Brown v. U.S. Taekwondo

• Decision Date: 01 April 2021
• Docket Number: S259216
• Parties: Yazmin BROWN et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. USA TAEKWONDO et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: California Supreme Court

11 Cal.5th 204

483 P.3d 159

276 Cal.Rptr.3d 434

Yazmin BROWN et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.USA TAEKWONDO et al., Defendants and Respondents.

S259216

Supreme Court of California.

April 1, 2021

Estey & Bomberger, Stephen J. Estey, San Diego; Corsiglia McMahon & Allard, B. Robert Allard, San Jose; Turek Law, Kenneth C. Turek ; Williams Iagmin and Jon R. Williams, San Diego, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Arbogast Law, David M. Arbogast, Los Angeles; Siminou Appeals, Benjamin I. Siminou, San Diego; Herzog, Yuhas, Ehrlich & Ardell, Ian I. Herzog, Santa Monica; The Bronson Firm and Steven M. Bronson for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Esner, Chang & Boyer, Holly N. Boyer and Shea S. Murphy, Pasadena, for National Crime Victim Bar Association and Manly, Stewart & Finaldi as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Kjar, McKenna, Stockalper, Patrick E. Stockalper, Matthew A. Schiller, San Diego, and Mina M. Morkos ; Horvitz & Levy, Mitchell C. Tilner, Steven S. Fleischman, Burbank, and Yen-Shyang Tseng for Defendant and Respondent USA Taekwondo.

Clyde & Co. US, Douglas J. Collodel, Los Angeles, Margaret M. Holm, M. Christopher Hall, Irvine; Covington & Burling, Beth Brinkmann, Mitch A. Kamin and Carolyn J. Kubota, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent United States Olympic Committee.

Munger, Tolles & Olson, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Hailyn J. Chen and John B. Major, Los Angeles, for National Collegiate Athletic Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent United States Olympic Committee.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

To state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish the defendant owed a legal duty of care. Generally speaking, all persons have a duty to take reasonable care in their activities to avoid causing injury, though particular policy considerations may weigh in favor of limiting that duty in certain circumstances. ( Civ. Code, § 1714 ; Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 ( Rowland ).) The issue before us concerns how courts should decide whether a defendant has a legal duty to take action to protect the plaintiff from injuries caused by a third party. Despite a substantial body of case law addressing the issue, the Courts of Appeal have remained uncertain about the proper legal framework to apply. Distilling the principles articulated in prior cases, we now clarify that whether to recognize a duty to protect is governed by a two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine whether there exists a special relationship between the parties or some other set of circumstances giving rise to an affirmative duty to protect. Second, if so, the court must consult the factors described in Rowland to determine whether relevant policy considerations counsel limiting that duty. Because the Court of Appeal in this case employed the correct framework for decision, we affirm its judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I.

This case comes to us at the demurrer stage, so for present purposes we assume the truth of the allegations in the complaint. ( Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 395, 247 Cal.Rptr.3d 632, 441 P.3d 881 ( Gas Leak Cases ).) As teenagers, plaintiffs Yazmin Brown, Kendra Gatt, and Brianna Bordon trained in the Olympic sport of taekwondo. They traveled to compete at various events in California and throughout the country with their coach, Marc Gitelman. Gitelman took advantage of these opportunities to sexually abuse the young athletes. This went on for years until the sponsor of these competitions, USA Taekwondo (USAT), banned Gitelman from coaching. Gitelman was ultimately convicted of multiple felonies for the sexual abuse of the minor athletes he trained.

Plaintiffs (to whom we will generally refer as Brown) filed this civil suit against Gitelman and several others, including respondents USAT and the United States Olympic Committee (USOC).¹ USOC is a federally chartered nonprofit corporation whose central function is to coordinate amateur sports throughout the country for athletes hoping to one day compete in the Olympics. (See 36 U.S.C. § 220505(c)(1).) In this role, USOC certifies and oversees each sport's national governing body, the entity responsible for conducting and administering the sport in the United States. USAT is the national governing body for the sport of taekwondo. If an athlete wishes to compete in taekwondo at the Olympics or in any other USAT-sponsored competition (as Brown and the other plaintiffs did), the athlete must become a member of USAT and train under a USAT-registered coach (as Gitelman was before USAT banned him).

As relevant here, Brown alleged that USOC and USAT were negligent in failing to protect her from Gitelman's abuse.² Brown emphasized that the sexual abuse of young athletes was a known problem; Gitelman's abuse came on the heels of a series of similar instances of abuse of minors by their coaches dating back to the 1980's. In the wake of these incidents, USOC mandated that national governing bodies adopt a Safe Sport Program to protect athletes from such abuse. Brown alleged that USAT failed to implement the program in a timely fashion — a fact known to USOC, which placed USAT on probation as a result. Brown further alleged that USAT took insufficient steps to protect Gitelman's victims once it was made aware of her allegations: USAT temporarily suspended Gitelman, but nevertheless permitted him to continue coaching at USAT competitions for several months before ultimately placing him on its list of banned coaches.

USOC and USAT both demurred to the complaint. As relevant here, they argued Brown had not adequately alleged they had an affirmative duty to take action to protect her and the other plaintiffs from Gitelman's abuse. The trial court sustained both demurrers without leave to amend and entered judgments of dismissal.

Brown appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment dismissing USAT but affirmed as to USOC. ( Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1083, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 708 ( Brown ).) In determining whether Brown had adequately alleged each defendant had a legal duty to protect plaintiffs from Gitelman's abuse, the court employed a two-part framework. As a general rule, the court explained, " ‘ "one owes no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct." ’ " ( Id. at p. 1091, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 708, quoting Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 413 P.3d 656 ( Regents ).) An exception to this no-duty-to-protect rule exists for cases in which the defendant has a special relationship with either the dangerous third party or with the victim. ( Brown , at p. 1091, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 708.) But even when the so-called special relationship exception applies, the policy considerations described in Rowland , supra , 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, may weigh against imposing a duty to protect in a given case.³ ( Brown , at p. 1092, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 708.) The court thus asked, first, whether Brown had adequately alleged a special relationship between the parties that gave rise to a legal duty to protect, and second, whether the Rowland factors weighed in favor of limiting or eliminating this duty.

Applying this framework, the Court of Appeal concluded that Brown had adequately alleged that USAT owed a duty to protect her from Gitelman. The court first concluded Brown had sufficiently alleged a special relationship between USAT and Gitelman that enabled USAT to control Gitelman's actions, as demonstrated by the fact that USAT had registered him as a coach, took disciplinary action against him, and ultimately barred him from coaching. ( Brown , supra , 40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1094–1095, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 708.) The court then went on to consider whether the Rowland factors counseled against imposing a duty on USAT, and determined they did not. ( Id. at pp. 1095–1101, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 708.)

By contrast, the Court of Appeal concluded that USOC, unlike USAT, had no special relationship with either the plaintiffs or Gitelman, and thus no legal duty to protect the plaintiffs from Gitelman's abuse. The court explained that Brown's case for imposing an affirmative duty on USOC rested largely on allegations that USOC had the ability to regulate USAT's conduct. The court considered this insufficient to establish a special relationship that would enable USOC to control Gitelman's conduct, or that would give plaintiffs reason to look to the USOC for protection. ( Brown , supra , 40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1101–1103, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 708.) Having concluded that Brown's allegations faltered at the first step of the analysis, the court declined to consider how the Rowland factors might apply to USOC. ( Id. at p. 1103, 253 Cal.Rptr.3d 708.)

The Court of Appeal's decision added to a considerable body of law addressing the connection between the special relationship doctrine and the Rowland factors in cases alleging a duty to protect the plaintiff from harms caused by third parties. The appellate courts that have addressed the issue have adopted various approaches. Several other Courts of Appeal have employed the same two-part framework as the court in this case, holding that a plaintiff must satisfy both the special relationship test and the Rowland factors before a duty to protect the plaintiff from third party harm can be imposed on the defendant. (See, e.g., Barenborg v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 70, 77, 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 680 ["Thus, plaintiffs alleging a defendant had a duty to protect them must establish: (1) that an exception to the general no-duty-to-protect rule applies and (2) that the Rowland factors support imposition of the duty."]; Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Assn., Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1118, 1128, 214 Cal.Rptr.3d 552 [noting that if courts find a...