Brown v. Trent
| Decision Date | 26 November 1912 |
| Citation | 128 P. 895,36 Okla. 239,1912 OK 749 |
| Parties | BROWN ET AL. v. TRENT ET AL. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Where a petition, in a suit to quiet title to certain land, alleges that an order of court directing a guardian to sell land was procured by fraud, and prays to have the order of sale and subesquent orders approving the sale canceled, the suit is a "direct attack" on the orders and not a "collateral attack."
The fraud which will justify the cancellation, in an equitable suit, of a judgment or order of a probate court, must be extraneous to the issues, and such as prevented the complaining party from having a fair hearing.
A district court of one county has jurisdiction, in a suit to quiet title to land in that county, to cancel and set aside an order of the United States Court in the Indian Territory made in what is since statehood another county, directing the sale of the land, and another approving the sale, where the orders affect the title to be quieted, if it appears that the orders were obtained by fraud.
A petition, which alleges that grantees in a deed were the nephews of the grantor, that she had confidence in their integrity, that they procured her signature to a deed upon the representation that it was a release of a dower right for the purpose of selling the land for town-site purposes whereby a large sum could be realized, that she relied upon said representations, that they were untrue, and that no consideration was paid or promised her, states sufficient grounds to justify a cancellation of the deed as against the grantee and subsequent purchasers with notice.
A petition, which alleges that an order of the probate court directing the sale of minors' lands was procured without the knowledge of the guardian, that all of the proceedings in making the sale were without her knowledge, and that neither the guardian nor the minors had received anything from the sale, states sufficient grounds to justify the cancellation of the order of sale and deed made thereunder as against the grantee procuring the sale and subsequent purchasers with notice.
A purchaser of land is charged with notice of the rights of persons in actual possession.
Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 2. Error from District Court Washington County; John J. Shea, Judge.
Action by Nannie E. Brown and others against R. O. Trent and others to quiet title to land. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the petition, plaintiffs bring error. Reversed and remanded.
Veasey & Rowland and J. D. Talbott, both of Bartlesville, for plaintiffs in error.
Chas W. Pennel, of Bartlesville, for defendants in error.
This was an action brought in the district court of Washington county, by Nannie E. Brown et al. against R. O. Trent et al. The petition alleged that plaintiffs were the owners of certain land situated in Washington county, which they inherited from M. R. Brown, who was the husband of Nannie E Brown and the father of the other two plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were, at all times mentioned in the petition, in the exclusive possession of the land; that the defendants Roy D. Palmer and R. O. Trent had caused to be filed of record in Washington county two deeds affecting the title to the land one dated March 12, 1907, filed for record November 9, 1907, purporting to be executed by Mollie K. Trent, a widow, and Annie Borrowman and Catherine Brown, minors, by their guardian, to Roy D. Palmer, and one purporting to be dated June 1, 1907, and filed for record November 9, 1907, purporting to be executed by Nannie E. Brown as guardian of Annie Borrowman and Catherine Brown. The petition further alleged that R. O. Trent is the nephew of the plaintiff Nannie E. Brown, and that Roy D. Palmer is the nephew by marriage of Nannie E. Brown; that Nannie E. Brown has known Palmer and Trent for many years, and on account of the relationship has had, at all times mentioned in the petition, full confidence in their integrity and business capacity; that about the 12th of March, 1907, Palmer and Trent represented to Nannie E. Brown that it would be to the interest of her children, Annie Borrowman and Catherine Brown, if she would sign away her dower right to the land described for the purpose of platting the land and selling the same for town-site purposes; that Palmer and Trent fraudulently represented to her that she was merely signing a waiver of her dower rights, and that nothing further was intended to be conveyed by the deed, and that if she would execute the deed the land could be placed on the market and a large sum realized.
The petition alleged that Nannie E. Brown was unacquainted with business methods and unacquainted with the truth or falsity of the statements, and that she relied upon the representations made to her, and relying thereon signed the instrument or purported deed; that she has never received any consideration whatever for the execution of the deed; and that there was no agreement that she should receive any consideration therefor. The petition further alleged that about the 1st of June, 1907, Palmer and Trent represented to her that there was some irregularity in the instrument she had signed, and that it was necessary for her to sign another in order that her dower rights might be duly relinquished, and the plans for selling the lots might be carried out, and that, still relying upon their statements, and being entirely ignorant of the matter, she signed some instrument which she was later informed was a deed. She alleges that Palmer and Trent never informed her that there was any proceedings in the probate court relating to the sale of her children's interest in the land, and that she never heard of the sale through the probate court until long after the transaction took place; that she has never received any consideration for the execution of her personal deed or the deed as guardian; and that there was never any understanding, either express or implied, by which she was to receive any consideration. The petition further alleged that the plaintiff Catherine Brown reached majority on the 27th day of January, 1909, and that Annie Borrowman reached majority on the 13th of April, 1907. The petition further alleged that there appears of record in the county court of Cherokee county an order of court purporting to be an order of the United States Court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory, sitting at Talequah; that said order is invalid and should be canceled, because the court was without jurisdiction to sell or authorize the sale of Annie Borrowman's interest in the land, because she was of full age at the time it was made; that the order approving the sale is invalid for the same reason; that all the proceedings leading up to the sale are fictitious, false, and fraudulent, and without the knowledge of the guardian, and against the interests of the minors; and that the statutes of Arkansas affecting the sales of land were in no respect complied with. The petition alleged further that Palmer attempted to convey the land to Trent by deed, and that Trent took the deed with full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances already mentioned; that Trent, by pretended mortgage, attempted to mortgage the interest of the plaintiffs to the Western Bank & Trust Company of Amarillo, Tex.; that the bank took the mortgage while the plaintiffs were in full and exclusive possession of the land, and with actual and constructive knowledge of the claim of plaintiffs. It concluded with a prayer that all the deeds be set aside, and that the order confirming the sale be set aside, and that the mortgage be canceled and set aside, and that all the defendants be enjoined from setting up further claim to the land, and that the court make such other proper orders as will give the plaintiffs full and equitable relief in the premises, and for costs of suit and general relief.
The defendants demurred to this petition for the reasons: First. That it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Second. That the court was without jurisdiction. Third. That there was defect in parties plaintiff and defendant. The court sustained the demurrer, and the plaintiffs elected to stand upon their petition, whereupon judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants, and plaintiffs have appealed.
The question presented in briefs of counsel is as to the jurisdiction of the district court over the action.
This case seems to have been decided upon the ground that the district court of Washington county was without jurisdiction to set aside the order of sale, and the order confirming the sale made by the United States Court for the Northern District of the Indian Territory prior to statehood, and it is urged on the part of the defendant that this is a collateral attack upon the judgment of that court which cannot be made in the district court. In this the defendant is mistaken. This proceeding is a direct attack upon that judgment. It is a suit, one of the ultimate purposes of which is to set aside the order of sale and the order confirming the sale. Bergin v. Haight, 99 Cal. 52, 33 P. 760; Campbell-Kawannanakoa v. Campbell, 152 Cal. 201, 92 P. 184. It is alleged that the orders were procured by fraud, and a portion of the prayer is that they be canceled and set aside.
A collateral attack is an objection, incidentally raised in the course of the proceeding, which presents an issue collateral to the issues made by the pleadings. For instance, if the parties in this action were reversed and the purchaser at the guardian's sale had brought suit for the possession relying upon the title bought as shown by the record, and the ward, without alleging the invalidity of the judgment and praying for its...
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