Brown v. State

• Decision Date: 02 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 48S02–1406–CR–363.,48S02–1406–CR–363.
• Citation: 10 N.E.3d 1
• Parties: Martez BROWN, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

10 N.E.3d 1

Martez BROWN, Appellant (Defendant below),

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 48S02–1406–CR–363.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

June 2, 2014.

David W. Stone IV, Stone Law Office and Legal Research, Anderson, IN, for Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, James B. Martin, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Attorneys for Appellee.

On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 48A02–1212–CR–1007

RUCKER, Justice.

Martez Brown appeals his 150–year sentence imposed for two counts of murder and one count of robbery. Exercising our constitutional authority we revise Brown's sentence.

Facts and Procedural History

Sometime during the late evening hours of Friday, November 26 and the early morning hours of Saturday, November 27, 2010, three teenagers—eighteen-year-old Na–Son Smith, sixteen-year-old Martez Brown, and fifteen-year-old Jacob Fuller—robbed Stephen Streeter and his girlfriend Keya Prince in their Anderson home. Streeter and Prince were shot and killed during the robbery, and Brown and his friends absconded with several thousand dollars in cash, several pounds of marijuana, two video game systems, two flat-screen televisions, and a 9mm handgun. The bodies of Streeter and Prince were discovered the following Monday when police conducted a welfare check at their home. In the days following the crime Brown sold the stolen 9mm handgun, which eventually made its way into the hands of police investigating the murders.

Approximately four days after the victims' bodies were discovered, Brown was arrested in connection with the crime and gave police a statement—which he subsequently recanted when called as a witness during Fuller's trial—implicating himself, Fuller, and Smith in the double killings. Specifically Brown explained that he, Fuller ¹ and Smith had targeted Streeter because they heard he was a drug dealer and kept large amounts of cash. See State's Ex. 172 (Tr. of Brown's Interview at 24–25). According to Brown, Fuller drove the three of them to Streeter's house; each of the teenagers was armed with a gun; and the trio entered the house, bound Streeter, and grabbed Prince. While Brown was “looking for money and the bud,” Fuller shot Prince once in the chest. Id. at 29. According to Brown, shortly thereafter Smith shot Streeter once in the back of the head. Brown told police his friends shot the victims because they were afraid of being recognized. After the robbery Brown and his cohorts went on a shopping spree in which they spent the proceeds. They were later identified in a Walmart surveillance video during one of these excursions. And police later recovered photographs retrieved from the cell phones of Smith and Fuller taken shortly after the crime depicting the trio displaying large amounts of cash. State's Ex. 157a.

The State charged Brown with two counts of murder, one count of robbery as a Class A felony, one count of burglary as a Class A felony, and one count of theft as a Class D felony. The State also sought a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that Brown at one point entered a plea agreement with the State that was either withdrawn or not accepted by the trial court. In any event Brown eventually waived his right to trial by jury and his three-day bench trial began October 30, 2012, at the conclusion of which the State moved to dismiss the burglary charge and its request for a sentence of life without parole. The trial court granted the motion and found Brown guilty of the remaining charges. At the sentencing hearing the trial court reduced the robbery conviction to a Class B felony because of double jeopardy concerns and did not enter judgment for theft finding it a lesser included offense of the robbery. After recounting and weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors the trial court ultimately sentenced Brown to the maximum term of sixty-five years for each murder and the maximum term of twenty years for the robbery, all to be served consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 150 years.

Brown appealed raising several claims including the appropriateness of his sentence, all of which the Court of Appeals rejected. See Brown v. State, No. 48A02–1212–CR–1007, 2013 WL 3894117 (Ind.Ct.App. July 30, 2013). We now grant Brown's petition to transfer to address his appropriateness claim. In all other respects we summarily affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals. SeeInd. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2). Additional facts are set forth below.

Discussion

Typically, the juvenile court has jurisdiction over sixteen-year-old teenagers like Brown. However, in the case of some crimes—including murder and robbery—“[t]he juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over an individual ... [who] was at least sixteen (16) years of age at the time of the alleged violation.” I.C. § 31–30–1–4(a). It is by virtue of this statute that Brown was tried as an adult. The sentencing range for an adult convicted of murder is forty-five to sixty-five years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five years.²I.C. § 35–50–2–3(a). The sentencing range for Class B felony robbery is six to twenty years, with the advisory sentence being ten years. I.C. § 35–50–2–5. In addition, the trial court has discretion to “determine whether terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently or consecutively ... [and] may consider” aggravatingand mitigating circumstances in making such a determination. I.C. § 35–50–1–2(c).

At the sentencing hearing, before imposing sentence the trial court commented: “This is a community tragedy. It's a significant community tragedy and it requires a powerful response and my job, my role here is to act as the voice of the community and tell you what the community thinks about what you've done.” Tr. at 429–30. The trial court then considered the aggravating and mitigating factors. In aggravation the court identified the following: (1) two people were killed; (2) Brown's history of criminal and delinquent activity; (3) the offenses were committed in the presence of a person under eighteen years of age (cohort Jacob Fuller who was fifteen); (4) Brown had recently violated probation; and (5) that Brown conspired with his co-defendants to commit the offenses. Tr. at 430. In mitigation, the trial court found: (1) Brown initially cooperated with law enforcement by giving a statement; and (2) Brown's young age. Tr. at 431. The trial court then imposed the maximum sentence possible: Sixty-five years for Streeter's murder, plus sixty-five years for Prince's murder, plus twenty years for the robbery, all to be served consecutively.

The trial court certainly acted well within its broad discretion in imposing this sentence. But see infra note 3. However, “[e]ven where a trial court has not abused its discretion in sentencing, the Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing decision.” Pierce v. State, 949 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind.2011) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind.2007), clarified on reh'g by875 N.E.2d 218). We implement this authority through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that we may “ ‘revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision’ ” we find “ ‘the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.’ ” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491 (quoting App. R. 7(B)). Whereas prior to 2003 our authority to revise was confined to cases in which the sentence was “ manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender,” seeApp. R. 7(B) (2002) (emphasis added), the current rule reflects our “modest steps to provide more realistic appeal of sentencing issues.” Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ind.2003). Today's Rule 7(B) “places central focus on the role of the trial judge, while reserving for the appellate court the chance to review the matter in a climate more distant from local clamor.” Id. at 856–57.

In considering the nature of the offense we recognize the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494. The trial court ultimately imposes a sentence based on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances it finds. However, in analyzing a claim under Appellate Rule 7(B), we are not limited to the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court.

Nature of the offense

The record in this case reveals two circumstances we find important with respect to the nature of Brown's offense.

First, and particularly important, although receiving the same maximum sentence as his two cohorts, Brown was apparently found guilty of both murders as an accomplice. As the prosecutor noted in closing argument, “the evidence suggests and probably indicates [Brown] did not kill anybody himself.” Tr. at 409. “The evidence in this case suggests he probably was not [one of] the murderers. Not one of the persons that actually pulled the trigger and took a life himself.” Id. However, the prosecutor correctly contended: “[Brown is] still guilty under the theory of accompli[ce] liability.” Id. Recently in Castillo v. State, we recognized that the “nature of the offense ... provides the strongest consideration in favor of revising the defendant's sentence” where “the evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant knowingly or intentionally killed the victim but ... sufficient for the jury to find her guilty as an accomplice.” 974 N.E.2d 458, 463 (Ind.2012) (footnote omitted). In that case Engelica Castillo was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for her role in her boyfriend's beating death of a two-year-old child in her care. In revising Castillo's sentence to sixty-five years we relied in part on...