Brown v. Thomson
| Decision Date | 19 October 1889 |
| Citation | 10 S.E. 95,31 S.C. 436 |
| Parties | BROWN et al. v. THOMSON. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Spartanburg county; J. B KERSHAW, Judge.
Thomson Nicholls & Moore, for appellant.
R. K Carson, for respondents.
This is the second appeal in this case, and for a more full statement of the facts than it is deemed necessary to make here reference should be had to the case as reported in 27 S.C 500, 4 S.E. Rep. 345. It is sufficient to say that the action was to recover the amount of an account for goods, wares, and merchandise, alleged to have been sold and delivered by plaintiffs' intestate to the defendant, who was and is a married woman, during the year 1884. Under the former appeal this court held that while the defendant, though a married woman, would be liable for such articles as were purchased by her, or by her authority, for the use of her separate estate, --her plantation,--yet she would not be liable for household supplies furnished her for the use of herself and family, under such a proceeding as this, though plainly indicating that, under proper allegations and proper proofs, the income of the defendant's separate estate might be subjected to the payment of such portion of the account as should appear to have been contracted for the use of herself and family. The case was therefore sent back for a new trial, in order that the jury might pass upon the question as to how much of the account sued on the defendant should be held responsible for under the principle above stated. The case having come on for a new trial before his honor, Judge KERSHAW, and a jury, a verdict was rendered for very nearly, though not quite, the whole amount of the account, and, a motion for a new trial on the minutes, based upon the ground "that the verdict was contrary to the evidence and the charge of the presiding judge, and that, for at least a portion of the account, there were no grounds whatever to sustain the verdict," having been made and refused, defendant appeals upon the following grounds, imputing error to the circuit judge: "(1) In charging that if the defendant's husband had the management and control of her farm, as agent, and she recognized his orders to and purchases from J. J. Brown, that she is liable for all articles purchased by him for use on the farm and supplies for tenants; (2) in charging that, after the writing of that letter, which is put in evidence, signed by the defendant, and said to bear date, or at least to have been written on, the 12th July, 1884, the burden is on the defendant of showing that the articles purchased were not for use on her farm, or for her tenants; (3) in charging that defendant is estopped by that letter from denying that the goods purchased were for use on her plantation, or for her tenants, unless it be shown that J. J. Brown knew that such goods were intended for other purposes; (4) in charging that defendant is liable for all articles purchased by her of the plaintiffs' intestate, Mr. Brown, except those for use of herself and family; (5) in refusing to grant a new trial; (6) in not at least granting a new trial nisi."
The charge of Judge KERSHAW appears to be fully set out in the "case," and should be incorporated with the report of this decision. An examination of it will show that he instructed the jury precisely in accordance with the principles laid down in the former decision. The error complained of in the first ground of appeal certainly cannot be established, for that portion of the charge there assailed expressly received the sanction of this court at the hearing of the former appeal. There can be no doubt that a married woman may manage her separate estate, either in person or by an agent, and there is as little doubt that she can constitute her husband her agent for that purpose, ( Greig v. Smith, 29 S.C. 426, 7 S.E. Rep. 610;) and if such agent purchases articles for the use of her separate estate, her farm, or supplies for her tenants thereon, she is unquestionably liable therefor. Whether the husband has been constituted agent, and whether the purchases made by him as such were for the uses specified, are questions of fact for the jury, and must be left to them, as...
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