Reynolds v. State, 80A04-9803-CR-173

Decision Date06 January 1999
Docket NumberNo. 80A04-9803-CR-173,80A04-9803-CR-173
Citation703 N.E.2d 701
PartiesHarold Wayne REYNOLDS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court
OPINION

SULLIVAN, Judge.

Appellant-defendant Harold Wayne Reynolds (Reynolds) appeals his conviction of Resisting Law Enforcement, 1 a Class D Felony.

We affirm.

The sole issue on appeal is whether Reynolds knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to a trial by jury. The argument is premised upon the fact that defense counsel, not the court, advised Reynolds of the substance of such right and that Reynolds had been found only minimally competent to stand trial.

While on duty during the afternoon of Saturday, February 8, 1997, Detective David Lee Cochran (Cochran) of the Tipton County Sheriff's Department attempted to serve an arrest warrant on Reynolds, whom Cochran observed walking westbound on State Road 28 near the town of Hobbs, Indiana, in Tipton County. Driving a marked police unit, Cochran activated the vehicle's flashing lights and stopped directly behind Reynolds. Cochran, who was not in uniform but displayed a badge on his belt and a firearm at his side, stepped out of his car and yelled at Reynolds by name. Reynolds stopped and turned around to face Cochran, at which point Cochran identified himself as a police officer and asked Reynolds to step back to the vehicle. Reynolds responded with a profane phrase and started running southbound. Cochran yelled at Reynolds, ordering him not to run and informing Reynolds that he was under arrest.

Cochran next observed Reynolds standing in an alley behind a residence. Detective Cochran again advised Reynolds that he was under arrest. Reynolds cursed at Cochran and walked away to the side of the residence. Reynolds attempted to enter the residence through a window but was denied access. Cochran exited his police vehicle, yelled once more at Reynolds and started to approach him. At that point, Reynolds picked up a two by two inch pine board, eight feet in length, and started walking towards Cochran, while swinging the board like a baseball bat. Cochran drew his firearm and ordered Reynolds to drop the board or risk being shot. Still swinging the board, Reynolds threatened to kill Cochran and continued advancing towards him. A second officer, Michael Pratt, arrived on the scene and attempted to calm Reynolds down. When approximately ten feet away from Cochran, Reynolds stopped his advance and stopped swinging the board, although stilling holding onto it. A third officer on the scene, Trooper Jack Horner, then grabbed Reynolds and laid him over the hood of Cochran's vehicle. Cochran handcuffed Reynolds and transported him to the county jail.

The State filed an Information against Reynolds on April 16, 1997, charging him with one count of Resisting Law Enforcement. 2 On July 11, 1997, upon motion by Reynolds, the trial court ordered an examination of Reynolds in order to determine his competence to stand trial. 3 Dr. Robert J. McDaniel informed the trial court on August 11, 1997, that Reynolds possessed the minimal capacity to stand trial. Reynolds had received a score of 21 on a competency screening test. According to Dr. Reynolds "[s]cores above 20 suggest that an individual is competent to stand trial." Record at 27. Also, Reynolds had explained the duties of different officers of the court and had expressed his willingness to aid his attorney in preparing his defense.

On the day scheduled for his jury trial, October 28, 1997, Reynolds appeared with his counsel in open court, and the trial court made a preliminary inquiry as to whether Reynolds chose to waive his right to a jury trial. Under oath, Reynolds responded as follows to questions asked by defense counsel:

"Q. Harold, you understand that you have a constitutional right to have your criminal charges heard by a jury?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And do you understand what that means?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you try to explain to the Court what that means?

A. I'm liable to have a jury trial.

Q. And what does a jury trial mean?

A. (No audible answer.)

Q. Do you believe it to mean that--that citizens from the community would listen to the evidence and make a decision based on the testimony and the evidence presented as to whether the State proved its case and made you guilty or not guilty, is that what you understand a jury trial to be?

A. Yeah. Yeah.

Q. Okay and you also understand that you have a right to waive your right to a jury trial?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have a right to have a court trial or a bench trial?

A. Yes.

Q. And do you understand that a court trial is when a jury of citizens does not judge the evidence, but a--the judge will listen to the evidence and the judge will make a decision as to whether the State proved its case and to whether you should be found guilty or not guilty?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay and you understand the difference between a jury trial and bench trial?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have an opinion today as to whether you wish to have your case heard by a jury or by the Court?

A. I'd rather have it heard by the Court.

Q. And you understand that by having your case heard by the Court you are giving up your constitutional rights for the jury trial?

A. Yes.

Q. And are you making that decision because you believe that that is what is in your best interests today?

A. Yes.

Q. And you want to have a bench trial today?

A. Yes." Record at 42-44.

Upon hearing this testimony, the trial court determined that Reynolds had voluntarily, freely and knowingly waived his constitutional right to a jury trial. A bench trial ensued, and, following presentation of the evidence, the court found Reynolds guilty of the crime charged. The trial court ordered preparation of a presentence investigation report. On December 18, 1997, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing and sentenced Reynolds to three years incarceration, less 253 days for time served prior to sentencing. The court cited as an aggravating factor Reynolds' extensive criminal history, including a prior conviction for the same offense, and cited as a mitigating factor Reynolds' history of "mental illness" or "instability." Record at 89.

Reynolds contends that he did not make a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial. Thus, he argues, the trial court committed fundamental error. Reynolds asserts that he was not properly advised as to jury trial waiver. He asserts:

"In addition to what was conveyed to Reynolds by trial counsel, it is important to point out to this Court what was left out. There was nothing said about Reynolds['] capacity to understand the proceedings regarding the waiver of his right to a jury trial. He was not informed that it would be six (6) citizens who are sworn to be impartial and that both his attorney and the prosecutor would engage in their selection. He was not told he could take certain jurors off the panel for no particular reason pursuant to peremptory strikes. There was no inquiry into Reynolds' ability to read and understand the English language, nor is there any evidence as to whether Reynolds had any formal schooling, and if he did, to what level or extent." Appellant's Brief at 9.

The record, according to Reynolds, does not support the trial court's determination that Reynolds knew and understood the nature, extent and importance of his right to a jury trial.

A person charged with a felony has an automatic right to a jury trial unless he waives it. Hutchins v. State (1986) Ind., 493 N.E.2d 444, 445. It is fundamental error to deny a defendant a jury trial unless there is evidence of the defendant's knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right. Eldridge v. State (1994) Ind.App., 627 N.E.2d 844, 846, trans. denied. The waiver must be elicited personally from the defendant, either orally in open court or in writing....

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    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
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    ...796 N.E.2d 1230, 1234 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) ; Gonzalez v. State, 757 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied; Reynolds v. State, 703 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) ; Greene v. State, 670 N.E.2d 38, 40 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied; Hanna–Womack v. State, 623 N.E.2d 439, 440 (Ind.......
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    ...a jury trial unless there is evidence of the defendant's knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right." Reynolds v. State, 703 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).The State notes, "It is possible that the trial court did not explicitly inform Hogan of his right to have that evidence......
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    ...a jury trial unless there is evidence of the defendant's knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right." Reynolds v. State, 703 N.E.2d 701, 704 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). "The defendant must express his personal desire to waive a jury trial and such a personal desire must be apparent from ......
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