Brown v. State
| Decision Date | 01 July 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. A09A0774.,A09A0774. |
| Citation | 683 S.E.2d 614,299 Ga. App. 402 |
| Parties | BROWN v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Michael J. Kramer, Marietta, for appellant.
David L. Cannon, Jr., Solicitor-General, Kristen A. Roch, Michelle L. Holbrook Homier, Asst. Solicitors-General, for appellee.
Following a stipulated bench trial, Mary E. Brown appeals her convictions for DUI per se, DUI less safe, and underage possession of alcohol, contending that (1) the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the results of an alco-sensor test, because she was not read Miranda rights prior to its administration, (2) she was arrested without probable cause, and (3) the legally admissible evidence presented against her was insufficient to support her convictions. Finding no error, we affirm.
We will affirm the trial court's judgment "if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
(Citations omitted.) Rainey v. State, 286 Ga.App. 682, 649 S.E.2d 871 (2007).
So construed, the evidence shows that on April 20, 2008, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Deputy Shaw of the Cherokee County Sheriff's Department stopped a vehicle for various equipment violations, including a cracked windshield and broken brake light. The vehicle was occupied by Brown, who was driving, and a passenger. Upon approaching the vehicle, Deputy Shaw noted an odor of alcohol. When asked for identification, Brown stated that she had lost her driver's license. Brown was directed out of the vehicle to determine if the alcoholic odor was exuding from her. Once Brown was outside, Deputy Shaw asked her preliminary questions including her date of birth, from which he learned that Brown was a minor. Deputy Shaw continued to smell the alcohol on her and further noticed she was extremely talkative, manifesting a state he described as a "happy drunk." Additionally, her eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Shaw asked Brown to take an alco-sensor test, and after some initial difficulty in performing the test, she was able to complete it. The test measured positive, and the officer asked her again whether she had been drinking, although she had initially told him that she had not consumed any alcohol. When questioned again, Brown told the officer she had consumed "one," although she did not specify what type of alcoholic beverage she had consumed. Brown was then placed under arrest and, after being read the implied consent warning for suspects under the age of 21, agreed to take the state-administered breath test. The results of that test indicated that Brown was well above the per se legal limit for persons under the age of 21.
No other field sobriety tests were conducted, and there was no indication of any impairment in Brown's driving.
On June 2, 2008, Brown filed a motion to suppress and/or motion to dismiss, contending that she was arrested without probable cause and that the results of the alco-sensor test should be suppressed because she was not read her Miranda rights prior to its administration. The trial court denied these motions and found Brown guilty of DUI per se (Count 1), DUI less safe (Count 2), minor in possession of alcohol (Count 4), violation of a Class D license restriction (Count 5), and improper brake lights (Count 6).1
1. Brown first argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress/motion to dismiss because she was entitled to be advised of her Miranda rights prior to the administration of the alco-sensor test. We find no merit to this contention.
[T]he issue of whether Miranda protections attach to the results of field sobriety evaluations has been addressed repeatedly under Georgia law. It is well established that Miranda warnings are not required while an investigating officer conducts preliminary questioning or field sobriety tests, but apply only after a DUI suspect is arrested.
Loden v. State, 271 Ga.App. 632, 633, 610 S.E.2d 593 (2005).
Although, the record clearly shows that the alco-sensor test was administered prior to Brown's formal arrest, Brown contends that she was nevertheless in custody at the time the test was administered and therefore the protections of Miranda were triggered.
[F]or the proscriptions of Miranda to apply, a "person must be taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way." In determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, but the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. The test for determining whether a person is "in custody" at a traffic stop is if a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have thought the detention would not be temporary.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lyons v. State, 244 Ga.App. 658, 663(2), 535 S.E.2d 841 (2000).
"The issue of whether one is in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact, and we will not disturb the trial court's determination unless it is clearly erroneous." Tune v. State, 286 Ga.App. 32, 35(1)(b), 648 S.E.2d 423 (2007).
In this case, Deputy Shaw did not make any statement or take any action that would cause a reasonable person in Brown's position to believe that his freedom was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Brown was not handcuffed, secured in the back of a police vehicle, or treated in any manner which would raise this investigative stop to the level of an arrest. Additionally, Brown voluntarily submitted to the alco-sensor tests. Similarly, we held the suspect in Lyons was not entitled to Miranda rights because he voluntarily chose to step out of the car and take field sobriety tests. Lyons, 244 Ga.App. at 663(2), 535 S.E.2d 841. The trial court's finding that Brown was not in custody at the time the alco-sensor test was administered was not clearly erroneous.
Brown makes the additional argument that her status as a minor makes this case materially different than typical DUI stops. Brown notes that when people over the age of 21 are questioned in situations involving a possible DUI offense, the officer is trying to determine whether there is possible impairment or probable cause...
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