Brown v. State
| Decision Date | 21 February 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. S90P1325,S90P1325 |
| Citation | 261 Ga. 66,401 S.E.2d 492 |
| Parties | BROWN v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Thomas P. Lenzer, Robert W. Lenzer, Lenzer & Lenzer, Norcross, Larry L. Duttweiler, Lawrenceville, for Brown.
Thomas C. Lawler, III, Dist. Atty., Daniel J. Porter, Asst. Dist. Atty., Gwinnett County Judicial & Adm. Center, Lawrenceville, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Debra K. Turner, Asst. Dist. Atty., Lawrenceville, Andrew S. Ree, Atty., Dept. of Law, Atlanta, for the State.
Patsy Morris, Atlanta, Joseph L. Chambers, Sr., Pros. Attorneys' Council, Smyrna, for James Brown.
This is a death penalty case. The crime occurred in 1975. The appellant, James Willie Brown, was found incompetent to stand trial until 1981, when he was tried, convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Brenda Watson. We affirmed, holding, inter alia, that Brown had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the crime. Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 71-72, 295 S.E.2d 727 (1982). However, in 1988, a federal district court granted Brown's petition for writ of habeas corpus on two grounds relating to Brown's competence to stand trial. That order directed the state to make a "reliable determination" of Brown's competency before any retrial. See Brown v. Kemp, Case No. 1:88-cv-228-RCF (N. District Ga., decided September 30, 1988) (unpublished opinion).
The case was returned to Gwinnett County for a retrial. Brown was evaluated by two physicians, who concluded that Brown was competent to stand trial. A jury trial was impanelled to hear Brown's special plea of incompetence. See OCGA § 17-7-130. The special jury found him competent to stand trial, and, after further pretrial hearings, the case proceeded to the retrial of the case in chief. Brown again was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. This is his appeal. 1
1. In his 5th, 10th, 11th, 13th and 17th enumerations of error, Brown argues he has been denied a fair opportunity to prove his mental condition at the time of the crime because of delays between the time of the crime and the time of the retrial. The combined result of these delays and an alleged violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) at the first trial, he argues, have deprived him of expert testimony about his mental condition at the time of the crime that would be relevant to his insanity defense, and as mitigation.
As we noted in our earlier opinion, Brown has been evaluated and treated for mental problems since 1968, when he was arrested on various charges of robbery and assault. Brown v. State, supra, 250 Ga. at 67, 295 S.E.2d 727. He exhibited no signs of psychosis, however, until after his arrest in this case in 1975. A psychiatrist at Central State Hospital evaluated Brown and concluded that Brown was a paranoid schizophrenic, was psychotic, and was not competent to stand trial. Other evaluations followed. Brown was given medication appropriate to the treatment of schizophrenia, and in 1977 a psychiatrist at Central State Hospital concluded he was now competent to stand trial. Brown experienced new difficulties after being transferred to the Gwinnett County jail, and was returned to Central State Hospital. He remained there until 1980, after a further finding of competence. In October of 1980, the jail administrator sent Brown to a local mental health clinic for evaluation after Brown wrote offensive letters to women inmates. The clinic psychiatrist evaluated Brown and concluded in a written report that Brown "needs treatment and does not seem to be able to stand trial." This report was not furnished to the jail personnel, and the prosecutor did not learn of the evaluation until after trial when the psychiatrist, testifying at a post-trial hearing, mentioned his earlier evaluation.
Brown again was evaluated soon before his 1981 trial by a psychologist who concluded that Brown was competent to stand trial. A special jury so found, and Brown was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death.
In 1988, the federal district court granted further habeas relief on two grounds: (1) The psychologist's evaluation was inadequate; and (2) the state violated Brady v. Maryland, supra, by failing to disclose to the defense the results of the clinic psychiatrist's 1980 evaluation.
2. (a) After the case returned to Gwinnett County, Brown was evaluated by his psychiatrist of choice, and by the psychiatrist chosen by the state. Both psychiatrists testified at Brown's competency trial, and both were of the opinion that Brown was, without question, competent to stand trial. According to them, Brown had not been treated or medicated since 1982 and showed no indication of any serious mental disorder. One witness testified that he was surprised to find Brown "in such a good remission," given the previous diagnoses of psychosis and paranoid schizophrenia, and his lack of medication since 1982. He suggested that the original diagnosis was incorrect and Brown had not been paranoid schizophrenic, but had a personality disorder that was aggravated by drug abuse. The state's witness agreed that Brown was in good mental condition. He testified that schizophrenia is "for the most part a lifelong illness with exacerbations of the illness ... and remissions," and agreed with the district attorney that schizophrenia is generally a "degenerative type mental condition if left untreated," as Brown has been since 1982. He said:
For an individual who was schizophrenic to go this period of time with no psychotic episodes, to show no residual level of schizophrenia, no blunting of the affect, no loss of energy, no loss of goal direction, no loosening of association ... will be most unusual to say the least.
Expressing doubt that "schizophrenia is ever cured," the witness stated it is "highly unlikely" that Brown ever was schizophrenic; and that it is "not uncommon" for those who abuse hallucinogenic drugs "to go through periods where they have the same symptoms as a schizophrenic." In his opinion, with the benefit of hindsight and observation of Brown's present and continuing good mental condition, Brown's previous mental condition was not paranoid schizophrenia, but "hallucinogen perception disorder" caused by his admitted frequent consumption of LSD between 1971 and 1975.
Brown did not present an insanity defense at the retrial, contending instead that he simply was not guilty. However, at the sentencing phase, two experts appeared on his behalf. One testified Brown was psychotic when he first examined him in June of 1975. He had no opinion about the defendant's sanity at the time of the crime, and suggested the stress of arrest could have triggered the defendant's psychosis. The other testified that when he examined the defendant in 1980, Brown was psychotic, but that he was now in complete remission.
The psychiatrist chosen by the state testified that the symptoms of post-hallucinogenic perceptual disorder were similar to schizophrenia. This fact, he testified, was unknown to psychiatric practitioners in 1975; that schizophrenia is a chronic, unrelenting disorder; and that he had never seen a schizophrenic with severe symptoms improve to the point of having no symptoms. In his opinion, Brown was never schizophrenic, but either had been malingering, or had suffered from post-hallucinogenic perceptual disorder.
(b) Whatever his mental condition during his first trial, it is abundantly clear that Brown has been mentally competent in the years since his first trial, and was competent at the time of the retrial.
3. Brown argues that the delay in trying his case has deprived him of an insanity defense and of evidence in mitigation. The delay between the time of the crime and the original trial was discussed in our previous opinion. Brown, supra, 250 Ga. at 73(4), 295 S.E.2d 727. Whether or not Brown's incompetence to stand trial during that time was feigned or real, the delay was caused by nothing that the state may have done.
4. (a) Brown argues that the state's Brady violation at the first trial caused a loss of favorable evidence. The record showed that neither the prosecutor nor any law enforcement officer knew of the clinic psychiatrist's opinion (that in 1980 Brown was not competent to stand trial).
Under the 11th Circuit holding of U.S. v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (1989):
Brady and its progeny apply to evidence possessed by a district's " 'prosecution team' which includes both investigative and prosecutorial personnel." [Cit.] Brady, then, applies only to information possessed by the prosecutor or anyone over whom he has authority.
A clinic psychiatrist who was unknown to the prosecution could not be characterized as part of the prosecution "team." Under the present interpretation of Brady, this could not constitute a Brady violation.
(b) Additionally, there is no reasonable likelihood that Brown has been prejudiced by the delay. As the state points out, Brown had been examined numerous times since May of 1975, and at no time--neither while he was supposedly incompetent, nor since he has recovered--has any mental health expert concluded that he was insane at the time of the crime. 2 There is nothing in the record to support a conclusion that Brown was deprived of expert testimony or other material evidence about his mental condition at the time of the crime as a result of the delays in the conclusion of the case.
5. (a) In his first and 16th enumerations of errors, Brown contends the court erred by allowing Brown's wife to invoke the marital privilege contained in OCGA § 24-9-23, and to refuse to testify on his behalf.
The relevant portion of OCGA § 24-9-23 provides:
(a) Husband and wife shall be competent but shall not be compellable to give evidence in any criminal proceeding for or against each other. [Emphasis supplied.]
(b) The privilege of refusing to...
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