Brown v. State, 91-876

Decision Date12 August 1992
Docket NumberNo. 91-876,91-876
Citation604 So.2d 20
PartiesAlphonso BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. 604 So.2d 20, 17 Fla. L. Week. D1918
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

James C. Banks, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Charlie McCoy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

SHIVERS, Judge.

Appellant Brown was convicted and sentenced on charges of armed burglary (Count I), possession of burglary tools (Count II), grand theft of a firearm (Count III), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count IV). Outside the presence of the jury, the state and defense had stipulated that Brown had a prior felony conviction. The state subsequently admitted into evidence, without a defense objection, a certified judgment and sentence showing the prior conviction was of the crime of resisting arrest with violence. On appeal, Brown alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to move to sever Count IV, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, from the other counts. Appellant asserts that, because he did not testify on his own behalf, the jury would not have known about the prior felony conviction but for counsel's failure to act. We cannot determine, from the appellate record, whether the failure to move to sever Count IV unfairly prejudiced appellant. State v. Vazquez, 419 So.2d 1088 (Fla.1982). Accordingly, we decline to review this issue any further, inasmuch as the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel should be addressed in a Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 motion for post-conviction proceeding. See Stewart v. State, 420 So.2d 862, 864 & n. 4 (Fla.1982), cert. den., 460 U.S. 1103, 103 S.Ct. 1802, 76 L.Ed.2d 366 (1983) (ineffective assistance of counsel is collateral matter that may not be raised for the first time on appeal, unless facts on which claim is based are evident in appellate record); Blanco v. Wainwright, 507 So.2d 1377, 1384 (Fla.1987); Antunovich v. State, 491 So.2d 328, 329 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

Appellant was sentenced as a habitual felony offender pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1989), on Counts II through IV. He challenges the constitutionality of his habitualization, citing Johnson v. State, 589 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), in which we reversed the case and remanded for resentencing on the ground that Chapter 89-280, Laws of Florida, which had amended the 1988 version of the habitual felony offender statute, violated the constitutional single-subject rule. We find appellant's challenge to be without merit and affirm this point on appeal. See Tims...

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3 cases
  • Dickson v. Sec'y
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • 5 Octubre 2015
    ...on this issue.[25] A decision to try these cases together, rather than to have multiple trials, can be a valid tactical decision. Brown v. State, 604 So.2d 20 (1DCA Fla. 1992). A valid tactical decision made by a knowing and willing defendant cannot be the subject of appellate review, so th......
  • Moore v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 10 Noviembre 2011
    ...felon from the remaining charges, and that Moore did not raise this as a ground for relief in his 3.850 motion. Cf. Brown v. State, 604 So.2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Sloan v. State, 500 So.2d 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). As his first issue, Moore claims that his counsel was ineffective for faili......
  • Lewis v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 15 Octubre 2008
    ...it is clear that a single trial of all charges does not constitute apparent ineffective assistance of counsel. See Brown v. State, 604 So.2d 20, 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (finding that the failure of defense counsel to sever a possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge from other char......

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