Brown v. Town of Carlisle
| Decision Date | 03 June 1957 |
| Citation | 142 N.E.2d 891,336 Mass. 147 |
| Parties | Joseph W. BROWN v. TOWN OF CARLISLE. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Alfred W. Howes, Boston, for plaintiff.
David B. Williams, Town Counsel, Concord, for defendant.
Before WILKINS, C. J., and RONAN, WILLIAMS, WHITTEMORE and CUTTER, JJ.
This bill for a declaratory decree as to the validity of a part of a by-law of the defendant town is reported without decision upon a case stated. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 214, § 31. The plaintiff, a resident of the town of Natick and the holder of a hunting license issued by its town clerk, desires to hunt wild game and to discharge firearms on private property in the defendant town without first obtaining the consent of an owner or legal occupant.
A controversy exists between the plaintiff and the defendant town as to the validity of the portion in supplied italics of Article VIII of its by-laws which reads: 'No person shall fire or discharge any firearms or explosives of any kind within the limits of any highway, park or other public property except with the permission of the board of selectmen; or on any private property, except with the consent of the owner or legal occupant thereof; provided, however, that this by-law shall not apply to the lawful defense of life or property nor to any law enforcement officer acting in the discharge of his duties. * * *'
The question is whether the by-law is authorized by that part of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 40, § 21, which reads: 'Towns may, for the purpose hereinafter named, make such orders and by-laws, not repugnant to law, as they may judge most conducive to their welfare, which shall be binding upon all inhabitants thereof and all persons within their limits * * * (1) For directing and managing their prudential affairs, preserving peace and good order, and maintaining their internal police.'
Every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of a by-law. Town of Concord v. Attorney General, Mass., 142 N.E.2d 360, and cases cited. We think that it is not an unreasonable method of preserving peace and good order in the town of Carlisle to prohibit the discharge of firearms on private property without the consent of the owner or occupant. Not only would this provision tend to prevent breaches of the peace arising out of controversies between owners and occupants on the one hand and armed trespassers on the other, but it would tend to minimize the risk of injury to persons and damage to property by preventing such conduct without the knowledge of the owners or occupants. It just is not true that the discharge of firearms on private property is no more safe with the owner's or legal occupant's consent than without it. It is a misconception of the by-law and its obvious purpose to assert that permitting such conduct with such consent is a concession that the discharge of firearms in and of itself does not disturb the peace, or is not dangerous to property, or is not unsafe. Be it noted that this is not a restriction upon the right of a person to use his own property. The restriction is upon the use of another's property without his consent. The plaintiff's hunting license issued in a neighboring town is no guaranty of safety. The many accidental shootings which occur during a hunting season are a matter of common knowledge, and give cogent proof that something more than a hunting license is required for the protection of human life.
The objections made by the plaintiff do not impress us as substantial. We have considered them all and we mention those which most deserve discussion. It is not correct as a general proposition to say that the authority of a town under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 40, § 21, is limited to 'a matter which municipalities have had the right to regulate as a result of many years of custom and usage by all municipalities similarly situated.' This argument would have us ignore all growth, all progress, all development inevitable with the passing of years. The contention that such 'by-laws must have been sanctioned from early colonial times by long usage and independent of statute' is disposed of by the definition of the phrase, 'prudential concerns of a town,' given by Chief Justice Shaw in Willard v. Inhabitants of Newburyport, 12 Pick. 227, 231, where it was said that 'it embraces that large class of miscellaneous subjects affecting the accommodation and convenience of the inhabitants, which have been placed under the municipal jurisdiction of towns, by statute or by usage.' In the case at bar the by-law is upheld not as dealing with the town's prudential affairs, but as 'preserving peace and good order' equally clearly in the doing of which a municipality is not to be restricted solely to the methods customary in colonial days.
The plaintiff contends that the by-law 'is repugnant to the general law because the legislature has retained to itself the power to regulate and control the discharge of firearms.' Gile...
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