Brownsville v. Cavazos

• Decision Date: 01 October 1879
• Citation: 25 L.Ed. 574,100 U.S. 138
• Parties: BROWNSVILLE v. CAVAZOS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

100 U.S. 138

100 U.S. 138

25 L.Ed. 574

BROWNSVILLE v. CAVAZOS.

October Term, 1879

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. Thomas J. Durant for the plaintiff in error.

Mr. James R. Cox for the defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action for the possession of certain real property in Brownsville, a city of Texas, situated on the left bank of the Rio Grande, opposite the town of Matamoras. Previous to the revolution which separated Texas from the Republic of Mexico, Brownsville constituted a portion of Matamoras, which was recognized as a town in 1826 by a decree of the congress of Tamaulipas, one of the States of Mexico. By the laws of Mexico in force at the time, pueblos or towns, when recognized as such by public authority, became entitled for their use and benefit, and the use and benefit of their inhabitants, to certain lands embracing the site of such pueblos or towns and adjoining territory, to the extent of four square leagues. This right was held by the cities and towns of Spain for a long period before her conquests in America, and was recognized in her laws and ordinances for the government of her colonies here. Laws of the Indies, in White's Recop., vol. ii. 44; Townsend v. Greeley, 5 Wall. 326; Grisar v. McDowell, 6 id. 363; The Pueblo Case, 4 Sawyer, 563. By them provision was made for the measurement of the lands, and their assignment to the pueblos or towns, when once they were officially recognized. If any portion of the lands which fell within the four square leagues, laid off in the usual way in a square or oblong form, had previously become vested in private proprietorship, authority was sometimes given to take the necessary proceedings to divest the property of its private character—to expropriate it, as it was termed—and subject it to the uses of the town. Such was the case here. The four square leagues measured off and assigned to Matamoras crossed the Rio Grande and embraced the site of the present city of Brownsville, which was then the private property of one Dona Maria Francisca Cavazos. The premises were a part of a tract called the Espiritu Santo tract, granted by the Spanish government, in 1781, to one De la Garza. The grant was recognized as valid by the legislature of Texas in 1852, when it relinquished to the heirs and assignees of the grantee all the right and interest of the State therein. For the expropriation of the premises thus embraced within the limits of the land assigned to the municipality proceedings were taken soon after the town was established, in 1826. For some years immediately preceding their institution, Madam Cavazos was seised of the Espiritu Santo tract by regular deraignment of title from the grantee; and so continued until her death in 1835, unless she was divested of that portion assigned to the town by the proceedings for its expropriation. She devised the tract to three parties, one of whom is the defendant, Dona Josefa Cavazos, who, on partition with the others, became seised of that part which includes the premises in controversy, portions of which she conveyed to persons from whom the other defendants derive their title to the parcels which they severally claim.

The principal inquiry, therefore, presented for our consideration relates to the validity of the proceedings taken for the expropriation of the premises assigned to Matamoras as common lands—or ejidos, as they are termed in the Spanish language—on the left bank of the Rio Grande. And on this point we can add nothing to the clear and satisfactory exposition of the law contained in the opinion of the presiding justice at the circuit. We can do little more than repeat his argument and adopt his conclusions. The City of Brownsville v. Cavazos, 2 Woods, 293.

After the separation of Mexico from the mother-country, the several States composing the republic formed new constitutions of government, retaining the old Spanish laws so far as they were applicable to their new condition. The State of Tamaulipas, which embraced territory on both sides of the Rio Grande, in 1825 adopted a constitution containing an article which declared that 'neither the Congress nor any other authority shall be able to take the property, even that of the least importance, of any private individual. When it shall become necessary for an object of a common recognized utility to take the property of any person, he shall first be compensated upon the examination of arbiters appointed by the government of the State and the interested party.'

Under this article, in order to divest the title of Madam Cavazos to the property taken, it became necessary to make to her compensation; and its amount could only be determined by arbiters, of whom one was to be chosen by her. But she declined to appoint an arbiter, or to participate in the proceedings. She desired to retain the farm occupied by her, from which she drew her support, and specially wished that it should be reserved from the ejidos or common lands. Various efforts were made for more than a year to induce her to act in the matter, but she persistently refused. Finally, in October, 1827, the Congress of the State interfered, and by its decree declared that the government, in the exercise of its powers, would see that the civil authorities of Matamoras compelled her to obey the Constitution and laws; that if, on being notified a second and third time, she should refuse to appoint an arbiter for the appraisement of her lands, which were to be taken for the town, the common council should proceed to their occupation and survey without further citation to her; and that should she or her heirs afterwards ask for indemnification, and be willing to name an arbiter, a new measurement should be made if desired, and the land she asked should be given to her....