Brown v. Texas Employment Com'n, C14-90-159-CV

Decision Date08 November 1990
Docket NumberNo. C14-90-159-CV,C14-90-159-CV
Citation801 S.W.2d 5
Parties64 Ed. Law Rep. 1283 Marvinell BROWN, Appellant, v. TEXAS EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION and Houston Independent School District, Appellees. (14th Dist.)
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Marvinell Brown, Houston, for appellant.

Frankie Vanderford, Austin, Charlotte C. Orr, Lisa A. Brown, Houston, for appellees.

Before PAUL PRESSLER, CANNON and ELLIS, JJ.

OPINION

CANNON, Justice.

Marvinell Brown appeals from a summary judgment granted in favor of the Texas Employment Commission ("TEC") and Houston Independent School District ("HISD"). The trial court granted summary judgment on the grounds that the time for Brown to file her suit had passed and that she failed to join an indispensable party. In five points of error, Brown claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because she was unaware of the time limitations and the necessity of joining all parties. We affirm.

Brown applied to the TEC for unemployment benefits. After reviewing her case, the TEC sent her two determination letters. Both were mailed April 25, 1989. One letter stated that Brown was eligible to receive benefits under section 4(c) of the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act, TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5221b-2(c) (Vernon Supp.1989) ("the act"). The second letter stated that Brown was disqualified from receiving benefits under section 5(a) of the act because she voluntarily left her employment with HISD for reasons not constituting good cause. The letters contained the following recitation:

INFORMATION ABOUT APPEAL RIGHTS

Either the claimant or the employer may appeal this determination, but such appeal must be filed in writing within 14 calendar days after the "date mailed" shown below. Each "Texas Employment Commission Notice of Claim Determination" must be appealed separately. If this document is appealed, the claimant should continue to file claims if still unemployed. (emphasis in original)

Brown did not file an administrative appeal until May 30, 1989, several weeks after the deadline had passed. Because her filing was late, the appeal tribunal dismissed her appeal for want of jurisdiction. The appeal tribunal decision was mailed on June 17, 1989. That decision stated that it would become final unless Brown appealed within fourteen days. Brown appealed the appeal tribunal decision to the TEC, which held that her claim was properly dismissed. The final determination from the TEC denying a rehearing was mailed to Brown on September 14, 1989. That determination informed Brown that her only recourse was to file a lawsuit within fourteen days. Brown filed suit against TEC on October 11, 1989, twenty-seven days after the final determination was mailed. Brown did not join HISD as a defendant in the lawsuit until November 27, 1989.

In her first through fifth points of error, Brown claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because she was not aware of the procedure regarding appeal to the TEC, or her remedy to file a lawsuit after the TEC decision became final. Appeals from orders of the TEC are governed by the substantial evidence rule. Texas Employment Commission v. Holberg, 440 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Tex.1969). For an appealing party to prevail, she must show that the TEC's decision was not reasonably supported by substantial evidence. Circuitronics, Inc. v. Texas Employment Commission, 561 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e). In other words, Brown must show to the trial court that the TEC's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious and was made without regard to the facts or law. See De Leon v. Texas Employment Commission, 529 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex.Civ.App.--Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e).

Article 5221b-4 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes prescribes a two step procedure for review of a TEC decision. First, an aggrieved party must file an administrative appeal within fourteen calendar days after the TEC decision is mailed. After exhausting her administrative remedies, a party may appeal to the courts by filing a lawsuit within fourteen days after the TEC decision becomes final. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5221b-4(i) (Vernon Supp.1990). Article 5221b-4(i) also requires any party to the proceeding before the TEC be made a party in the lawsuit.

Brown does not dispute that she filed her appeal with the TEC after the time limit had expired. She also does not dispute that the lawsuit was untimely filed and that HISD was not joined as a party until after time to file suit had passed. Brown claims she did not receive proper notice of the TEC decision because TEC sent her two letters, one claiming she was eligible for benefits and the other claiming she was disqualified. Brown claims she did not know which letter was true and that she was not aware that she needed to appeal the decision because the first letter said she was eligible for benefits. Both letters, however, state in bold type that an appeal of the determination "must be filed in writing within 14 calendar days after the date mailed" or the determination will become final. The date mailed was clearly stamped on each letter as April 25, 1989. Brown did not file her...

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