Brown v. State
| Decision Date | 08 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. A13A1465.,A13A1465. |
| Citation | 325 Ga.App. 237,750 S.E.2d 453 |
| Parties | BROWN v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Sheueli Cindy Wang, Margaret Elizabeth Flynt, for Appellant.
Paul L. Howard Jr., Dist. Atty., Arthur Conley Walton, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Appellee.
Johnny L. Brown was convicted of terroristic threats,1 six counts of aggravated assault,2 possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,3 and criminal damage to property in the second degree.4 After the trial court denied his motion for new trial, Brown filed this appeal, arguing that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective; and (2) the evidence was insufficient. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,5 the record shows that about two weeks prior to the incident in question, Shanteria Miller and Brown had ended their relationship, angering Brown. At the time, Miller was living with her parents, sister, and her young daughter at 2285 Burdett Ridge Drive. Although the two had not seen each other since the break-up, Miller and Brown continued to be in contact via phone calls and text messages, including on the evening in question.
In the early morning hours of November 8, 2007, Miller received numerous phone calls from Brown, and after initially avoiding his calls, she finally answered. Miller testified that Brown wanted to know if she was at home, which she denied, and he then told her he was going to kill her and was on the way to her house. Miller got dressed, dressed her young daughter, and left to go to her brother's house without telling her mother or sister because she believed that Brown would not injure them if she was not at home.
Miller then called her across-the-street neighbor, Diane Pritchett, and asked her to watch her house and make sure that Miller's mother left to go to work without incident. She also warned Pritchett to look out for Brown's car, which she described as a yellow and brown Ford LTD Pritchett called Miller back to confirm when she should be watching for Miller's mother and was on the phone with Miller and looking out her window when she saw the car described by Miller drive up to Miller's house and saw the driver firing a gun from the vehicle. Miller told Pritchett to call 911, which Pritchett did.
Miller continued to her brother's house, but on the way, she called her house to check on her mother and sister; when she arrived at her brother's house and explained the situation, they both returned to the scene to check on their family. When they arrived, Miller saw holes in the house and emergency personnel were on the scene. While Miller was standing outside surveying the scene, she received numerous text messages from Brown, some of which were apologetic and some of which were threatening; so she showed the phone to police.
Miller's mother, Sheryl, testified that she and her six-year-old daughter were at 2285 Burdett Ridge Drive on the morning in question, and she had gone downstairs to the kitchen to prepare breakfast; before she could return upstairs, the shooting began. Sheryl was unsure what was happening at first, and she was frightened by the popping sounds, debris, and smoke from the bullets; she called her husband, who instructed her to call 911, which she did. Miller's brother testified that his mother was crying when he arrived and that spent firearm shells were everywhere. A police officer who arrived at the scene testified that multiple gunshot holes were in the side of Miller's home. Another officer testified that the shell casings were from an AK–47 assault rifle.
Sharon Johnson, who was babysitting at a nearby home during the incident, heard the gunshots and came out to find that her vehicle, which was parked on the street, had been hit by a car that left yellow paint in the damaged area, and her car alarm was sounding off.
Miller testified that she and Brown reunited as a couple after the incident because she thought it would protect her family from further harm. She testified that she talked to him repeatedly while he was in jail awaiting trial, and he tried to get her to convince the witnesses to refuse to testify.6
After trial, the jury found Brown guilty of all counts, and he filed a motion for new trial, which was later amended. The trial court denied the amended motion after a hearing, and this appeal followed.
(a) First, Brown contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the evidence did not exclude every reasonable hypothesis except for guilt. We disagree.
In support of this, Brown cites to Miller's testimony in which she states that another ex-boyfriend had threatened to kill her because he did not want her to date someone else. Miller, however, testified that the individual did not know that she was dating Brown until after the incident in question and did not make the death threat until after the incident. Brown also cites to the facts that the car was never found, no firearm was recovered, and no one at the scene could visually identify the shooter. He also points to his testimony, the testimony of his father, and the testimony of his friend, who all contended that Brown was not the shooter.
Nevertheless, the evidence as stated above was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that Brown committed the acts in question. Pritchett testified that a vehicle fitting the description of Brown's car was driven by the shooter, and Miller testified that Brown had threatened to come to her house and kill her earlier that morning. Furthermore, Miller received text messages from Brown later that morning apologizing "for what happened," which supports Miller's version of events. Under these circumstances, the jury was authorized to believe Miller and to conclude that Brown was the shooter. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.7
(b) Next, Brown argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for criminal damage to property in the second degree because there was no evidence that the damage to the neighbor's vehicle was intentional.
Brown contends that even assuming he was the driver of the car that struck the Johnson's vehicle while it was parked on the side of the street, the State failed to submit any evidence to support a finding that the damage to the vehicle was other than accidental. Nevertheless, the jury was properly charged on the offense of criminal damage to property, including that the requisite intent, and the facts presented support the verdict because the jury was authorized to find that as a result of his flight from his intentional criminal actions of firing a firearm into the Millers' home, he damaged Johnson's vehicle.10
(c) Finally, Brown argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for terroristic threats because the State failed to present corroborating evidence. We disagree.
Brown contends that because no one besides Miller heard his alleged threat to come to her house and kill her on the morning of the incident, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for terroristic threats.
A person commits the offense of a terroristic threat when he or she threatens to commit any crime of violence with the purpose of terrorizing another. The crime of making terroristic threats focuses solely on the conduct of the accused and is completed when the threat is communicated to the victim with the intent to terrorize. But no person shall be convicted of the offense of terroristic threats based on the uncorroborated testimony of the person to whom the threat was communicated. OCGA § 16–11–37(a). Nevertheless, it is well established that the quantum of corroboration need not in itself be sufficient to convict, but need only be that amount of independent evidence which tends to prove that the incident occurred as alleged. Slight circumstances may be sufficient for corroboration and the question of corroboration is one solely for the jury. If there is any evidence of corroboration, this court will not go behind the jury verdict and pass on its probative value.11
In this case, the threat was corroborated by Pritchett's testimony that a vehicle fitting the description of that owned by Brown was the vehicle driven by the shooter and Brown's text messages to Miller after the incident.12 " "13
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