Brown v. State, F-86-566

Decision Date19 September 1988
Docket NumberNo. F-86-566,F-86-566
PartiesBilly C. BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
OPINION

PARKS, Judge:

Appellant, Billy C. Brown, was tried by jury and convicted of Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle, After Former Conviction of a Felony (47 O.S.1981, § 4-102 and 21 O.S.1981, § 51) in Tulsa County District Court, Case No. CRF-85-3467, before the Honorable Jay Dalton, District Judge. The jury set punishment at twenty (20) years imprisonment, and judgment and sentence was imposed accordingly. From this, appellant perfected this appeal.

On September 4, 1985, Fran Darby left her white 1979 Mercury Capri parked in a local restaurant parking lot. She locked her purse and an extra set of car keys in the vehicle. The next morning, she returned to pick up her car, but discovered it was missing.

Three days later, Michelle Butler saw a white 1979 Mercury Capri hit her grandmother's truck. The driver of the vehicle ran from the scene of the accident, but was chased by several onlookers who caught him and brought him back to the accident scene. The passenger in the vehicle, Sharisa Crowles, jumped from the car but did not flee, apparently because of her injuries. Butler positively identified appellant as the driver of the vehicle.

After some investigation, the vehicle was identified as the one stolen from Fran Darby. A purse and a billfold containing checks and credit cards were found in the car, and were identified by Darby as belonging to her. The car had not been hot-wired; keys were found in the ignition. The license tag present on the vehicle was not that registered in Darby's name, but instead was registered to a Shirley Tiger, an aunt of Sharisa Crowles.

The defense called two witnesses, who testified that appellant had borrowed the car from Willie Golden, a known car thief. One of the defense witnesses, Sharisa Crowles, testified that when the accident occurred, appellant told her to jump from the car "because it might blow." Facts not included in this brief summary will be discussed as they become relevant.

In his first proposition, appellant claims that the verdict is contrary to law and the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. The test used when determining the sufficiency of the evidence was set forth in Spuehler v. State, 709 P.2d 202, 203 (Okla.Crim.App.1985):

Whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

The statute under which appellant was convicted, 47 O.S.1981, § 4-102 requires the State to prove that appellant was using or driving a vehicle without the consent of the owner, with the intent to deprive the owner, temporarily or otherwise, of the vehicle or its possession. Fox v. State, 686 P.2d 292, 293 (Okla.Crim.App.1984). Thus, if the jury could have found each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed by this Court.

Witness Butler testified that appellant was driving the car when the accident occurred and that he then fled from the scene. The owner of the vehicle testified that she had not given appellant permission to drive her car. As to the element of intent, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to show that appellant knew the car to be stolen and intended on depriving the owner of possession of the car. The license tag had been switched to that of one of appellant's girlfriend's relatives. Appellant's girlfriend testified that she saw a purse in the backseat of the car, but did not question appellant as to its owner. There was also evidence that appellant and his girlfriend had gone to Sapulpa on the day of the accident. The tag on the car at the time of the accident was registered to a resident of Sapulpa. These facts were sufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt.

Also in his first proposition, appellant argues that it was error for evidence regarding Willie Golden's reputation as a car thief to be admitted into evidence. He urges that the State failed to lay the proper foundation of showing that witness Mack was sufficiently acquainted with Golden to know of his reputation. We disagree. The record shows that Mack was a resident of the community and had known Golden for over two (2) years. Thus, this assignment is without merit.

Appellant also complains of evidence which was introduced to impeach the credibility of defense witness Crowles. Crowles, on direct examination, testified that she went to Sapulpa on the day of the accident but did not remember who took her. She also stated that she did not know how her aunt's car tag got on the stolen vehicle. On cross-examination, she denied telling Officer Vickers that appellant drove her to Sapulpa. In rebuttal, the State called Officer Vickers, who testified as to a conversation he had with Crowles. His testimony was that Crowles stated that appellant picked her up on the day of the accident and asked her if she wanted a ride in his new car. He also said that the tag was registered in the name of Shirley Tiger, the aunt of Crowles, who lived in Sapulpa.

Appellant claims it was error to introduce this evidence because it was hearsay and was impeachment on a collateral matter. Again, we disagree. Officer Vicker's testimony did not fall within the definition of hearsay as defined by 12 O.S.1981, § 2801(3) insofar as it was not "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted...." Rather, it was offered to point out the inconsistencies in the statements made by Crowles. Neither was it impeachment on a collateral issue. The evidence went directly to show appellant's intent. See Pickens v. State, 600 P.2d 356, 361 (Okla.Crim.App.1979). This assignment is without merit.

As his next proposition of error, appellant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to give his requested instruction regarding his theory of the case. Defense counsel submitted an instruction which stated that appellant borrowed the car from Golden and "Mr. Brown further believed that...

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  • Hearsay Rule
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Is It Admissible? - 2017 Testimonial evidence
    • July 31, 2017
    ...years old at the time, became hysterical and cried at the sight of the defendant. 88 See FRE 803(20) and 803(21). 89 Brown v. State , 762 P.2d 959 (Okla.Crim. App. 1988). 90 For discussions about cross-examining character witnesses by using hypothetical questions, see U.S. v. Siers, 873 F.2......
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