Brown v. State

• Decision Date: 10 February 1956
• Docket Number: No. 29237,29237
• Citation: 235 Ind. 186,131 N.E.2d 777
• Parties: William A. BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 777

131 N.E.2d 777

235 Ind. 186

William A. BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 29237.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Feb. 10, 1956.

Walter B. Keaton, Rushville, William L. Woodfull, Frank I. Hamilton, Greensburg, for appellant.

Edwin K. Steers, Atty. Gen., Owen S. Boling, Richard M. Givan, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellee.

LANDIS, Judge.

Appellant was convicted in 1931 of first degree murder upon a plea of guilty, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In 1953 appellant filed writ of error coram nobis, which petition was sustained, his conviction set aside, and a plea of not guilty substituted for a previous plea of guilty.

A jury trial followed, and appellant was again convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Error is assigned upon the denial of his motion for new trial.

Appellant first contends that the record of this cause indicates appellant was insane during the trial before a jury, and that the court erred in failing to apply appropriate sections of the Indiana statutes pertaining to insane defendants in criminal actions. ¹

Here it appears the prosecuting attorney, prior to appellant's trial by jury, filed a motion to determine the question of appellant's sanity, and thereupon the court appointed Drs. Earl Mericle and E. Rogers Smith of Indianapolis, two eminent psychiatrists, to examine appellant. The examination was conducted August 23, 1952, and in January of 1953 they submitted their report to the court, describing in detail his condition, and concluding as follows, towit:

'He is clearly able to differentiate between right and wrong and fully understands the nature of the charge against him. He is capable of aiding in his own defense.

'We believe that this man is of sound mind at the present time and is suffering from no mental disease.'

The record does not indicate, nor does appellant claim on this appeal, that he at any time entered a plea of insanity, nor made a request for re-examination by court-appointed doctors.

The trial began on November 16, 1953, and during the same, appellant moved the court to discharge his court-appointed attorneys, and to be allowed to conduct his own defense. The trial judge, the Honorable John W. Goddard, Judge of the Decatur Circuit Court, while granting said motion of appellant, very properly instructed appellant's counsel to remain in the courtroom and at all times to be available to appellant for advice and consultation if appellant should desire the same. See: Sneed v. State, Ind.1955, 130 N.E.2d 32. The prisoner, during his previous years of imprisonment, had familarized himself in a limited way with some of the rudiments of a legal education. The State has conceded that the actions of appellant during the course of the trial indicated he was not skilled as an attorney, and that he persisted in bringing extraneous matter into the record. However, it appears this was done by the appellant voluntarily after advice from the court on repeated occasions, cautioning appellant as to his conduct.

The report of the doctors who examined appellant, indicated he had sufficient comprehension to differentiate between right and wrong, and that he understood the nature of the charge against him. The mere fact that he conducted himself in an indiscreet manner, or did not follow the wisest course in prosecuting his defense, cannot be considered as necessarily establishing that he was, in fact, insane. This court in Goodwin v. State, 1884, 96 Ind. 550 said:

'Where there is mental capacity sufficient to fully comprehend the nature and consequences of an act, and unimpaired willpower strong enough to master an impulse to commit a crime, there is criminal responsibility.' See also: Kallas v. State, 1949, 227 Ind. 103, 122, 83 N.E.2d 769, certiorari denied 336 U.S. 940, 69 S.Ct. 744, 93 L.Ed. 1098.

An examination of the record in this cause discloses that although appellant conducted himself at the trial in a rather unusual and unorthodox manner, he also demonstrated an understanding of the charge against him and of the consequences which he might suffer. When appellant chose to discharge his court-appointed counsel and to conduct his own defense, he necessarily accepted the handicaps that resulted from such self-representation. State ex rel. Fulton v. Schannen, 1946, 224 Ind. 55, 64 N.E.2d 798; Blanton v. State, 1...