Brown v. State

• Decision Date: 12 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-47,96-47
• Citation: 953 P.2d 1170
• Parties: Paul David BROWN, III, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1170

953 P.2d 1170

Paul David BROWN, III, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 96-47.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Feb. 12, 1998.

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Deborah Cornia, Appellate Counsel; and Diane Lozano, Assistant Public Defender, for Appellant (Defendant). Argument by Ms. Lozano.

William U. Hill, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jon R. Forwood, Special Assistant Attorney General; and Mary Beth Wolff, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee (Plaintiff). Argument by Ms. Wolff.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, Justice.

Appellant, Paul David Brown III (Brown), appeals the judgment and sentence of the district court convicting him of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. We affirm.

Brown sets forth five issues for our review:

ISSUE I

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting evidence in appellant's second trial that it disallowed in the first trial and altering a jury instruction from the first trial to the second?

ISSUE II

Did the trial court err when it permitted the state to use prior bad acts against the appellant in order to obtain a conviction?

ISSUE III

Did the trial court commit reversible error when it admitted the hearsay statements of a co-conspirator?

ISSUE IV

Was the admission of testimony of the State's witness stating that appellant was guilty of the crime charged error per se and deny appellant his right to a trial by jury [sic]?

ISSUE V

Did the trial court err when it refused to give the defense theory of the case instruction?

The State articulates a single issue:

Whether the trial court properly admitted all evidence and properly instructed the jury.

FACTS

Paul Brown arrived in Cheyenne, Wyoming on September 12, 1994, after separating from his wife in Estes Park, Colorado. Upon his arrival, he stayed at the Comea Shelter for one week. He then got a job as a dishwasher at the Luxury Diner and moved into his own room at the Wyoming Motel. At that time, he began frequenting the neighboring Lincolnway Detail Center and became friends with the owner, Joseph Vena, and his employees.

In October 1994, Randy Smith, an agent from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), brought his vehicle into Vena's detail shop and asked Vena to phone him when the vehicle was ready. Vena discovered that the phone number belonged to ATF, and informed Smith that his friend, Paul Brown, may have some information concerning criminal activity involving guns and narcotics in the Cheyenne area. Special Agent Kenneth Bray of the ATF contacted Brown and hired him as an undercover informant. Shortly thereafter, Vena, who had worked extensively as a paid witness and informant in the past, also signed an agreement to become an informant. Between November 18 and November 21, 1994, Brown and Vena set up two controlled buys of narcotics for the ATF at the Lincolnway Detail Center. A third buy had been scheduled to take place on November 30, but was thwarted On November 30, 1994, a male body was discovered adjacent to a county road in a remote area of Weld County, Colorado. Investigators called to the scene observed that the man had died as a result of two shotgun blasts to the chest and neck. One of the wounds contained small fragments, including cut-up pieces of screws, razor blades, dimes and glass, demonstrating a homemade shotgun shell. The same day, Wyoming highway department employees discovered bags of personal items and bloody clothes in two different trash barrels along Interstate 80 between Cheyenne and Laramie. Among the items found were identification cards for James Calvin Guthrie and a pay stub from the Lincolnway Detail Center in Cheyenne. The Wyoming Highway Patrol sent a teletype to authorities in Wyoming and Northern Colorado inquiring if a body had been discovered, and within an hour they received a response from Weld County.

because police officers were on site investigating the disappearance of James Guthrie.

Investigators learned that Guthrie had been an employee of Vena, and his last known residence was a back storage room at the Detail Center. Witnesses last saw Guthrie at 5:00 p.m. on November 28, 1994, when he returned to the Detail Center after a dentist appointment. On November 29, at Vena's direction, employees at the Detail Center had cleaned the storage room, washing the walls and throwing Guthrie's bed into a dumpster. Officers discovered evidence of blood spatter in Guthrie's room and that his bedding had been the sleeping bag in which his body was found. This information led investigators to believe that Guthrie had been killed inside the Detail Center.

Investigators had also discovered that Brown owned a shotgun and that both he and Vena were seen together in a car driven by Vena early on the morning of November 29, 1994. The car was examined on December 2, and traces of blood were found in the trunk and passenger compartment. That same day, Agent Bray went to the Detail Center and asked Brown and Vena to come in for questioning by Cheyenne police detectives about Guthrie's disappearance. Neither were advised that Guthrie's body had been found. Following his interview at the police station, Brown was arrested for the murder of Guthrie. The next evening at the police station, Vena implicated himself and Brown in Guthrie's murder, outlining his knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the shooting and directing officers to various locations along Interstate 80 where he and Brown had disposed of evidence. Vena was arrested on December 4.

Brown was charged with one count of conspiracy to commit murder and one count of murder in the first degree. At the close of a four-day trial in September 1995, Brown was acquitted on the first degree murder charge, but the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the conspiracy charge. Brown's second trial, for conspiracy to commit murder, was held in early December 1995. After the five-day trial, Brown was found guilty and sentenced to a mandatory life term in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. He timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

Changed evidentiary rulings between first and second trial

Brown argues that the trial judge improperly admitted evidence in his second trial that was excluded in his first trial. Brown's contention is that the rulings of the trial court in the first trial stood as the law of the case, and that the court erred in Brown's retrial when it made different rulings based on the same evidence.

Under the law of the case doctrine, a decision on an issue made by a court at one stage of a case should be given effect in successive stages of the same litigation. 1B, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE p 0.404 (2d ed.1991). The doctrine is designed to avoid repetitious litigation and to promote consistent decision making. Triton Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 846 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo.1993). The law of the case is a discretionary rule which does not constitute a limitation on the court's power but merely "expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided." WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE : § 4478, at 790 (1981) (quoting Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 Brown urges us to follow those jurisdictions which have limited a court's discretion to revisit issues previously decided. United States v. Tham, 960 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir.1991) (precluding reversal of identical evidentiary ruling made during first trial absent clear error or a change in circumstances); United States v. Duchi, 944 F.2d 391, 392-93 (8th Cir.1991) (precluding reconsideration of previously decided issues unless substantially different evidence is subsequently discovered or prior decision will work a manifest injustice on one of the parties). We do not believe such limitations are warranted. Generally, a trial judge has broad discretion on evidentiary rulings because this type of decision turns upon the evidence as developed during the course of a trial. United States v. Akers, 702 F.2d 1145, 1148 (D.C.Cir.1983). Rigorously applying the law of the case doctrine would undercut the broad discretion traditionally accorded trial courts in these matters. We hold that a district court is not bound by prior evidentiary rulings made during the course of a prior proceeding but may, in its discretion, reconsider such rulings. United States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 402 (6th Cir.1990). Consequently, a court may recognize and enforce prior rulings based on the law of the case doctrine, but the court also retains the power to reconsider previously decided issues as they arise in the context of a new trial. Id.; Pearson v. District Court, 924 P.2d 512, 515 (Colo.1996).

                S.Ct. 739, 740, 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912)). 1  The doctrine of the law of the case, therefore, does not foreclose a trial court from reconsidering issues in a case previously decided by the same court.  WRIGHT, ET AL., at 789
                

Having determined that the trial court could revisit evidentiary rulings made at the first trial, our focus shifts to whether the court properly admitted the challenged evidence. In general, rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court and are entitled to considerable deference. Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953, 956-57 (Wyo.1996). Such rulings will not be disturbed on appeal absent demonstration of a clear abuse of discretion. Hayes v. State, 935 P.2d 700, 702 (Wyo.1997). This court will not find an abuse of discretion as long as a legitimate basis exists for the trial court's rulings. Thus, unless the court acted in a manner exceeding the bounds of reason, no abuse of discretion will be found. Vit, 909 P.2d at 956-57. Likewise, a trial court's decisions regarding admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence are entitled to great deference on appeal. Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo.1996). Where the defendant...