Broyles v. Iowa Dept. of Social Services

• Decision Date: 13 May 1981
• Docket Number: No. 65337,65337
• Citation: 305 N.W.2d 718
• Parties: Donald E. BROYLES, Appellee, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 718

305 N.W.2d 718

Donald E. BROYLES, Appellee, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Appellant.

No. 65337.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 13, 1981.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., and John R. Martin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Davenport, for appellant.

Realff H. Ottesen, Davenport, for appellee.

Considered by LeGRAND, P. J., and McCORMICK, ALLBEE, McGIVERIN, and SCHULTZ, JJ.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

The Iowa Department of Social Services, as assignee of support payments provided for in a support order rendered against Donald E. Broyles, appeals from a decision of the Scott County District Court holding that the judgment debtor, Donald, is not obligated to the Department for past-due support payments. We hold the trial court erred and reverse and remand.

Pursuant to a 1974 dissolution of marriage decree, Donald was ordered to pay $25 child support per week to Michelle L. Broyles through the office of the Scott County Clerk of Court. On May 4, 1976, as a condition of receiving welfare assistance, Michelle assigned her rights to child-support payments to the Department. The assignment, which was filed with the clerk of court in the dissolution file, provided:

I, the undersigned recipient, do hereby assign all my right, title and interest to all support payments (accrued, current or future) provided for in the support order herein unto the Iowa Department of Social Services, and I understand that this assignment includes my interest in all support payments which come due during the period of my receiving assistance, whether paid before or after termination of assistance.

At the time of the assignment Donald was delinquent on his support payments in the sum of $450.

On September 27, 1977, a notification of partial termination of assignment was filed with the clerk of court, to be effective on September 30, the date Michelle ceased to receive assistance from the Department. At that time Donald was delinquent on his support obligation in the amount of $1200. The notification of termination of assignment authorized the clerk of court to pay current support payments to Michelle, but expressly stated that any payments toward the delinquency were to be paid directly to the Department.

Between September 30, 1977, and November 30, 1978, Donald paid over $1200 in child support, which the clerk of court paid to Michelle as current child-support payments. In December 1978 Michelle executed a "Release of Child Support Judgment" acknowledging "as fully paid, satisfied and released child support judgment entered in this matter on the second day of August 9, 1974, up through and including the first day of December A.D., 1978." In a written pretrial stipulation, however, the parties stipulated that any release executed by Michelle purporting to release delinquencies owed to the Department was null and void.

On March 16, 1979, Donald brought a declaratory judgment action against the Department requesting the trial court to declare judgment that he was not liable to the Department for any of the $1200 delinquency. The case was submitted to the court on a written pretrial stipulation of the facts.

In his petition Donald contended that his child-support payments subsequent to the termination of the assignment applied to the oldest installments due, and he had thus paid in full the $1200 delinquency claimed by the Department. He also alleged that Michelle had executed a release of all support payments due to her through December 1, 1978.

The trial court held that Donald is not obligated to the Department in any amount for past-due child support. The court mentioned but did not rely on the release, stating:

Consequently, when the judgment debtor, the plaintiff in this case, made his payment of October 27, 1978, he had paid in full the principal amount of the delinquent support payments on September 30, 1977, of $1200 being the entire sum asked for by the defendant in this case.

Thus, the trial court limited the assignment to those installments that fell due while the assignment was in effect. It concluded that these installments were subsequently paid, and Broyles owed no obligation to the Department.

Before analyzing the correctness of the trial court's determination, we find it necessary to examine the nature and validity of the assignment, interpret its meaning, and determine its effect on the parties.

I. Validity of the assignment and its effect on Michelle. An assignment is a transfer to another of the whole of any property or right therein. 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 2 (1975). As a welfare recipient, Michelle was required by statute to assign her rights to all support payments provided for in the dissolution decree:

Persons entitled to periodic support payments pursuant to an order or judgment entered in an action for dissolution of marriage, who are also welfare recipients, shall assign their rights to such payments to the department of social services. The clerk of court shall forward support payments ... to the department which shall have the right to secure support payments in default through proceedings provided for in chapter 252A or section 598.24.

§ 598.34, The Code, as amended by 1975 Sess., 66th G.A., ch. 151, § 12 (effective Aug. 15, 1975).

A court-ordered child-support judgment becomes a lien when payment is due. See Slack v. Mullenix, 245 Iowa 1180, 1184-85, 66 N.W.2d 99, 101-02 (1954); Whittier v. Whittier, 237 Iowa 655, 661, 23 N.W.2d 435, 440 (1946); § 598.22, The Code 1975. We have long recognized that a judgment may be assigned, see Edmonds v. Montgomery, 1 Iowa 143, 147 (1855), and this recognition extends to a future judgment, see Weire v. City of Davenport, 11 Iowa 49, 52-53 (1860). We conclude that Michelle was required to, and did in fact, execute a valid assignment of the support payments due under the dissolution decree.

An assignment ordinarily carries with it all rights, remedies, and benefits of the thing assigned. Kintzel v. Wheatland Mutual Insurance Association, 203 N.W.2d 799, 806 (Iowa 1973); Mutual Surety Co. v. Bailey, 231 Iowa 1236, 1242, 3 N.W.2d 627, 630 (1942). The assignment was effective to transfer Michelle's rights in her support judgment to the Department; however, we must determine whether the assignment was limited to those payments that became due during the period of the assignment.

Donald, in his petition, maintained that the assignment and release thereof could only apply to any amounts that became due during the period of time Michelle was a recipient of welfare funds. The Department asserted in its answer that the assignment applied to payments accrued, current, and future, whether paid before or after termination of assistance. It claims further that the notification of termination of assignment clearly reserved to the Department any delinquencies that accrued pursuant to the assignment. Thus, the parties took differing positions as to the interpretation of the assignment and the notification of partial termination of assignment.

An assignment is a contract between the assignor and assignee. Rules of construction applicable to contracts thus apply to assignments. The basic rule in construing a written contract is that the intent of the parties controls. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(14). See also 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 43: "The creation and existence of an assignment is to be determined according to the intention of the parties and that intention is derived not only from the instruments executed by them, if any, but from the surrounding circumstances."

In construing an assignment, as in contract, when words are free from ambiguity, there is no occasion for interpretation. However, absent lucid and unambiguous language expressing the clear intent of the parties, it is the court's duty to give effect to the language of the entire contract of assignment in accordance with commonly accepted and ordinary meaning. See Kinney v. Capitol-Strauss, Inc., 207 N.W.2d 574, 576-77 (Iowa 1973); Gendler Stone Products Co. v. Laub, 179 N.W.2d 628, 630 (Iowa 1970).

Although the individual provisions of the assignment may be ambiguous, when read in its entirety the assignment clearly manifests the intent of the assignor and assignee. Michelle assigned to the Department her right to support payments that had accrued on April 27, 1976, the effective date of the assignment, and current and future support payments "which come due during the period of my assistance,...