Brown v. State Printing Bd.
| Decision Date | 11 March 1941 |
| Docket Number | 45588. |
| Citation | 296 N.W. 719,230 Iowa 22 |
| Parties | BROWN v. STATE PRINTING BOARD et al. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Polk County; O. S. Franklin, Judge.
Plaintiff a veteran of the war with Germany claiming the benefits of the Soldiers Preference Law, Code 1939, § 1159 et seq. petitioned for a writ of certiorari, challenging the legality of his removal as State Superintendent of Printing. The defendant printing board moved to quash the writ on the ground that plaintiff held a strictly confidential relation to the board and therefore was not entitled to the benefits of the law. The trial court sustained the motion. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
H. W Hanson, of Des Moines, for appellant.
Carl J. Stephens and Ben C. Buckingham, both of Des Moines, for appellees.
Plaintiff's petition alleges that he was appointed by defendants to the office of State Superintendent of Printing on January 7 1939, and removed from that position as of January 15, 1941; that plaintiff is an honorably discharged soldier of the war with Germany and therefore entitled to the benefits of the Soldiers Preference Law, Ch. 60, Code, 1939, § 1159 et seq.; that his removal was wrongful because the provisions of the law with regard to hearing upon stated charges were not complied with. A writ of certiorari was issued, which defendant printing board moved to quash on the ground that the position held by plaintiff came within the exceptions to the Soldiers Preference Law provided for by Code section 1165. The trial court sustained the motion and plaintiff has appealed.
This appeal presents the one question whether the position of State Superintendent of Printing held by appellant falls within any of the exceptions to the Soldiers Preference Law stated in Code, section 1165, reading as follows:
If appellant's position was that of private secretary or deputy of the printing board or if appellant held a strictly confidential relation to the board, under the plain mandate of the statute, he is not entitled to the benefits of the Soldiers Preference Law and the ruling of the trial court must be affirmed. We are agreed that the trial court was right in holding that appellant's position falls within the confidential relation exception stated in section 1165.
We will not undertake any comprehensive definition, applicable in all cases, of the terms " private secretary", " deputy", or " person holding a strictly confidential relation to the appointing officer" . A similar question to that now before us was before the court in Allen v. Wegman, 218 Iowa 801, 254 N.W. 74; Hannam v. Commerce Commission, Iowa, 292 N.W. 820; and Bowman v. Overturff, 229 Iowa __, 294 N.W. 568. All three of these cases, especially Allen v. Wegman, supra, discuss the meaning of the confidential relation exception to the preference law. The Allen case quotes with approval from Scott v. Brown, 90 Ind.App. 367, 157 N.E. 64, (page 810 of 218 Iowa, page 79 of 254 N.W.), as follows:
" ‘ The term " confidential relation" is a very broad one and is not at all confined to any specific association of the parties, but applies generally to all persons who are associated by any relation of trust and confidence." ’ This statement is frequently found in texts (see 15 C.J.S., Confidential, page 822) and in decisions in cases of this kind.
Also in the Allen case, referring to People v. Palmer, 152 N.Y. 217, 46 N.E. 328, a leading case on this subject (page 810 of 218 Iowa, page 79 of 254 N.W.), we say: " The court in that case further said that, where the duties of the appointing officer were of such a character that it is impossible for him to personally discharge them, and of necessity he was compelled to intrust the performance of them largely to others, a confidential relation arose between the officer and the others to whom a portion of his duties was necessarily delegated."
Where duties are not merely clerical and require skill, judgment, trust and confidence, the courts are inclined to regard the appointee to whom such duties are delegated as holding a strictly confidential relation to the appointing officer or board.
The state printing board was created by the legislature. Ch. 14 of the Code, § 178 et seq. Its duties are defined by statute, many of them being stated in section 183. The board consists of the secretary of state, auditor of state, attorney general, and two appointive members each of whom must have had at least five years experience in the printing trade. Section 178. The law does not contemplate that the members devote their full time to the business of the board. The three state officials have other important functions to perform. The two appointive members are paid only for the time actually engaged in the performance of their duties. Code, section 182. Of necessity, what the board members themselves can personally do is limited. The statute expressly provides that the board shall prescribe rules for the conduct of its business.
The printing board is authorized to appoint the superintendent who " shall serve during the pleasure of the board." Code, section 213. Section 215 outlines at least many of the duties of the superintendent. He is required to devote his full time to the duties of the position. With regard to the enforcement of contracts for state printing the statute...
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