Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co., s. 92-3149
| Decision Date | 01 February 1995 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 92-3149,93-0923,s. 92-3149 |
| Citation | 649 So.2d 912 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D291 Willie BROWN, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. The TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
We grant rehearing and substitute our previous opinion with the following.
This appeal brings us the question whether this homeowner's fire insurance carrier may avoid coverage under an intentional acts exclusion for a fire loss caused by an insane insured. We hold that the carrier may not.
The facts are straightforward and uncomplicated. It was undisputed that the insured himself set his own house on fire. His rage was sparked by his belief that his sister was plotting to steal his property. He was arrested, charged with arson, and upon being found initially incompetent was placed in a mental health institution. After a time, he was found fit to stand trial and released. A jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity on the criminal charges.
A few days after the blaze, Travelers was given notice of the loss and began processing a claim. While the insured was in the mental health facility, Travelers corresponded with him numerous times requesting that he complete its standard proof of loss and claim forms and that he submit to an oral examination under oath. After his release from the institution, he voluntarily appeared with counsel at a scheduled examination but refused to answer questions, asserting his fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination while the criminal charges were still pending.
Later he filed the present action seeking a declaratory judgment on the coverage question. In the first count of the complaint he sought a declaration that he was insane when he set the fire and that the delay in providing proof of loss caused by his condition did not adversely affect his right to recover for the losses from the fire. In the second count, he sought a protective order against an oral examination regarding the nature and origins of the fire, to the extent that answers to questions on these subjects could incriminate him in the then pending criminal case. Travelers counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment on the coverage issue.
This case was tried to a jury. At the close of the evidence, Travelers moved for a directed verdict on the basis that, even if the insured were found to be insane on the evening in question, the resulting loss from his conduct could not be considered accidental under Florida law. The court reserved ruling on that motion. The jury was given a special interrogatory verdict that asked: (1) whether the insured was insane when he set the fire; and (2) whether the insured failed to comply with the material terms of the policy resulting in prejudice to Travelers. The jury answered the first question "Yes,", and the second question "No."
Travelers filed a post trial motion for new trial and for judgment on its prior motion for directed verdict, arguing three grounds: (A) that the finding of insanity was not supported by evidence; (B) that the losses were the result of the insured's intentional acts; and (C) that the evidence established that the insured had failed to comply with conditions precedent to recovery under the policy. The trial court granted the motion in part, concluding that the intentional acts exclusion precluded coverage for the fire loss. We disagree and reverse.
We begin, of course, with the text of the policy, for that is where any decision as to the rights and liabilities of the parties to an insurance contract must find its base. The policy is divided into two sections; section I provides "Property Insurance," and section II provides "Liability Insurance." Under section I, there are four separate coverages entitled: "Coverage A--Dwelling", "Coverage B--Other Structures", "Coverage C--Personal Property", and "Coverage D--Additional Expenses". 1 Under section II, there are two separate coverages entitled "Coverage N--Personal Liability", and "Coverage O--Medical Payments".
There are two applicable insuring clauses under section I. The first pertinent provision states:
The second pertinent insuring clause states:
Beginning on page 10 there is the subheading, "Section I--General Exclusions", followed by a three-page listing of 18 expressed exclusions; there is no provision relating to intentional acts of the insured.
The insuring clause in section II states the following:
That is later succeeded by a subheading, providing in relevant part:
1. It does not cover property damage to the insured's own property. * * *
2. It does not cover property damage to property rented to, occupied or used by, or in the care of the insured. However, it does cover property damage when caused by fire, smoke or explosion." [e.o.]
As in the case of section I, the coverage N exclusions do not contain any intentional acts provisions, however. Even later in this section, there is the following provision in a subheading accompanied in part by the following text:
Travelers contends, and the trial court found, that this last provision avoids the insured's claim.
Travelers argues that the words, "[t]hese exclusions apply to all coverages," mean that the intentional acts exclusion contained under that subheading in section II applies to all coverages contained in the policy, including those in section I; therefore the insured's fire loss is excluded from coverage under section I because it is one of the coverages embraced in the words "all coverages." This argument invites us to erase all context, exclude all headings and sub-headings, ignore contrary provisions, and limit...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Shaw v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Case No. 5D07-3136 (Fla. App. 10/23/2009)
...including the titles of the various sections of insurance policies, are crucial to their interpretation. See Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co., 649 So. 2d 912, 914-15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). The majority cites to two Florida cases for the proposition that a caption in a policy cannot be used to crea......
-
Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Cichowlas
...the establishment of the rights and liabilities of the parties to an insurance contract must find their basis. Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co., 649 So.2d 912 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). It is a universal rule that it is neither the duty nor the responsibility of the courts to rewrite an agreement betw......
-
Delissio v. Delissio, 1D00-3705.
...interpretation of the text of the entire agreement to accomplish its stated meaning and purpose. See Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co., 649 So.2d 912, 914-915 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Further, a court may not remake an agreement between the parties and, if there is any ambiguity, the agreement will b......
-
Apple Glen Investors, L.P. v. Express Scripts, Inc.
...must be viewed in relation to the other terms and provisions contained within the agreement."); see also Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co., 649 So. 2d 912, 914-15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). "We must read the contract to give meaning to each and every word it contains, and we avoid treating a word as re......
-
The intentional acts exclusion.
...an intentional act exclusion. See Brown v. Travelers Ins. Co., 641 So. 2d 916, 921-22 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1994), withdrawn and superseded by 649 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1995). Courts have also held that the public policy considerations which preclude coverage for intentional acts are inapp......