Brown v. State
| Decision Date | 15 July 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 63559,63559 |
| Citation | 294 S.E.2d 305,163 Ga.App. 209 |
| Parties | BROWN v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
John K. Larkins, Jr., Athens, for appellant.
Ken Stula, Sol., Athens, for appellee.
John D. Brown appeals his conviction of obstruction of a law enforcement officer. Viewed in a light most favorable to upholding the verdict, the evidence at trial showed that on December 6, 1980, at approximately 1:40 a.m., Officer Richard Norton of the Clarke County Police Department was on patrol when he observed a car approaching without headlights. He turned his blue lights on and pulled in behind the car, at which point the car accelerated to a high rate of speed and ran a stop sign. The officer pursued the car down the road to a house and pulled in behind at an angle, whereupon one Ayear Brown emerged from the car, looked at the officer and ran into the house.
After calling for back-up units and while waiting for assistance to arrive, Officer Norton observed Ayear come onto the back porch of the house. The officer attempted to go toward the suspect, but the suspect fled into the house and went to the front door.
At this point defendant emerged from the house and approached the officer, demanding an explanation. The officer explained to defendant that he was pursuing Ayear, who was now standing behind defendant. Norton informed Ayear that he was under arrest for attempting to elude and for driving without headlights and tried to take him into custody, but the defendant stepped in front of him every time he attempted to approach Ayear.
At this time another uniformed officer arrived and Ayear retreated into the house. Defendant blocked the doorway, pushing both officers back whenever they attempted to go around and demanded a search warrant. It was necessary for Officer Norton to strike defendant with a flashlight so that the second officer could get around him to complete the arrest. There was a further scuffle inside, and defendant had to be restrained while Ayear was being removed.
A third officer arrived and the three attempted to subdue defendant while he was trying to get to Ayear. Five officers finally succeeded in handcuffing the approximately two-hundred and sixty pound defendant by the use of two sets of handcuffs because of his size.
Defendant testified at trial that he thought Ayear had been in bed and asleep. He repeatedly asked the officers whether they had a warrant. He did not realize that Ayear had been out of the house that night or that Officer Norton had been pursuing him or that anything had happened which would justify the officers' entry into his home.
1. Defendant was convicted of violating Code Ann. § 26-2505: "A person who knowingly obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties is guilty of a misdemeanor." Defendant argues that the state failed to prove that Officer Norton was engaged in lawful activity in attempting to enter his home in order to arrest Ayear.
" '(A)bsent exigent circumstances or consent, an entry into a private dwelling to conduct a search or effect an arrest is unreasonable without a warrant.' " Thompson v. State, 248 Ga. 343(1), 285 S.E.2d 685 (1981), citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 214 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 1648, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981). However, "[a] suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place ... by the expedient of escaping to a private place." United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976). Since the arrest of Ayear in defendant's house was based upon Officer Norton's "hot pursuit" of the subject, such arrest was a lawful activity. Martasin v. State, 155 Ga.App. 396(2), 271 S.E.2d 2 (1980); Annot., 76 ALR2d 1432 § 2b.
2. In light of the uncontroverted evidence of record showing Officer Norton's hot pursuit of Ayear, the trial court did not err in refusing to give a charge which would have permitted the jury to consider the issue of whether there existed "exigent circumstances" justifying the warrantless intrusion into defendant's house.
3. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to charge as to mistake of fact (Code Ann. § 26-705) and also as to the use of force in defense of habitation (Code Ann. § 26-903). Defendant testified, "The first time I saw the police was when I come out of my bedroom and I saw Lieutenant Norton at the door, that's when I blocked the doorway." He testified further, Defendant also stated, "Okay, we just kept on talking there and soon he hit me with a flashlight."
It is clear from this testimony that defendant was aware that the police were attempting to enter his home to arrest Ayear. Defendant's only concern was whether the police officer had the lawful authority to enter the house to apprehend the subject. This was not a misapprehension of fact as contemplated by Code Ann. § 26-705 but was instead a misapprehension of the law. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing this charge. Furthermore, since the entry by the officers was lawful, the refusal to charge Code Ann. § 26-903 applicable to unlawful entry was not error.
4. Defendant also enumerates as error a rather extensive portion of the charge. Accordingly, we will recite only these portions thereof necessary to discuss the issues raised.
(a) The trial court charged that Officer Norton had "reasonable cause" to arrest Ayear, and that in doing so he was in performance of his duties as a police officer for Clarke County, Georgia. In light of our discussion in Divisions 1 and 2 of this opinion, this charge was not error.
(b) The court charged: ...
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