Brown v. State, CA

Decision Date22 February 1984
Docket NumberNo. CA,CA
PartiesWaymon Kilan BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. CR 83-139.
CourtArkansas Court of Appeals

William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender by Thomas J. O'Hern, Deputy Public Defender, Little Rock, for appellant.

Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. by Victra L. Fewell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

CORBIN, Judge.

Appellant, Waymon Kilan Brown, entered a plea of guilty to theft of property by deception on July 6, 1982, and was given a suspended imposition of sentence for a period of five years on conditions. One of the conditions was that he make restitution to the State of Arkansas in the amount of $2,725.00, payable at the rate of $50.00 per month beginning December 1, 1982. Appellant was arrested on March 7, 1983, pursuant to a petition for revocation based upon appellant's alleged failure to make any payments toward restitution. On March 24, 1983, a hearing was held on the petition for revocation wherein the trial court committed appellant to the Arkansas Department of Corrections for a term of ten years with credit for jail time from March 7, 1983, to March 24, 1983. We affirm.

Appellant testified at the revocation hearing that he did not work in December of 1982 or in January and February of 1983. He stated that he had worked in September, October and November of 1982. Appellant was in jail from November 15, 1982, to December 16, 1982, because of his failure to pay the fine and costs assessed against him on the original theft by deception charge. He testified further that he was planning to go to work for his mother, although it was unclear at what time and for what wages. He offered no evidence to explain why he was not working, what job contacts he had made, or what his living expenses were. The record reveals appellant offered nothing in the way of explanation as to why he had failed to comply with the conditions previously imposed upon him by the trial court.

The provisions for revocation of suspended sentence are found in Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1208 (Repl.1977). Subsection four of that statute addresses the showing that is required to revoke a suspended sentence, stating, "If the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a condition of his suspension or probation, it may revoke the suspension or probation at any time prior to the expiration of the period of suspension or probation." Thus, the State must prove not only that a condition was violated but also that there was nothing that could be said to fairly excuse the violation. These factors need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Selph v. State, 264 Ark. 197, 570 S.W.2d 256 (1978). On...

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9 cases
  • Hanna v. State, CA CR 09–121.
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • 2 Diciembre 2009
    ...can[not] sit back and rely totally upon the trial court to make inquiry into his excuse for nonpayment.” Brown v. State, 10 Ark.App. 387, 389, 664 S.W.2d 507, 508 (1984). Nor must the State negate every possible excuse for nonpayment—an impossible task—in its case in chief. Reese, supra. Th......
  • Aldridge v. State, CACR02-971.
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • 25 Junio 2003
    ...was inexcusable. Cavin v. State, 11 Ark. App. 294, 669 S.W.2d 508 (1984). The burden of proof does not shift. See Brown v. State, 10 Ark. App. 387, 664 S.W.2d 507 (1984). However, once the State has introduced evidence of nonpayment, the burden of going forward does shift to the defendant t......
  • Cavin v. State, CA
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • 30 Mayo 1984
    ...court will not overturn the findings of the trial court unless it is clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. Brown v. State, 10 Ark.App. 387, 664 S.W.2d 507 (1984); Brewer v. State, 274 Ark. 38, 621 S.W.2d 698 (1981). As a determination of a preponderance of the evidence turns heav......
  • Howard v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Court of Appeals
    • 12 Abril 2023
    ...of going forward requires more of a defendant than simply stating he did not work and earn money regularly during a period of suspension. In Brown, the appellant was ordered to pay installments of $50 beginning December 1, 1982, as a condition of his suspended imposition of sentence. Id. at......
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