Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company v. King

Decision Date31 May 1900
Docket Number11,954 - (44)
Citation82 N.W. 1103,80 Minn. 76
PartiesCONNECTICUT MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. SILAS KING and Others
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Action of ejectment in the district court for Hennepin county. On a second trial, the case was tried before Brooks, J., who directed a verdict in favor of defendants. After denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, judgment was entered pursuant to the verdict. From the judgment, plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Second Trial in Ejectment -- First Decision -- Stare Decisis.

In a second trial, upon the same state of facts, in an action in ejectment, taken under G.S. 1894, §§ 5845, 5846 held, that the decision upon the former appeal controls upon the doctrine of stare decisis, and not upon the doctrine of res judicata.

Redemption from Foreclosure -- G.S. 1894, § 6044.

Held that G.S. 1894, § 6044, in reference to the time within which subsequent creditors may redeem with respect to prior lienholders, was enacted for the benefit of parties seeking to redeem, and the party holding the rights acquired at the foreclosure sale can take no advantage of the fact that a subsequent creditor redeems within the time open to a prior lienholder.

Charles J. Tryon and Charles A. Willard, for appellant.

The decision in the first appeal has no bearing, except as a precedent; the doctrine of res judicata does not apply, but that of stare decisis. At common law the verdict and judgment was not conclusive. Repeated actions of ejectment might be brought, and the prior judgment was no bar; after many actions at law, a bill for an injunction would lie to restrain further ejectments, and these statutes for a second trial are to prevent the title of real estate from being concluded by a single trial. Somerville v. Donaldson, 26 Minn. 75, 77; Smale v. Mitchell, 143 U.S. 99; Equator Co. v. Hall, 106 U.S. 86. The statute does not extend, but restricts, the right of the parties to continue litigation. Keeler v. Dennis, 39 Hun, 18, 21. It is a relic of the fictions of the common law. Kremer v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 54 Minn. 157, 161. The judgment in ejectment stands as the final determination of the rights of the parties, unless a new trial be obtained under the section of the statute referred to. West v. St. Paul & N. Pac. Ry. Co., 40 Minn. 189, 191; Newell, Ej. 844; Sheldon v. Van Vleck, 106 Ill. 45, 48; Slauson v. Goodrich, 99 Wis. 20; Green Bay v. Hewitt, 62 Wis. 316; Donahue v. Klassner, 22 Mich. 252, 254; Eichert v. Schaffer, 161 Pa. St. 519. The first judgment in ejectment does not bar, or constitute res judicata on, the second trial. Brownsville v. Cavazos, 100 U.S. 138; Sheldon v. Van Vleck, supra; Kinter v. Jenks, 43 Pa. St. 445.

The wording of our statute confirms this view. It provides (G.S. 1894, § 5845) that "thereupon the action shall be retried." By section 5358 "a trial is the judicial examination of the issues between the parties, whether they are issues of law or of fact." This appellant is entitled to another judicial examination of the issues of law. There can be no examination of such an issue if the result of the first examination must necessarily control. The statute also provides that "the judgment last given shall be the final determination of the rights of the parties." Section 5846. But if there is to be no re-examination of the issues of law, then the first judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties so far as the law is concerned. See Hunt v. O'Leary, 78 Minn. 281. The doctrine of law of case on second appeal in our courts is that of res judicata. Ayer v. Stewart, 16 Minn. 77 (89); Bradley v. Norris, 67 Minn. 48; Schleuder v. Corey, 30 Minn. 501; Maxwell v. Schwartz, 55 Minn. 414; Tilleny v. Wolverton, 54 Minn. 75. This doctrine, which differs radically from estoppel by verdict, if applied here, would prevent the defeated party in ejectment from having re-examined, not only those issues of law and fact which were actually examined upon the first trial, but also all those which might have been examined. Berryhill v. Peabody, 77 Minn. 59. The logical result of the application of this doctrine is to make a second trial nugatory both as to the facts and as to the law, and to repeal the statute. Hammond v. Carter, 161 Ill. 621, 628. Our court has not at any time applied this doctrine to an ejectment on statutory second trial, and there is no room for its application. But even the doctrine of second appeal is not here applicable. The ruling of the court has since been reversed in Sheldon v. Brown, 72 Minn. 496, and Terry v. Moran, 75 Minn. 249. See Cluff v. Day, 141 N.Y. 580; Central v. Shoup, 28 Kan. 394; Hamilton v. Marks, 63 Mo. 167, 172; Bird v. Sellers, 122 Mo. 23.

The mortgages were co-ordinate. The former decision has been overruled. Sheldon v. Brown, supra; Terry v. Moran, supra. The decision on the first appeal that these became successive mortgages, through the prima facie priority of registration evidenced by the document numbers, is not only at variance with the later Sheldon and Terry cases cited above; it is at variance with every decided case in other courts. 1 Jones, Mort. 566; Boone, Mort. 67; Greene v. Warnick, 64 N.Y. 220; Lampkin v. First, 96 Ga. 487; Cain v. Hanna, 63 Ind. 408; Collerd v. Huson, 34 N.J.Eq. 38, and note; Stanbrough v. Daniels, 77 Iowa 561, 566; Rhoades v. Canfield, 8 Paige, 545; Gausen v. Tomlinson, 23 N.J.Eq. 405; Vredenburgh v. Burnet, 31 N.J.Eq. 229; Stafford v. Van Rensselaer, 9 Cow. 316; Van Aken v. Gleason, 34 Mich. 477; Koevenig v. Schmitz, 71 Iowa 175. G.S. 1894, § 4180, only gives priority to a subsequent deed or instrument which is placed of record before a prior one. And even then the burden of proof is on one who claims priority to show absence of notice. There is no evidence that the mortgagees who had earlier document numbers, were without notice of King's mortgage. Palmer v. Yorks, 77 Minn. 20; Roussain v. Patten, 46 Minn. 308; Mead v. Randall, 68 Minn. 233; Nickerson v. Wells-Stone M. Co., 71 Minn. 230; Fritz v. Ramspott, 76 Minn. 489; Plymouth Cordage Co. v. Seymour, 67 Minn. 311, 317; Minor v. Willoughby, 3 Minn. 154 (225); Newton v. Newton, 46 Minn. 33; Hackney v. Wollaston, 73 Minn. 114.

The former appeal was decided on a mistake of fact. Other redemption rights had not been cut off when King redeemed. Plaintiff may contest the redemption. Its right is a valuable right, -- to take the property unless a lawful redemption be made. And it may dispute the right of one who pays to the sheriff the true amount, and deny the redemption on the ground that the right to redeem does not exist. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Capehart, 63 Minn. 120; Lowry v. Akers, 50 Minn. 508; Hughes v. Olson, 74 Minn. 237; Roberts v. Meighen, 74 Minn. 273.

Harlan P. Roberts and John H. Long, for respondents.

The former decision is the law of the case. When parties have submitted to the supreme court certain facts and asked for a decision of the law thereon, as between those parties and upon those facts the decision as to the law is final. City v. Foxworthy, 34 L.R.A. 321, 326, note and cases cited; Wells, Res. Adj. 569, et seq.; 2 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 373, 376; Semple v. Anderson, 9 Ill. 546; Stacy v. Vermont, 32 Vt. 551; Lee v. Stahl, 13 Colo. 174; Sanger v. Merritt, 131 N.Y. 614; Washington Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. 413; Meyer v. Shamp, 51 Neb. 424. See also Roberts v. Cooper, 20 How. 467; Dodge v. Gaylord, 53 Ind. 365; Himely v. Rose, 5 Cranch, 313; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304; The Santa Maria, 10 Wheat. 431; Browder v. M'Arthur, 7 Wheat. 58; American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511; Ex parte Sibbald v. U.S., 12 Pet. 488; President v. Beverly, 1 How. 134; Corning v. Troy Iron & N.F., 15 How. 451; Sizer v. Many, 16 How. 98; In re Sanford Fork & T. Co., 160 U.S. 247; Emory v. Owings, 3 Md. 178; Preston v. Leighton, 6 Md. 88; Hammond v. Inloes, 4 Md. 138; Eyler v. Hoover, 8 Md. 1; Brown v. Sumerville, 8 Md. 444; Mong v. Bell, 7 Gill (Md.) 244, 246; Cumberland v. Sherman, 20 Md. 117; Dewey v. Gray, 2 Cal. 374; Clary v. Hoagland, 6 Cal. 685; Gunter v. Laffan, 7 Cal. 588; Soule v. Ritter, 20 Cal. 522; Leese v. Clark, 20 Cal. 387; Phelan v. City, 20 Cal. 39; Mitchell v. Davis, 23 Cal. 381; Trinity v. McCammon, 25 Cal. 117; Lucas v. City, 28 Cal. 591; In matter of Pacheco, 29 Cal. 224; Parker v. Pomeroy, 2 Wis. 112; Downer v. Cross, 2 Wis. 371; Cole v. Clarke, 3 Wis. 323; Pierce v. Kneeland, 9 Wis. 23; Reed v. Jones, 15 Wis. 40; Ryan v. Martin, 18 Wis. 672; Akerly v. Vilas, 24 Wis. 165; Wright v. Sperry, 25 Wis. 617; Noonan v. Orton, 27 Wis. 300; McLeod v. Bertschy, 34 Wis. 244; Du Pont v. Davis, 35 Wis. 631; Adams v. Pearson, 7 Pick. 341; Booth v. Com., 7 Metc. (Mass.) 285; Craig v. Bagby, 1 T.B. Mon. 148; Tribble v. Frame, 3 T.B. Mon. 51; Moss v. Rowland, 3 Bush, 505; President v. Groff, 14 S. & R. 181; Gratz v. Lancaster, 17 S. & R. 278; Simpson v. Hart, 1 Johns. Ch. 91; Gelston v. Codwise, 1 Johns. Ch. 188, 195; Perine v. Dunn, 4 Johns. Ch. 140; Wilcox v. Hawley, 31 N.Y. 648; Goodrich v. Thompson, 4 Day, 215; Nichols v. City, 27 Conn. 459; Jesse v. Cater, 28 Ala. 475; Maulden v. Armistead, 30 Ala. 480; Goodman v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482; Hollowbush v. McConnel, 12 Ill. 203; Hallissy v. West Chicago, 177 Ill. 598. The Minnesota decisions upon the law of the case are found in Johnson v. N.W. Tel. Ex. Co., 54 Minn. 37; Tilleny v. Wolverton, 54 Minn. 75; Ayer v. Stewart, 16 Minn. 77 (89); Cochran v. Stewart, 57 Minn. 499, 509; Bradley v. Norris, 67 Minn. 48.

OPINION

LEWIS, J.

This is an action in ejectment, and involves a review of the second trial secured by plaintiff under the statute. The decision upon the first appeal is reported in 72 Minn. 287, 75 N.W 376, where...

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