Brown v. Steele
| Decision Date | 14 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:12-CV-02290 ERW/NAB,4:12-CV-02290 ERW/NAB |
| Parties | LUKE BROWN, Petitioner, v. TROY STEELE, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Nannette A. Baker [ECF No. 23], pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), recommending the denial of Petitioner Luke Brown's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [ECF No. 1]. Defendant filed timely objections to the Report and Recommendation. [ECF No. 24].
I. BACKGROUND
On December 4th, 2007, Petitioner was found guilty after a jury trial of first-degree murder, and armed criminal action, in the Circuit Court of the City of Saint Louis. See State v. Brown, Cause No. 0622-CR02088-01 (22nd Judicial Circuit). Petitioner was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment, without the possibility of parole, on the murder conviction, and a term of twenty-five years imprisonment on the armed criminal action conviction, with the terms to be served consecutively. [ECF No. 9 Ex. B. at 59-62].
Petitioner filed a direct appeal of his conviction with the Missouri Court of Appeals, which denied relief. State v. Brown, 281 S.W.3d 850 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); [ECF No. 9 Exs. C & E]. Petitioner then filed an amended 29.15 motion for post-conviction relief, and was granted an evidentiary hearing, but his motion was ultimately denied. [ECF No. 9 Exs. F at 1-30, G at 14-27, 34-41]. Petitioner then appealed the denial of the Rule 29.15 Motion Court's ruling to the Missouri Court of Appeals, [ECF No. 9 Ex. H] where the Court of Appeals affirmed the Motion Court's denial of the 29.15 motion. Brown v. State, 353 S.W.3d 675 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); [ECF No. 9 Ex. J]. Petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court on December 11, 2012, making six claims for habeas relief, including: claim one - use of post-Miranda silence at trial to infer guilt with a videotaped statement; claim two - prosecutor's improper references to silence during closing argument; claim three - insufficient evidence to support Petitioner's conviction of first-degree murder in that the state failed to prove the element of deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt; claim four - ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to convey State's plea bargain to petitioner; claim five - ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to advise Petitioner of the merits of the defense versus the state's plea offer; and claim six - referring to facts not in evidence during closing argument. [ECF No. 1].
I. STANDARD
When a party objects to a Report and Recommendation, the court must "make a de novo review determination of those portions of the record or specified proposed findings to which objection is made." United States v. Lothridge, 324 F.3d 599, 600 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)).
"A state prisoner who believes that he is incarcerated in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000)." Osborne v. Purkett, 411 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 2005), as amended (June 21, 2005). In order for a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus brought by a person in custody by order of a state court, the petitioner must show the state courtdecision:
28 U.S.C. § 2254. State court decisions are contrary to federal law if "the state court either 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases,' or 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.'" Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001) quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000). An unreasonable application of precedent is found where the state court uses the correct governing legal principle, but unreasonably applies the principle to the facts of the case. Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2004). Therefore a federal court making an "unreasonable application" inquiry, should determine whether the state court's interpretation was objectively reasonable, and although the Supreme Court has not defined "objectively reasonable", it should be noted that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law." Williams, 529 U.S. at 410.
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner makes four specific objections to the Report and Recommendation, and one general objection. [ECF No. 24]. Petitioner first objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding the State Court's resolution of claims one and two concerning Petitioner's post-arrest silence, did not result in a decision contrary to, or involved in an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as established by the Supreme Court, or resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state courtproceedings. [ECF No. 24 at 2]. Petitioner next objects to the magistrate judge's findings that the Court of Appeals findings as to claim three were not contrary to, nor did they involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, nor was it the result of a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the evidence presented at State Court hearings. [ECF No. 24 at 3]. Petitioner then objects to the Magistrate Judge finding Petitioner's counsel's performance was not deficient, where counsel did not advise petitioner of the plea offer, or failed to advise him of the relevant merits of his self-defense argument. [ECF No. 24 at 3]. Finally, Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation prosecutorial misconduct is properly defaulted and lacks merit. [ECF No. 24 at 4]. The petitioner also makes general statement contending the Report and Recommendation misapprehends the facts and law. [ECF No. 24 at 4].
Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge's finding the State Court's resolution of claims one and two concerning petitioner's post-arrest silence, was not contrary to or did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as established by the Supreme Court, or did not result in a determination that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at State Court proceedings. [ECF No. 24 at 2]. In response to the Magistrate Judge's finding on claim one, Petitioner argues he was not impeached by a prior inconsistent statement, but rather with a prior invocation of the right to silence by showing a videotaped statement. [ECF No. 24 at 2]. In response to claim two, Petitioner argues the Prosecutor's attempts to impeach the Petitioner with Petitioner's invocation of his right to silence, during closing argument, and violated his Constitutional Rights. [ECF No. 24 at 2].
The Fifth Amendment states no person, "shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," and is applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964). The Fifth Amendment also requires police to warn individuals taken into custody of these rights under Miranda. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426, 444 (1966). "The use for impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976). State courts have "some leeway" to reach reasonable judgments in regards to determining permissible references to post-arrest silence, as the Supreme Court has not answered all questions in regards to Doyle. Dansby v. Hobbs, 766 F.3d 809, 821 (8th Cir. 2014). Although not every reference to an accused post-Miranda warning silence violates the principles of due process. Id. at 820.
Petitioner hopes to distinguish his case, by noting in his objection he was not impeached by a prior inconsistent statement, but rather with a prior invocation of the right to silence. [ECF No. 24 at 2]. The Missouri Court of Appeals held the state was free to show the circumstances under which the right to remain silent had been waived, and it also held the state did not create an inference of guilt when the tape was stopped. [ECF No. 9 Ex. E]. The Report and Recommendation determined this finding was not contrary to, or did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as established by the Supreme Court, or did not result in a determination based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at State Court proceedings. [ECF No. 23 at 9].
The following is the transcript of the videotaped statement, after Petitioner was given his Miranda rights, which are also on video.
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