Brown v. State
Decision Date | 29 January 2018 |
Docket Number | S17A1755 |
Citation | 809 S.E.2d 742 |
Parties | BROWN v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
302 Ga. 813
809 S.E.2d 742
BROWN
v.
The STATE.
S17A1755
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Decided: January 29, 2018
David Tavis Winheim, for Appellant.
Plez H. Hardin, District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Aimee F. Sobhani, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Hunstein, Justice.
Appellant Patricia Ann Brown was convicted of murder and related offenses in connection with the beating death of Eugene Clark. On appeal, Brown contends that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Though we conclude that Brown was erroneously sentenced, we otherwise affirm.1
We begin by examining the evidence adduced during Brown's trial, reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdicts. Brown and her friend, Gussie Moore, met the victim, Eugene Clark, at a Sumter County bar. Clark was flush with cash from his tax refund, which he was flashing around the bar, and purchasing drinks for bar patrons. Brown attempted to engage Clark, but he was not interested; Clark was, however, interested in Moore, and, much to Brown's dismay, the pair left the bar for Moore's house. Several hours later, Brown visited her boyfriend, Fred Hoston, and advised him that someone had tried to rape her; at the time she made the accusation, Brown was observed—apparently uninjured—dancing in the street with a drink in her hand. The pair proceeded to Moore's house where Brown reignited an earlier argument with Moore and identified Clark as her assailant; Clark subsequently left Moore's house on foot. According to Hoston, he and Brown followed Clark to a nearby community center where they physically assaulted Clark, took his wallet, and then left him to die. Hoston testified that it was Brown who took Clark's wallet, and a number of witnesses later observed
Brown with a large amount of cash.
1. Though Brown does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction, we have reviewed the record and conclude that the evidence as summarized above was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that she was guilty of the crimes of which she was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. In her sole enumeration of error, Brown alleges that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to voice his concern regarding Brown's mental competency and seek a continuance to secure a mental evaluation.
In order to prevail on a claim that trial counsel was ineffective, Brown must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was prejudicial. See Terry v. State, 284 Ga. 119, 120 (2), 663 S.E.2d 704 (2008). To prove deficient performance, one must show that his attorney "performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms." Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344 (3), 745 S.E.2d 637 (2013). With respect to the second Strickland 2 prong, "to show that he was prejudiced by the performance of his lawyer, [Appellant] must prove ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ " Arnold v. State, 292 Ga. 268, 269, 737 S.E.2d 98 (2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ). Here, Brown has failed to satisfy either prong.
In September 2007, the trial court ordered that Brown undergo a mental evaluation, specifically requesting that her competency to stand trial be...
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