Casiano v. Comm'r of Corr.

• Decision Date: 26 May 2015
• Docket Number: SC 19345
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: JASON CASIANO v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

JASON CASIANO v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

SC 19345

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Argued September 16, 2014

May 26, 2015^*

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js.

Heather Golias, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Robin S. Schwartz, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state's attorney, and Adrienne Maciulewski, deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

Opinion

McDONALD, J. We recently held in State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637, 659, A.3d (2015), that, to comport with the eighth amendment to the federal constitution, the trial court must give mitigating weight to the youth related factors set forth in Miller v. Alabama, U.S. , 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464-65, 2468, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), when considering whether to impose a life sentence without the possibility of parole on a juvenile homicide offender. In Riley, the defendant challenged on direct appeal a total effective sentence of 100 years with no possibility of parole before his natural life expired, a sentence that the state conceded was the functional equivalent to life without parole. State v. Riley, supra, 642. The different procedural posture and sentence in the present case raises two significant issues regarding the reach of Miller, whether Miller applies retroactively under Connecticut law to cases arising on collateral review, and, if so, whether Miller applies to the imposition of a fifty year sentence on a juvenile offender. We answer both questions in the affirmative¹ and, therefore, reverse the habeas court's decision rendering summary judgment in favor of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner, Jason Casiano.

This case arises in the context of the following undisputed facts. In 1995, the petitioner, then sixteen years old, and two accomplices attempted to rob a Subway sandwich shop. When the store employee failed to promptly comply with a demand for money, the petitioner shot him four times, resulting in his death. The petitioner and his accomplices fled the scene without completing the robbery. The petitioner was arrested and charged with felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-134 (a) (2), and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-134 (a) (2). The state also sought an enhanced penalty for the use of a firearm during the commission of these offenses in violation of General Statutes § 53-202k. For these crimes, the petitioner faced a potential total effective sentence of between twenty-five and 105 years imprisonment.

The petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the three substantive charges pursuant to a court indicated plea agreement, conditioned on his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress incriminating statements he made to the police. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the petitioner to a total effective prison term of fifty years: fifty years on the felony murder count, and separate twenty year sentences on the counts of attempt to commit robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commitrobbery in the first degree, to run concurrent to the felony murder sentence. The petitioner is not eligible for parole on the felony murder conviction. See General Statutes § 54-125a (b) (1) (C). The Appellate Court upheld the petitioner's conviction on appeal; State v. Casiano, 55 Conn. App. 582, 591, 740 A.2d 435 (1999); and this court denied certification to appeal that decision. State v. Casiano, 252 Conn. 942, 747 A.2d 518 (2000).²

After the petitioner's conviction and sentence became final, the United States Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases that altered the landscape of juvenile sentencing practices. The court held that, under the eighth amendment to the federal constitution, "children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing"; Miller v. Alabama, supra, 132 S. Ct. 2464; and, therefore, that they cannot be sentenced in certain circumstances as if they are adults. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005) (eighth and fourteenth amendments prohibit imposition of death penalty on offenders who were under age of eighteen when their crimes were committed); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010) (eighth amendment prohibits sentence of life without possibility of parole for juvenile nonhomicide offender); Miller v. Alabama, supra, 2463-64 (eighth amendment prohibits sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offender, thereby precluding sentencing authority from considering offender's age and hallmarks of adolescence).

In light of these legal developments, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that General Statutes §§ 53a-35a (2) and 54-125a (b), the authority under which his fifty year prison term with no possibility of parole was imposed, violate the eighth amendment as applied to him. He requested that his sentence be vacated and his case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The respondent filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that the petitioner's claims were controlled by the Appellate Court's decision in State v. Riley, 140 Conn. App. 1, 14-19, 58 A.3d 304 (2013), which held that Connecticut sentencing practices that permit the trial court to impose a lesser sentence than life imprisonment without parole and to consider any mitigating evidence offered are constitutional under Miller.³ The habeas court agreed and granted the respondent's motion.

Following this court's decision granting certification to appeal in State v. Riley, 308 Conn. 910, 61 A.3d 531 (2013), the petitioner appealed from the habeas court's judgment to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court. In his appeal, the petitioner argues that Miller requires a trial court to consider the characteristics of youth as mitigating evidence indetermining whether a sentence of life without parole is appropriate.⁴ He argues that his sentence of fifty years imprisonment without the opportunity for parole is the functional equivalent of a life sentence and therefore must comport with the requirements set forth in Miller. The respondent counters that Miller does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.⁵ The respondent further contends that, even if it does apply, the petitioner cannot avail himself of the individual sentencing procedure under Miller because his fifty year sentence is not a life sentence, nor was it imposed pursuant to a mandatory sentencing scheme. We conclude that Miller applies retroactively under Connecticut law to the petitioner's case.

I

In Riley, we provided an overview of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Roper, Graham, and Miller. State v. Riley, supra, 315 Conn. 645-53. Therefore, we limit our discussion of that court's juvenile sentencing cases to the aspects of those cases that are particularly relevant to the questions in the present case. Although Miller is our principal focus, we also address Graham insofar as that decision sheds light on the substantive question before us.

The eighth amendment to the United States constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the eighth amendment contains a proportionality principle, that is, that "punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to both the offender and the offense." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Alabama, supra, 132 S. Ct. 2463.

In Graham, the court adopted a categorical rule, concluding that the eighth amendment bars a sentence of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. Graham v. Florida, supra, 560 U.S. 82. Similarities between the death penalty—which Roper had barred for juvenile offenders—and life without parole—" 'the second most severe penalty permitted by law' "; id., 69; played a significant role in the court's basis for its holding in Graham. See Miller v. Alabama, supra, 132 S. Ct. 2463 (court in Graham "likened life without parole for juveniles to the death penalty"). The court in Graham explained that life without parole "is irrevocable. It deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence. . . . [T]his sentence means denial of hope; it means that good behavior and character improvement are immaterial; it means that whatever the future might hold in store for the mind and spirit of [the convict], he will remain in prison for the rest of his days." (Citation omitted; internalquotation marks omitted.) Graham v. Florida, supra, 69-70.

In Miller, the court held that, before a sentence of life without the possibility of parole may be imposed on a juvenile homicide offender, a sentencing authority must engage in an individualized sentencing process that accounts for the mitigating circumstances of youth and its attendant characteristics. Miller v. Alabama, supra, 132 S. Ct. 2469. Relying on its prior decisions in Roper and Graham, which both cited science and social science as support for their conclusions, the court noted that studies show that "[o]nly a relatively small proportion of adolescents who engage in illegal activity develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior. [Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. 570] . . . . [D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds—for example, in parts of the brain involved...