Brown v. State, CR–16–1079
| Decision Date | 27 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. CR–16–1079,CR–16–1079 |
| Citation | 531 S.W.3d 417 |
| Parties | Korey K. BROWN, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee |
| Court | Arkansas Court of Appeals |
William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Karen Virginia Wallace, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
Appellant, Korey Brown, appeals his conviction by the Pulaski County Circuit Court on a charge of committing theft of automobile by threat, for which he was sentenced as a habitual offender to eighteen years' imprisonment. Appellant's sole point on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.
On April 6, 2016, the State filed an amended three-count felony information alleging that on or about January 22, 2014, appellant committed three felony offenses against J.L. The three felony offenses were (1) rape; (2) kidnapping; and (3) theft of J.L.'s automobile by threat of serious physical injury. In the information, the State also alleged that appellant was a habitual offender with four or more prior felony convictions.
At appellant's jury trial held on May 10–12, 2016, the State offered proof through J.L.'s testimony that appellant allegedly threatened J.L. in order to obtain her automobile. She testified as to the events that occurred early on the morning of January 22, 2014, involving her encounter with appellant that resulted in the above-described charges.
Appellant preserved at trial the issue now on appeal at trial by complying with Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1(a) (2016) when, at the close of the State's presentation of its case-in-chief, appellant's trial counsel moved for a directed verdict on theft by threat as a lesser offense of theft by threat of serious physical injury, based on the State's failure to prove that appellant made any kind of threat to J.L. in order to obtain her automobile. The trial court denied this directed-verdict motion. At the close of presentation of all the evidence, appellant's counsel renewed the earlier motion for a directed verdict, which the trial court also denied.
The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the rape charge but found appellant (1) not guilty of kidnapping and (2) guilty of having committed theft of J.L.'s automobile by threat. The jury sentenced appellant, as a habitual offender, to eighteen years' imprisonment pursuant to a sentencing order filed on May 24, 2016, and an amended sentencing order filed on June 2, 2016. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 20, 2016.
The denial of a motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Petty v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 347, 526 S.W.3d 8. When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. The appellate court considers only the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. The verdict will be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Id. This court does not weigh the evidence presented at trial nor does this court assess the credibility of witnesses. Fronterhouse v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 211, 463 S.W.3d 312. The fact-finder is free to believe all or part of a witness's testimony and may resolve all questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Id. Inconsistent testimony does not render proof insufficient as a matter of law. Harmon v. State, 340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472 (2000). Criminal intent can be inferred from one's behavior under the circumstances. Id. It is presumed that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts. Id.
Appellant argues that the State failed to introduce substantial evidence that he obtained J.L.'s automobile by threat. Appellant submits that J.L.'s testimony established that, while his conduct showed an intention to inflict harm toward her, the State failed to introduce substantial evidence that appellant's menacing behavior was specifically directed toward obtaining J.L.'s automobile. He notes that J.L. never specifically testified that she let appellant obtain her automobile because she believed he would harm her. Appellant submits that the jury had to speculate as to what offense the State was arguing that his conduct was directed toward achieving—the rape, the kidnapping, or the theft of J.L.'s automobile. Appellant argues that the crucial proof missing from the State's case was testimony from J.L. that he obtained her automobile because she felt threatened by him.
"Threat," as is relevant to this case, is defined as "a menace, however communicated, to: cause physical injury to any person." Ark. Code Ann. § 5–36–101(11)(A)(i) (Supp. 2015). Although "menace" is not defined in the Arkansas Criminal Code, the ordinary, dictionary definition of "menace" is "a show of intention to inflict harm." See Saffold v. State, 951 So.2d 777, 780 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006). A person "obtains" property by theft by threat by bringing about a transfer of the property. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5–36–101(7)(A) ; 5–36–103(a)(2) (Repl. 2013).
Appellant argues that even when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, J.L.'s trial testimony established that while his conduct toward her showed an intention to inflict harm on her, his intention to inflict harm on her was not specifically directed toward obtaining her automobile. Appellant compares the facts of a rape and robbery case, Carter v. State, 295 Ark. 218, 748 S.W.2d 127 (1988), to illustrate the absence of the State's proof on this point. In Carter, during a home-invasion rape, the defendant beat the victim, threatened her with a knife, and then raped her. After he had raped her, the defendant went through the victim's purse looking for money. On appeal, the defendant argued that there was no substantial evidence that he committed robbery because he exercised no physical force against the victim after he had raped her. The Arkansas Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that when the defendant was going through the victim's purse, "she thought he would start hitting her again." Carter, 295 Ark. at 222–23, 748 S.W.2d at 129.
Contrast those facts with this case in which appellant notes that there was no similar testimony from J.L. She never testified at trial that she allowed appellant to drive her automobile because she feared that he would punch her again or otherwise inflict harm on her. Without such testimony, appellant urges that the jury could only speculate that he punched J.L. in the face to obtain control of...
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