Brown v. Wilson, Civ. A. No. 72-755.
Decision Date | 26 March 1974 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 72-755. |
Citation | 373 F. Supp. 1045 |
Parties | Joseph Carl BROWN, Jr. v. Ira WILSON. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
No appearance for plaintiff.
Stephen M. Sokol, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant.
The Plaintiff, Joseph Carl Brown, Jr., brought this action against Ira Wilson for his alleged failure to present a letter written on his behalf before the Board of Pardons. Plaintiff claims his action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the Civil Rights Act) and bases jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1343. The Defendant Wilson is a Counselor at the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh. The purpose of the Counselors at the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh is to (1) aid the prisoners to adjust to living in the prison population, (2) find what the particular aptitudes and abilities are of specific prisoners, and (3) to use their findings to help the prisoners to eventual rehabilitation through release by either pardon, parole or any other available program. The Plaintiff had applied for a commutation of his sentence; the Pennsylvania Board of Pardons was to meet on July 29, 1972 for the purpose of reviewing such applications. Since Plaintiff Brown did not have sufficient funds to obtain an attorney to represent him, Mr. Wilson would present his (Brown's) case for commutation before the Board of Pardons.
Sometime in June of 1972, the Plaintiff and the Defendant met and discussed Brown's application for commutation. In the best interest of the prisoner, he was advised he should procure as many letters of recommendation as possible to present before the Board. Plaintiff here was able to procure only one letter (other than letters from his immediate family) and that letter was from a former school teacher, Mrs. Bette Cavanah. The letter of Mrs. Cavanah was received at least a few days prior to the meeting of the Board of Pardons on June 29, 1972. In his Affidavit supporting the initial Motion for Summary Judgment, the Defendant stated:
In an "Opposing Memorandum of Fact and Law" filed December 14, 1972, the Plaintiff pro se alleged:
A Preliminary Hearing scheduled for August 7, 1973, was postponed by the request of Plaintiff and held on August 16, 1973. At that time the Plaintiff brought a Motion to Disqualify the Trial Judge. This Motion was subsequently denied and another hearing was scheduled on December 20, 1973.
In the interim, the Defendant filed an Affidavit of William B. Robinson, which stated the following:
At the Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment held on December 20, 1973, the Court pointed out a conflict between the two affidavits as presented. The Affidavit of Mr. Wilson stated that he did not have time to incorporate the letter prior to the hearing of the Board of Pardons on June 29, 1972, while the Affidavit of Mr. Robinson stated that at the conclusion of his oral presentation of June 29, 1972, on behalf of Mr. Brown, Mr. Wilson incorporated into the file the letter of Mrs. Cavanah. The Court, at the request of Brown, granted both parties forty (40) days to file briefs dealing with constitutional questions concerning inmates' rights before the Board of Pardons.
The Defendant's argument in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment is that the actions of the Defendant Wilson as alleged in the Complaint did not involve the deprivation of any right or privilege secured by the Federal Constitution or Laws. This reasoning starts with the premise that since there is no federal right to pardon, Plaintiff could not be heard to complain in a civil rights action that his letter was not presented to the Board. The Defendant then notes that actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be based on the deprivation of a right or privilege secured by the Constitution and/or Laws of the United States. From this, the Defendant concludes that pardon has never been held to constitute a right or privilege of the citizenship of a criminal, but rather has been recognized as purely an element of legislative and judicial grace, relying on Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129 (1916) and Murray v. State of Louisiana, 347 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1965) ( ), therefore, no federal right was violated.
The Defendant analogizes the situation presently before us to that in Lambur v. Chew, 356 F.Supp. 751 (E.D.Va. 1973). In Lambur the Plaintiff had been picked up as a parole violator on September 9, 1972. No hearing was held at the time of apprehension as required by Virginia law to determine whether or not he had violated his parole. On January 9, 1973, a probable cause interview was held and it was then determined that Lambur had indeed violated the terms of his parole. Lambur argued that the failure to give him the required hearing in September resulted in a violation of his rights from September until January. The Court held that since a hearing at the time of his apprehension would have shown that he was a parole violator, therefore, he should have been bound over. The Court then stated:
Plaintiff contends that the right to be protected was his right to have the letter presented before the Pardons Board. He relies principally on the Civil Rights Act that such a federal right exists.
After reviewing all the pleadings and the principles of law applicable, we concur with the Plaintiff that such a right exists which is federally protected; however, we conclude that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted since the Plaintiff...
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