Brownlee v. Catholic Charities of Archdiocese of Chi.

• Decision Date: 01 March 2022
• Docket Number: 16-cv-00665
• Parties: ESTHER BROWNLEE and JOANIE FLEMING, Plaintiffs, v. CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO and DWAYNE WASHINGTON, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

ESTHER BROWNLEE and JOANIE FLEMING, Plaintiffs,
v.
CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO and DWAYNE WASHINGTON, Defendants.

No. 16-cv-00665

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

March 1, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

FRANKLIN U. VALDERRAMA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiffs Esther Brownlee (Brownlee) and Joanie Fleming (Fleming) (collectively, Plaintiffs) worked for the Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Chicago (Catholic Charities) as mobile outreach workers providing emergency services to homeless and at-risk people in Chicago. Plaintiffs allege that they worked in a discriminatory, sexually charged, and hostile work environment. They brought suit against Catholic Charities and one of their male co-workers, Duane Washington (Washington) (collectively, Defendants), asserting several counts arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq. (each count concerns a distinct Title VII theory, including sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation). R. 37, SAC.^[1] Brownlee also brought state claims for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and violations of the

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Illinois Gender Violence Act (IGVA), 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 82/1 et seq. Id. On January 27, 2021, the Court entered an order granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motions for summary judgment (the Order). R. 145, Order Summ. J. Catholic Charities and Fleming now bring separate motions for reconsideration of the Court's Order. R. 146, Def.'s Mot. Reconsider; R. 150, Pl.'s Mot. Reconsider. For the reasons stated below, Catholic Charities' motion for reconsideration (R. 146) is granted in part and denied in part. Fleming's motion for reconsideration (R. 150) is denied.

Background

The Court assumes familiarity with the facts of this case detailed in the Order and thus does not fully recount them herein. The Court's Order, in pertinent part:

• denied Defendants' motions for summary judgment with respect to Count I (sexual harassment - Brownlee), Order Summ. J. at 29-33, Count III (sexual harassment - Fleming) with respect to Washington's conduct, id. at 48 51-55, and Count V (retaliation - Brownlee), id. at 37-40; and

• granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Count III (sexual harassment - Fleming) with respect to the Vaia owner's conduct. Id. at 48-51

Catholic Charities moves the Court to reconsider the denial of summary judgment for Count I (sexual harassment - Brownlee) and Count V (retaliation - Brownlee), as well as the Court's partial denial of summary judgment on Count III (sexual

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harassment - Fleming), with respect to Washington's conduct. Def.'s Mot. Reconsider. Fleming moves the Court to reconsider its partial grant of summary judgment on Count III (sexual harassment - Fleming), with respect to the Vaia owner's conduct, as well as the Court's finding that Fleming's allegations with respect to Washington's conduct before 2015 are time-barred. Pl.'s Mot. Reconsider.

Standard of Review

Motions to reconsider are interlocutory orders governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Patrick v. City of Chicago, 103 F.Supp.3d 907, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2015). Under Rule 54 of the Rules of Federal Civil Procedure, “any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).^[2] See also Galvan v. Norberg, 678 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir. 2012). The Court therefore has discretion to reconsider its ruling on Defendants' motions for summary judgment. Patrick, 103 F.Supp.3d at 911 (N.D. Ill. 2015).

Motions for reconsideration under Rule 54(b) generally “serve the limited function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact.” Slick v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 111 F.Supp.3d 900, 902 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Manifest error occurs where the court “has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court

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by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.” Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A party may also use a motion for reconsideration to alert the court to “a significant change in the law or facts.” Janusz v. City of Chicago, 78 F.Supp.3d 782, 787 (N.D. Ill. 2015), aff'd, 832 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Ligas, 549 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 2008)).

That said, a motion to reconsider is not an appropriate vehicle to “advance arguments already rejected by the Court or new legal theories not argued before the ruling[.]” Schilke v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 758 F.Supp.2d 549, 554 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Cohen v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 735 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Ultimately, motions for reconsideration are disfavored, and a party asserting that the court committed a manifest error of fact or law “bears a heavy burden . . . . ” Patrick, 103 F.Supp.3d at 911-12 (citations omitted).

Analysis

The Court addresses Catholic Charities' motion for reconsideration first, followed by Fleming's motion for reconsideration.

I. Catholic Charities' Motion for Reconsideration

Catholic Charities moves the Court to reconsider four aspects of the Order granting in part and denying in part summary judgment. Def.'s Mot. Reconsider at 1-2. With respect to the Court's denial of summary judgment on Count I (Sexual Harassment - Brownlee), Count V (Retaliation - Brownlee), and Count III (Sexual

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Harassment - Fleming), Catholic Charities asks the Court to conduct analysis on various issues the Court did not reach in its Order. Id. Alternatively, Catholic Charities requests reconsideration of the Court's denial of summary judgment on Count III (Sexual Harassment - Fleming) based on Fleming's purported failure to present facts to establish severe or pervasive sexual harassment. Id. at 2. Catholic Charities finally requests that the Court reopen discovery to allow Catholic Charities to re-depose Fleming. Id. The Court assesses each request in turn.

A. Count I (Sexual Harassment - Brownlee)

The Court denied summary judgment on Count I (Sexual Harassment - Brownlee), because the Court found that Brownlee had adduced evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the third element of a sexual harassment claim- severe or pervasive conduct-had been satisfied. Order Summ. J. at 29-33. Having rejected Defendants' argument with respect to the severe or pervasive conduct element, the Court declined to address Defendants' argument regarding the fourth element of a sexual harassment claim-employer liability. Id. at 33 (“Reaching these determinations precludes summary judgment, and the Court need not address Catholic Charities' second argument regarding employer liability.”).

1. Reconsideration is Proper for Count I (Sexual Harassment - Brownlee)

Catholic Charities argues that reconsideration is proper on the Court's denial of summary judgment on Count I (Sexual Harassment - Brownlee), as the Court declined to address Defendants' argument regarding employer liability. R. 147, Def.'s Memo. Reconsider at 8. Catholic Charities maintains that the Court could not resolve

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its summary judgment motion on Brownlee's sexual harassment claim without determining whether there is a basis for employer liability. Id. at 5, 8 (citing Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiffs respond that the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order reflects that it did consider the basis for employee liability, despite the Court's language to the contrary. R. 153, Pls.' Resp. Reconsider at 8-9.

To dodge summary judgment, the non-moving party must present sufficient evidence to support each element of its case on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Whereas the moving party on summary judgment only bears the burden of either: “(1) showing that there is an absence of evidence supporting an essential element of the non-moving party's claim; or (2) presenting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim.” Hummel v. St. Joseph Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 817 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

A plaintiff alleging sexual harassment has to adduce evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff on four elements: “(1) her work environment was both objectively and subjectively offensive; (2) the harassment complained of was based on her [sex]; (3) the conduct was either severe or pervasive; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability.” Scruggs, 587 F.3d at 840. Thus, to survive summary judgment on her sexual harassment claim, Brownlee had to put forward sufficient evidence on each of the aforementioned four elements, whereas Defendants only had to knock out or negate one of those elements. It follows then that Defendants could

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have prevailed on their motion for summary judgment for Count I (Sexual Harassment - Brownlee), independent of the Court's finding on the severe or pervasive element, if Defendants had shown either an absence of evidence on the employer liability element or affirmative evidence negating the employer liability element. Hummel, 817 F.3d at 1016.

Although the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the Court considered facts relevant to an employer liability analysis, see Pls.' Resp. Reconsider at 8-9, the Court ultimately did not discuss the law surrounding the employer liability element. Nor did the Court evaluate the pertinent facts under that...