Brown v. Walker Commercial, Inc.

• Citation: 2022 CO 57
• Decision Date: 19 December 2022
• Docket Number: 21SC390
• Parties: Marshall P. Brown, in his official capacity as Director of Water of the City of Aurora, Colorado, Petitioner v. Walker Commercial, Inc., a Colorado corporation. Respondent
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

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2022 CO 57

Marshall P. Brown, in his official capacity as Director of Water of the City of Aurora, Colorado, Petitioner v. Walker Commercial, Inc., a Colorado corporation. Respondent

No. 21SC390

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc

December 19, 2022

The supreme court clarifies that Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b) establishes a limitation period for invoking the district court's jurisdiction under Rule 106(a)(4). Thus Rule 106(b)'s limitation period is not subject to equitable considerations. This conclusion is consistent with nearly half a century of Colorado appellate case law treating Rule 106(b)'s deadline as strict and jurisdictional.

Here the district court properly dismissed Walker's Rule 106(a)(4) amended complaint as untimely because Walker filed its original complaint two days after Rule 106(b)'s twenty-eight-day filing deadline had lapsed. Because the complaint was untimely, the trial court also properly dismissed Walker's additional Claim 3 raised in its amended complaint. The court therefore reverses the judgment of the court of appeals.

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 20CA205

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Hamre, Rodriguez, Ostrander & Dingess, P.C. Richard F. Rodriguez Joshua R. Kruger Denver, Colorado, Office of the City Attorney Julia A. Bannon Aurora, Colorado Attorneys for Respondent:

Cambridge Law LLC Reid J. Allred Jared M. Haynie Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colorado Departments of Corrections, Education, Higher Education, Regulatory Agencies, and Revenue; Adams State University; Auraria Higher Education Center; and Colorado Mesa University: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Christopher J.L. Diedrich, Senior Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Municipal League: Robert D. Sheesley Rachel Bender Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

OPINION

MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE

¶1 Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 106(a)(4) provides for review of quasi- judicial decisions made by a governmental body or officer in a civil matter where the law otherwise provides no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. An action under Rule 106(a)(4) is commenced by filing a complaint in district court and is limited to a determination of whether the governmental body or officer exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)(I)-(II). Unless a statute establishes some other time limit for seeking review, "a complaint seeking review under [Rule 106(a)(4)] shall be filed in the district court not later than 28 days after the final decision of the body or officer." C.R.C.P. 106(b). The question before us is whether this twenty-eight-day deadline under Rule 106(b) for filing a Rule 106(a)(4) action may be extended for excusable neglect.

¶2 Walker Commercial, Inc. ("Walker") filed a Rule 106(a)(4) complaint seeking review of the decision of Marshall P. Brown, the Director of Water of the City of Aurora ("Director"), to levy a storm drain development fee against Walker's real property. Walker filed its Rule 106(a)(4) complaint in district court thirty days after the Director's final decision-two days past Rule 106(b)'s twenty-eight-day filing deadline.

¶3 Walker contends that C.R.C.P. 6(b) allows the district court to extend Rule 106(b)'s filing deadline upon a showing of excusable neglect. The Director disagrees, arguing that Rule 6(b) does not apply to Rule 106(b) because Rule 106(b)'s deadline establishes a limitation period that is jurisdictional and that must be strictly enforced.

¶4 We agree with the Director and conclude that Rule 6(b) does not apply to extend Rule 106(b)'s twenty-eight-day filing deadline. Instead, we reaffirm, consistent with nearly half a century of Colorado appellate case law, that Rule 106(b) establishes a limitation period for invoking the district court's jurisdiction under Rule 106(a)(4). Courts may not extend Rule 106(b)'s limitation period under Rule 6(b) on grounds of excusable neglect. Applying that understanding of Rule 106(b) here, we conclude the district court properly dismissed Walker's Rule 106(a)(4) amended complaint as untimely. Because the original complaint was untimely, the trial court also properly dismissed Walker's additional Claim 3 raised in its amended complaint. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶5 Walker, a developer, submitted an application to the Planning Commission for the City of Aurora ("City") to develop commercial property into a self-storage facility. In 2017, the City approved the development plan. Thereafter, in April 2019, the City invoiced Walker for part of a storm drain development fee on the property. Walker objected to the fee but made the partial payment under protest and petitioned the Director for an administrative hearing. The Director held a hearing on July 15, 2019. On August 13, the Director emailed Walker stating that the City would accept $74,140.32 as payment for the fee. Walker's counsel called the City and learned that the August 13 email was the Director's final decision.^[1]

¶6 On September 12-thirty days after the Director's final decision-Walker filed a Rule 106(a)(4) complaint in district court seeking review of the Director's decision. The Director moved to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending that Walker's complaint was untimely under Rule 106(b)'s twenty-eight-day deadline for filing a complaint under Rule 106(a)(4).

¶7 Instead of responding to the Director's motion to dismiss, Walker filed an amended complaint on October 11, reasserting its Rule 106(a)(4) claim and adding two more claims. As relevant here, Walker's additional Claim 3 sought a declaration that the Director's decision was not effective because Walker had commenced proceedings for review within thirty days, and under the Aurora City Code, the Director's final decision becomes effective thirty days after notice is mailed or served on the petitioner "unless proceedings for review by the district court are commenced within that time." Aurora City Code 138-398(d).

¶8 The Director moved to dismiss the amended complaint, reasserting that the action was time-barred. Walker filed a response to the motion and separately moved for an extension of time under Rule 6(b), arguing that its untimely filing of the Rule 106(a)(4) complaint was the result of excusable neglect.

¶9 On December 20, 2019, the district court issued two orders. The first order denied Walker's motion for an extension of time, concluding that Rule 6(b) does not apply to Rule 106(b)'s jurisdictional deadline, and that regardless, Walker had not demonstrated excusable neglect. The second order granted the Director's motion to dismiss Walker's amended complaint, concluding that it was untimely filed and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to hear it.

¶10 On January 28, 2020, the district court issued a third order, concluding that (1) Walker's complaint was time-barred because Rule 106(b)'s twenty-eight-day deadline was not preempted by the city ordinance's thirty-day deadline; (2) Walker's reliance on the thirty-day deadline did not constitute excusable neglect; and (3) Rule 106(b)'s twenty-eight-day deadline did not violate Walker's due process rights.

¶11 Walker appealed, contending, in part, that the city ordinance's thirty-day deadline governed, and that applying Rule 106(b)'s twenty-eight-day deadline violated Walker's due process rights. In the alternative, Walker contended that the trial court should have allowed its late-filed complaint under Rule 6(b), as Walker's two-day delay was due to excusable neglect. A division of the court of appeals reversed the district court's orders.

¶12 The division rejected Walker's claim that the municipal ordinance's thirty- day deadline governed and instead concluded that Rule 106(b)'s twenty-eight-day deadline applied to Walker's Rule 106(a)(4) action. See Walker Com., Inc. v. Brown, 2021 COA 60, ¶¶ 26-27, 492 P.3d 1045, 1051 (citing Gold Star Sausage Co. v. Kempf, 653 P.2d 397, 400-01 (Colo. 1982)). It also concluded that applying the twenty-eight-day deadline did not violate Walker's right to due process. Id. at ¶¶ 30-36, 492 P.3d at 1052. However, the division went on to hold that Rule 6(b) allows trial courts to accept late-filed Rule 106(a)(4) complaints upon a showing of excusable neglect. Id. at ¶ 49, 492 P.3d at 1055. It further held that the standard for determining whether excusable neglect exists under Rule 6(b) parallels the excusable neglect standard under Rule 60(b). Id. at ¶ 66, 492 P.3d at 1058. The division remanded the case for the district court to (1) reconsider Walker's Rule 6(b) motion for an extension of time, applying the excusable neglect standard that the division outlined; and (2) articulate its reasoning for dismissing Walker's Claim 3 for declaratory relief, if it were to again dismiss the amended complaint on remand. Id. at ¶¶ 67, 69, 71, 492 P.3d at 1058-59.

¶13 We then granted the Director's petition for certiorari review of the court of appeals' decision.^[2]

II. Standard of Review

¶14 We review a district court's interpretation of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure de novo. Schaden v. DIA Brewing Co., 2021 CO 4M, ¶ 32, 478 P.3d 1264, 1270. To analyze the rules, we apply "settled principles of statutory construction," and "we interpret the rules according to their commonly understood and accepted meanings." Id.

¶15 In so doing, "we read the rules as a whole, 'giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of [th...