a doubling of the work load for his office. Numerous individuals testified as to the duties, responsibilities and backlog of cases existing in the prosecutor's office. Testimony was given which indicated that personnel had left the prosecutor's staff due to insufficient salary. Other personnel had stayed based on Brune's promise to obtain a raise in salary for them.

Brune also testified in regard to a 'Deferred Alcohol Prosecution Program' ¹ which he had initiated and the funds that were needed for its operation.

The order of the trial court listed numerous accounts and mandated the council to appropriate funds to each of these accounts in the amounts requested by Brune. Subsequently the original temporary order of mandate was modified and made permanent on March 11, 1976. The chief effect of the order of mandate was to increase the salaries of Brune's staff and include the staff of the 'Deferred Prosecution Program' as a part of his staff. All items not specifically mentioned in the order of mandate were to remain as appropriated by the council in the 1976 budget allocations for the prosecutor's office.

The judgment specifically held that the requests of Brune were reasonable and were not arbitrary, extravagant nor unwarranted.

The council presents the following issues for our review:

(1) Is the appropriation of funds for a prosecutor's staff within the discretion of the county council and if so what is the proper standard of review to be applied to any action which the council takes?

(2) Did Brune have an adequate remedy available to him prior to initiating an action for mandate? And if so, must Brune avail himself of that remedy prior to court action?

(3) Is mandate available to command the performance of a discretionary act by the council?

(4) Is the 'Deferred Prosecution Program' required by law as a duty of the prosecutor?

(5) Did the trial court usurp the legislative function of the county council?

I.

The initial issue for our review concerns the legislative intent embodied in the statute enacted to require county councils to fund the operations of the prosecutor's offices. IC 1971, 33--14--7--2 (Burns Code Ed.) in pertinent part reads:

'There shall also be appropriated annually by the various county councils for other deputy prosecuting attorneys, for investigators, clerical assistance, witness fees, out-of-state travel, postage, telephone tolls and telegraph (,) repairs to equipment, office supplies, other operating expenses, and equipment, an amount as may be necessary for the proper discharge of the duties imposed by law upon the office of the prosecuting attorney of each judicial circuit.'

It is clear from a reading of this statute that the power to appropriate funds for prosecutors' staffs has been delegated to the county councils. The question becomes: Which party shall determine what is 'necessary' for the proper discharge of the duties imposed by law on the prosecutor's office?

A reading of the above quoted statute indicates that the legislature has imposed a duty upon county councils to adequately fund the prosecuting attorney and enable him to properly discharge the duties imposed upon him by law. Therefore, both the duty and the broad general standard have been specified by the legislature. Apparently the statute delegates the determination of what is 'necessary' to the county council. While it is true that some minimum level of appropriation would fall below the level of 'necessity', it is equally true that reasonable men could disagree as to what is 'necessary'. It would therefore appear that the county council has been delegated the duty, by statute, to support the prosecutor's office. The council is also given broad discretion in the exact amounts to be appropriated in complying with that statutorily imposed duty.

Once it has been determined that a governmental body is performing a discretionary act, our next step is to ascertain the proper standard of review for testing actions by governmental bodies.

It has long been the law in Indiana, as well as elsewhere, that discretionary decisions of a governmental body will not be reversed absent a showing that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law. County Dept., of Pub. Welf. v. City-County Council (1975), Ind.App., 338 N.E.2d 656; Pope v. Marion County Sheriff's Merit Board (1973), Ind.App., 301 N.E.2d 386; Haywood Pub. Co. v. West (1942), 110 Ind.App. 568, 39 N.E.2d 785. The standard of review therefore is whether the acts of the governmental body were arbitrary or capricious, and that standard must be used as a gauge to test the decision of the council in allocating funds to Brune.

In light of the appropriate standard of review, the judgment by the trial court must clearly indicate that the actions of the council were arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. The budgetary allocation to the prosecutor's accounts were not declared arbitrary or an abuse of discretion by the trial court's judgment. Instead that judgment held that the requests of Brune were reasonable. When reviewing a decision by a governmental body the reviewing court must find that the agency abused its discretion, not that the...