Broz v. Omaha Maternity & General Hospital Association
Decision Date | 14 July 1914 |
Docket Number | 17,583 |
Parties | TILLIE BROZ, ADMINISTRATRIX, APPELLEE, v. OMAHA MATERNITY & GENERAL HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, APPELLANT |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county: GEORGE A. DAY JUDGE. Affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
William Baird & Sons and E. M. Morsman, Jr., for appellant.
Duncan M. Vinsonhaler and W. C. Fraser, contra.
This is an action to recover $ 40,000 for alleged negligence resulting in the death of Adolph F. Broz, a farmer who, with his wife and two children, had resided on a farm in Saline county. Plaintiff is the administratrix of his estate. The Omaha Maternity & General Hospital Association, defendant, is a corporation conducting at Omaha a hospital for private gain. Broz was a patient therein from April 18, 1910, until June 21, 1910, paying for his room and care $ 15 a week. In the petition it is alleged that Broz was knowingly admitted as a patient when suffering from a mental disorder which caused at times a delirious condition impelling him intermittently to leave his bed and otherwise to act irrationally; that while a patient of defendant he took poison, the result being fatal; that defendant was negligent in permitting him to remain for a long time unattended and unguarded in his room and in the hallways of the hospital, and in negligently leaving in an exposed and unguarded place the poison which he took; that, after defendant was apprised that he had taken poison, it negligently failed to administer proper remedies and antidotes; that the facts pleaded constitute a negligent omission of duty and a breach of defendant's implied undertaking to furnish and supply him with all the care, nursing, medical treatment and oversight necessary, suitable and proper for him in view of his known physical and mental condition. In its answer defendant denied negligence, but admitted that Broz was affected with a mental disorder when taken to the hospital; that about midnight June 19, 1910, he was found in his room dangerously ill, and nurses then on duty were soon afterward apprised that he had taken poison; that he died June 21, 1910. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $ 7,000. From a judgment for that sum defendant has appealed.
The first assignment of error is directed to the admission in evidence of standard tables of expectancy of life. On this point defendant says: In support of this argument, City of Lincoln v. Smith, 28 Neb. 762, 45 N.W. 41, and Roose v. Perkins, 9 Neb. 304, 2 N.W. 715, are cited. The question now presented was not involved in either of those cases. While good health was shown, neither opinion contains the statement that mortality tables are inadmissible in absence of proof of that fact. As data or evidence, tending to show expectancy of life, mortality tables are not conclusive. City of Friend v. Ingersoll, 39 Neb. 717, 58 N.W. 281; Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 30 L.Ed. 257, 7 S.Ct. 1; City of Joliet v. Blower, 155 Ill. 414, 40 N.E. 619; Central R. Co. v. Crosby, 74 Ga. 737; Scheffler v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 32 Minn. 518, 21 N.W. 711. They are competent evidence to aid the jury or court in determining the probable duration of life when that question is in issue, and may properly be submitted with other evidence, showing health, age, existence of disease, physical and mental condition, vocation or employment, and other pertinent facts.
As evidence, the effect of mortality tables, if any, is determinable by the triers of fact. City of Friend v. Ingersoll, 39 Neb. 717, 58 N.W. 281; City of South Omaha v. Sutliffe, 72 Neb. 746, 101 N.W. 997. Proof that the person whose expectancy of life is under consideration conforms to the standards of health and vigor adopted in compiling mortality tables is not essential to their admissibility.
Evidence of disease or of ill health or of hazardous employment may impair or destroy the probative effect of tables of expectancy of life, but it does not make them inadmissible. Arkansas M. R. Co. v. Griffith, 63 Ark. 491, 39 S.W. 550; Greer v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 94 Ky. 169, 21 S.W. 649; Birmingham M. R. Co. v. Wilmer, 97 Ala. 165, 11 So. 886; Mary Lee Coal & R. Co. v. Chambliss, 97 Ala. 171, 11 So. 897; Coates v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 62 Iowa 486, 17 N.W. 760. In the Arkansas case cited the court said: This assignment of error is therefore overruled.
Another assignment of error challenges the admissibility of statements by Broz that the poison was on a table in his room, and that he took it, thinking it was his medicine. Over objections of defendant, statements of this nature were proved by Dr. Mares. There is testimony tending to show: Dr. Mares was a brother-in-law of Broz. The poisoning was discovered before midnight. About 8 o'clock the next morning Dr. Mares was notified, and promptly went to the hospital. Upon his arrival he conversed with the head nurse. He testified: Dr. Mares went to the room of the patient, interviewed him, and reported the conversation to the head nurse, who said: "That is what I thought." The statements of Adolph F. Broz were thus reported by Dr. Mares in his own language, as follows:
The question is: Did the trial court err in admitting this testimony and other proof of a similar nature? It is argued that defendant is not bound by such statements; that Broz was under the care of his own physician, and that the latter's instructions were obeyed by the nurses and other employees of the hospital; that Broz, under specific directions of his physician, was allowed the freedom of his room and of the halls in the hospital; that bichloride of mercury was used in the hospital as an indispensable disinfectant, and that it was kept for that purpose in a sinkroom, where Broz found the tablets; that he took the poison with suicidal intent, there being at the time no reason to suspect that he would do so. Defendant adduced proof in support of the positions thus taken. If, however the statements of Broz were properly admitted, there is evidence of negligence on the part of defendant. Intermittent mental infirmities of the patient were pleaded in the petition and admitted in the answer. The pleadings, evidence and circumstances justify a finding that he was admitted to the hospital under an implied obligation that he should receive such reasonable care and attention for his safety as his mental and physical condition required. The physician employed by him did not relieve the hospital of responsibility for negligence on its part, if any. The patient was under the personal observation of his physician only a small portion of the time. In the latter's absence and during emergencies he was under the care of the nurses and the interne who were employees of the hospital. Within the scope of their employment their employer is legally responsible for their negligence to a patient. Wetzel v. Omaha Maternity & General Hospital Ass'n, ante, p. 636. The patient's physician did not manage nor control the hospital, and he is not liable for the negligence of hospital nurses and internes, if he had no connection with any negligent act. Harris v. Fall, 177 F. 79, 27 L. R. A. n. s. 1174, and note. In absence of the physician employed by Broz, and in absence of the latter's wife, and of his relatives and friends, while he was under the exclusive care of...
To continue reading
Request your trial