Brown v. State, 2006-KA-00315-COA.

• Decision Date: 20 May 2008
• Docket Number: No. 2006-KA-00315-COA.,2006-KA-00315-COA.
• Citation: 999 So.2d 853
• Parties: King Young BROWN, Jr., Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

999 So.2d 853

King Young BROWN, Jr., Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.

No. 2006-KA-00315-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

May 20, 2008.

Rehearing Denied November 18, 2008.

Certiorari Denied January 29, 2009.

Brandon Isaac Dorsey, attorney for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Deshun Terrell Martin, attorney for appellee.

Before MYERS, P.J., CHANDLER and BARNES, JJ.

MYERS, P.J., for the Court.

¶ 1. King Young Brown, Jr., was convicted of Count I, manslaughter, and Count II, rape, and was sentenced under Count I to serve twenty years and under Count II to serve thirty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, both sentences to run consecutively. Brown appeals his conviction and sentence, seeking review of eleven issues, some of which have been combined for purposes of judicial economy. Brown asks (1) whether the trial court erred in granting a manslaughter instruction; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing expert testimony identifying characteristics of hair samples recovered at the crime scene; (3) whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony from a DNA analyst; (4) whether the trial court erred in denying the motions for a new trial, a directed verdict, and a mistrial; (5) whether the trial court erred in admitting certain photographs; (6) whether the trial court erred in finding probable cause existed for the search and seizure of Brown's hair, blood, and saliva; (7) whether the trial court erred in limiting Brown's cross-examination of the State's fingerprint expert; and (8) whether the trial court erred in dismissing a juror for failing to follow instructions during the course of the trial. Following a thorough review, we find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. R.W., a six-year-old girl, was last seen alive on April 20, 2002.¹ On that Saturday afternoon, R.W. and her mother visited R.W.'s great-grandmother. R.W. was given permission to play on the swings at a park located close to her great-grandmother's home. R.W. returned to her great-grandmother's home, but later she asked to return to the park to swing. R.W.'s mother granted her permission to play on the swings in the park; however, R.W. never returned home. R.W.'s mother subsequently reported to the police that her daughter was missing, and a search for R.W. began near her great-grandmother's home.

¶ 3. R.W.'s great-grandparents lived next door to Brown, who lived with his mother, Gloria Spencer; stepfather, Leon Spencer; and grandfather, Willie Spencer. After R.W.'s disappearance, Leon discovered a large bag he did not recognize in his garbage can. The garbage was located near the backdoor of his home and was too heavy to easily lift. Leon cut open the bag and discovered another bag inside. Leon then became suspicious and brought the bag to the attention of the police officers who were assisting in the search for R.W. Officer James Whitehead responded and cut open the second bag, which contained the remains of R.W. The Mississippi Crime Laboratory was called and arrived later that evening to take the evidence and the body of R.W. for evidence processing. The body and evidence were subsequently transported to Jackson, Mississippi, and an autopsy was performed on R.W.'s body. Evidence was then sent to the Mississippi Crime Laboratory and to ReliaGene Technologies in New Orleans, Louisiana for testing.

¶ 4. Brown was indicted for the rape and murder of R.W. At the State's request, the trial court ordered blood, saliva, and hair samples to be taken from Brown. The trial, where Brown was convicted, was eventually held in November 2005, following two earlier mistrials. After jury deliberations of approximately nine hours, Brown moved for a mistrial, which was denied. Brown was subsequently found guilty of rape and manslaughter. Brown moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, a motion for new trial. Both motions were denied, and Brown was sentenced to serve twenty years for the manslaughter conviction and thirty years for the rape conviction in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, both sentences to run consecutively. Brown now appeals his conviction and sentence.

DISCUSSION

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION S-6.

¶ 5. "In determining whether error exists in granting or refusing jury instructions, the instructions must be read as a whole; if the instructions fairly announce the law and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found." Jones v. State, 962 So.2d 1263, 1272 (¶ 33) (Miss. 2007) (citation omitted). In addition, "[t]o have an instruction granted the proponent must show that (1) the instruction is supported by the evidence and that (2) the instruction is a correct statement of the law." Adkins v. Sanders, 871 So.2d 732, 737 (¶ 11) (Miss.2004) (quoting Turner v. Temple, 602 So.2d 817, 823 (Miss.1992)). This Court recognizes that:

a lesser included offense instruction should be granted unless the trial judge—and ultimately this Court— can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn in favor of the accused from the evidence, that no reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense (and conversely not guilty of at least one essential element of the principal charge).

Greenlee v. State, 725 So.2d 816, 823 (¶ 14) (Miss.1998) (quoting Harper v. State, 478 So.2d 1017, 1021 (Miss.1985)). Basically, "where the evidence could only justify conviction of the principal charge could a lesser-included offense instruction be refused." Harveston v. State, 493 So.2d 365, 374 (Miss.1986) (quoting Fairchild v. State, 459 So.2d 793, 800 (Miss.1984)).

¶ 6. Brown now argues on appeal that jury instruction S-6 regarding manslaughter was improperly submitted to the jury. Brown previously objected to the instruction at trial because he argued that the evidence did not support a manslaughter instruction. The instruction in question stated that "The Court instructs the Jury that every killing of a human being without authority of law is either murder or manslaughter; murder when done with deliberate design to affect the death of the person killed, and manslaughter when done without malice, or in the heat of passion." The trial court allowed the manslaughter jury instruction S-6, over Brown's objection.

¶ 7. The evidence presented in this case was largely circumstantial, and the State's theory of the case was that a large amount of the evidence pointed to Brown. The State argued that from the facts and evidence presented at trial, the most logical explanation was that Brown was responsible. The State's evidence included testimony identifying Brown's fingerprints and hair found at the scene of the crime. The State further presented evidence showing that the body of R.W. had been located in a garbage can in his backyard, in two unique bags that most likely came from a locked storage shed in his backyard.

¶ 8. In this case, the jury was given instructions on both murder and manslaughter. The question for this Court is whether, looking at the evidence presented at trial, any rational jury could have found Brown not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter. Greenlee, 725 So.2d at 823 (¶ 14) (quoting Harper, 478 So.2d at 1021). The jury evaluated all the evidence and witnesses presented at trial and found that Brown was guilty of manslaughter, but not murder. This Court acknowledges that "[w]hether a defendant has committed murder or manslaughter is ordinarily a question to be resolved by the jury." Schankin v. State, 910 So.2d 1113, 1117 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (quoting Strahan v. State, 729 So.2d 800, 806 (¶ 24) (Miss. 1998)). From the facts surrounding this case, this Court cannot find that the trial court erred in allowing the S-6 jury instruction. This issue is without merit.

II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EXPERT TESTIMONY IDENTIFYING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HAIR SAMPLES RECOVERED AT THE CRIME SCENE.

¶ 9. This Court will review the admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Mooneyham v. State, 915 So.2d 1102, 1104 (¶ 3) (Miss.Ct.App. 2005) (quoting Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31, 34 (¶ 4) (Miss. 2003)). Determining whether a person sufficiently qualifies as an expert is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed unless it can be said there was an abuse of discretion. McGowen v. State, 859 So.2d 320, 334-35 (¶ 50) (Miss.2003) (quoting Duplantis v. State, 708 So.2d 1327, 1338-39 (¶ 45) (Miss. 1998)). "Hair analysis is a very useful tool in criminology." Bevill v. State, 556 So.2d 699, 707 (Miss.1990). In fact, "hair and fiber comparisons have long been recognized in Mississippi courts." McGowen, 859 So.2d at 341 (¶ 72). Under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702, "the witness must be qualified as an expert because of the knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education he or she possesses." In addition, "the witness's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge must assist the trier of fact." Mooneyham, 915 So.2d at 1104 (¶ 3) (citing Watkins v. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 770 So.2d 970, 973 (¶ 10) (Miss. Ct.App.2000)).

¶ 10. Brown contends on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing on the admissibility of the hair comparisons. Further, Brown argues that the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony stating that the hair samples from the crime scene had the same characteristics as known hair samples belonging to Brown and R.W. The State argues that the expert testimony on forensic hair examination met the test articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) because it was offered by a person with knowledge, skill, and experience in the field; and the testimony assisted the...