Brown v. Stephens
| Decision Date | 23 July 1932 |
| Citation | 52 S.W.2d 146 |
| Parties | BROWN v. STEPHENS (two cases). MITCHELL v. SAME. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Shelby County; Ben L. Capell, Judge.
Three separate suits, which were consolidated, by Sarah Brown, by Edward Lee Brown, by next friend, and by Macon Mitchell, by next friend, against J. J. Stephens, administrator of the estate of J. R. Lisenbury, deceased. From judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
Cavett & Buchanan, of Memphis, for plaintiffs in error.
Crabtree & Crabtree and O. F. Mathis, all of Memphis, for defendant in error.
These consolidated suits were brought against the appellee as administrator of the estate of J. R. Lisenbury, deceased, for injuries growing out of an automobile accident in which the deceased suffered injuries from which he died the following day, and before these suits were brought. The trial judge sustained pleas in abatement on the ground that the cause of action did not survive. Plaintiffs below have appealed, and counsel present a learned and extended argument in which, conceding, as we understand it, that the decisions of this court sustain the action of the trial judge, it is earnestly insisted that these holdings are not supported either by sound reasoning, or a proper application of fundamental principles of justice.
However unjustly the rule may sometimes work, it is founded on principles which the courts hold important and justified by experience, and the doctrine is so well established in the decisions of this court that we are unable to find justification for overriding our previous holdings and establishing by judicial legislation a right of action which the Legislature has failed to provide.
It is suggested in argument that Harris v. Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S. W. 584, 586, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 897, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 885, tends to establish a rule, contrary to the weight of our decisions, to the effect that the cause of action survives at common law. The court in that case did not so hold. The right of action in that case, which was a suit for publication by probate of a libel contained in a will, did not accrue until the publication of the libel after the death of Woodfin, and it was directly stated that the "right of action arose after Woodfin's death, and could not have been buried with him." In the instant case the alleged tort was committed before the death of Lisenbury. The ruling in the Harris Case has no application to the present case. Beginning with Griffith v. Beasly, 10 Yerg. 434, and followed in Cherry v. Hardin, 4 Heisk. 199; Driver v. Arn and Card, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 589; Whaley v. Catlett, 103 Tenn. 347, 53 S. W. 131; Wilson v. Barton,...
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Goss v. Hutchins
...to plaintiff's action. At common law an action could not be brought against a deceased tort feasor. See, Brown v. Stephens, 165 Tenn. 85, 87, 52 S.W.2d 146, 146 (1932) and cases there cited. In 1935, the Legislature abrogated the common law rule by adopting the predecessor of the current T.......
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Carne v. Maryland Cas. Co.
...thereon. Under the common law death gave rise to no causes of action, and terminated all those for personal torts. See Brown v. Stephens, 165 Tenn. 85, 52 S.W.2d 146, and authorities there No suit having been brought as stated in the cause of action herein set forth, the right of action die......