Brown v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
| Decision Date | 20 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | 3:10-cv-833 (CFD) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | RALSTON BROWN, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant. |
The plaintiff, Ralston Brown, has filed a pro se complaint against the defendant, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State Farm"), alleging breach of an insurance contract.1 State Farm has filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Brown's breach of contract claim is barred by the two-year suit limitation provision in the insurance policy. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants State Farm's motion for summary judgment and also denies Brown's second motion for leave to amend his complaint.
State Farm issued a "Business Policy," No. 97-BN-0439-3, to Brown for the policy period September 14, 2005 to September 14, 2006, as well as a homeowner's policy for the same property and the same coverage period.3 The Business Policy insured the property located at 100 Harral Avenue in Bridgeport, Connecticut.4 State Farm claims that Brown failed to make the payments necessary to keep his insurance policies in force, and on April 6, 2006, State Farm cancelled both the homeowners policy and Business Policy for non-payment of premiums. On April 21, 2006, a fire damaged Brown's building at Harral Avenue. Later that day, Brown attempted to pay the amounts he owed to State Farm to reinstate both of his policies. Brown subsequently filed a claim for coverage under his homeowners policy, but State Farm denied his claim because it had cancelled his policy for non-payment of premiums.
On May 27, 2010, Brown filed this suit alleging that State Farm breached the Business Policy by denying coverage for the loss. The Business Policy contains a suit limitation provision, which expressly limits the time for filing an action against State Farm. Under the Conditions section, the Business Policy provides in relevant part:
On November 11, 2010, State Farm moved for summary judgment, arguing that Brown's breach of contract cause of action is time-barred under the suit limitation provision in the Business Policy. On the same day, Brown moved for leave to amend his complaint to add claims for violations of the CUTPA and "DTPA," breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and fraud.
In a summary judgment motion, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine disputes of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); White v. ABCO Eng'g Corp., 221 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2000); Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994)). Once the moving party has met its burden, in order to defeat the motion the non-moving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and present such evidence as would allow a jury to find in his favor. Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000).
In assessing the record, the trial court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferencesin favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Graham, 230 F.3d at 38. "This remedy that precludes a trial is properly granted only when no rational finder of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party." Carlton, 202 F.3d at 134. Consistent with this standard, all evidence favorable to the non-moving party must be credited if a reasonable jury could credit it. Evidence favorable to the moving party, on the other hand, must be disregarded unless a reasonable jury would have to credit it because it comes from a disinterested source and is uncontradicted and unimpeached. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). "When reasonable persons, applying the proper legal standards, could differ in their responses to the question" raised on the basis of the evidence presented, the question must be left to the jury. Sologub v. City of New York, 202 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir. 2000).
Where one party is proceeding pro se, the court must read that party's papers liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments suggested. See Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994). "Despite this liberal interpretation, however, an unsupported assertion cannot overcome a properly supported motion for summary judgment." Hasfal v. City of Hartford, No. 06-cv-55, 2009 WL 1870871, at *1 (D. Conn. June 25, 2009) (citing Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1991)).
The Business Policy provides, as a condition to bringing suit against State Farm, that "no one may bring legal action against us under this insurance unless . . . the action is brought within two years after the date on which the accidental direct physical loss occurred." State Farm argues that Brown's breach of contract claim is time-barred, as Brown brought suit on May 27, 2010,over four years after the date of loss. "The Connecticut Supreme Court has long held that a contractual condition in an insurance policy requiring an action to be brought with[in] a particular time period 'is a part of the contract . . . [and] is valid and binding upon the parties.'" Gore v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 296, 302 (D. Conn. 2004) (quoting Chichester v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 74 Conn. 510, 513 (1902)). "[C]ontracting parties are free to adopt an unambiguous contract provision limiting the time in which an insurance claim must be filed; and that, when they do so, failure to comply with the terms therein bar[s] recovery." Voris v. Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co., 297 Conn. 589, 600 (2010) (citations omitted). Such a time limitation condition does not operate as a statute of limitations; it "is a part of the contract so that it controls the rights of the parties under the contract and, hence, such rights must be governed by the rules of law applicable to contracts." Monteiro v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 177 Conn. 281, 283 (1979). "Thus, plaintiffs' non-compliance with such a provision is a complete defense, unless the plaintiff in his reply alleges facts sufficient in law to excuse his nonperformance of the condition." Gore, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 302 (citation omitted); see also Monteiro, 177 Conn. at 286 ().
The suit limitation provision in the Business Policy further provides that "if the law of the state in which this policy is issued allows more than two years to bring legal action against us, that longer period of time will apply." State Farm argues that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-307 expressly permits such a two-year suit limitation provision.5 Although Section 38a-307 sets forththe standard form for fire insurance policies, Connecticut courts have construed homeowner's insurance policies that insure against fire loss to include the suit limitation provision in this statute. See, e.g., Bocchino v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 246 Conn. 378, 379-80 (1998); Boyce v. Allstate Ins. Co., 236 Conn. 375, 377 n.4 (1996); Riggs v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., CV05010671S, 2006 Super. LEXIS 407, at *1-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2006). The same reasoning would seem to apply to fire insurance coverage in business policies. Here, the Business Policy covers all "accidental direct physical loss" to the insured property unless the loss is specifically excluded. The Business Policy covers fire loss because it is not specifically excluded; thus, a suit limitation provision of at least twelve months is required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 38a-307.6 See Bocchino, 246 Conn. at 380. However, a longer period is not required under the statute.
Because Connecticut state law does not specifically "allow more than two years to bring legal action" against an insurance company, Brown's claim for breach of contract against State Farm must have been made within the contractually specified time period of two years. Brown did not file his action within two years from the date of the loss and he did not allege sufficient facts to excuse his nonperformance.7 Thus, the Court finds that his action is time-barred. SeeMonteiro, 177 Conn. at 286 ().
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), the court should freely give leave to amend a complaint when justice so requires. "However, it is well established that leave to amend a complaint need not be granted when amendment would be futile." Ellis v. Chao, 336 F.3d 114, 127 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Jones v. New York State Div. of Military & Naval Affairs, 166 F.3d 45, 50 (2d Cir. 1999) (); Fulton v. Goord, 591 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 2009) . "An amendment is futile when the proposed new claims would not withstand a motion to dismiss."...
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