Bruce Transfer Co. v. Johnston
| Decision Date | 01 August 1939 |
| Docket Number | 44897. |
| Citation | 287 N.W. 278,227 Iowa 50 |
| Parties | BRUCE TRANSFER CO. v. JOHNSTON, District Judge. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Certiorari to District Court, Clarke County; George A. Johnston, Judge.
Certiorari to review action of District Court in denying change of venue.
Writ annulled.
Stipp Perry, Bannister & Starzinger, of Des Moines, for petitioner.
E. K Jones, of Osceola, for respondent.
Petitioner Bruce Transfer Company, is an Iowa corporation with its principal place of business in Polk County. As a common carrier it was operating a line of motor vehicle freight trucks of semitrailer type upon a fixed schedule and over a regular route, with Des Moines, Iowa, and Kansas City, Missouri, as termini. Suit was instituted against petitioner in the District Court of Clarke County, Iowa, for damages resulting from a collision between an automobile and one of said trucks travelling over a public highway through said county upon said regular route. Petitioner had no office or agency in said county, venue therein being based solely upon Section 11041, Code of Iowa 1935, which permits the bringing of an action against certain common carriers " in any county through which such road or line passes or is operated." Contending that the statute was not applicable to a company engaged only in the operation of motor freight trucks, Bruce Transfer Company moved for change of venue to Polk County. The motion was overruled by the trial court, whereupon said company, as petitioner, instituted herein this original action in certiorari to test the legality of said ruling.
But one question is involved, viz: were the operations of Bruce Transfer Company of such character that the venue in said action was correctly fixed in Clarke County? Solution of this question rests upon the meaning of the aforementioned statute which reads as follows:
Among other things, the statute refers to " any railway corporation, the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars" . This clause has been a part of the statute in substantially the same form ever since 1872, and since 1897 has been unchanged. Motor cars, trucks or trailers have never been specifically named therein. Therefore, interpretation is necessary to determine whether or not the intendment of the legislature as expressed in the statute included operations of the character of those conducted by petitioner.
Obviously this interpretation should be made as of the times when the provisions in question were adopted in order that the surrounding conditions and the apparent purposes of legislation as well as the contemporary meaning of words used may be properly taken into account. Cherokee v. N.W. Bell Telephone Co., 199 Iowa 727, 202 N.W. 886; Platt v. Union P. R. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 25 L.Ed. 424; 59 C.J. 1014-1015.
During that period the only general mechanized means of transporting freight and passengers overland was by conveyances travelling upon rails. Practically all vehicles using roads and highways were drawn by animals. Few people, if any, envisioned the tremendous changes in highway traffic which were to result from automotive development. The legislatures could not have foreseen that concerns such as petitioner would one day be operating as common carriers of passengers and freight in intrastate and interstate commerce with regular established routes comparable to the railways of those times, handling a tremendous volume of traffic and furnishing the sternest of business competition to the railways.
The statute was apparently based upon the thought that the public interest and convenience would be promoted by permitting suits against common carriers in any county on their lines. In passing it may be said this legislation has in general proven to be sound and has tended to serve the convenience of litigants and witnesses, and that the hardships or abuses resulting therefrom have been relatively unsubstantial.
That the statute does not in so many words specifically describe the operations and business of petitioner will not necessarily prevent its applicability thereto.
* * *" 25 R.C.L. 778.This rule finds support in the following authorities: Commonwealth v. Quaker City Cab Co., 287 Pa. 161, 134 A. 404; In re Fox Film Corp., 295 Pa. 461, 145 A. 514, 64 A.L.R. 499; Haselton v. Interstate Stage Lines, 82 N.H. 327, 133 A. 451, 47 A.L.R. 218; Baker & Strawn v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 124 Okl. 94, 254 P. 26; Burton v. Monticello, etc., Turnpike Co., 162 Ky. 787, 173 S.W. 144; Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Oshkosh, 62 Wis. 32, 21 N.W. 828; Iowa Union Telephone Co. v. Board of Equalization, 67 Iowa 250, 25 N.W. 155; Franklin v. Northwestern Telephone Co., 69 Iowa 97, 28 N.W. 461; 59 C.J. 973-974. Therefore, if the terms of this statute are comprehensive enough to include petitioner and its business, they will be subject to its provisions.
The first class of carriers listed is " any railway corporation", followed by " the owner of stages, or other line of coaches or cars" . What was the meaning of the word " line" as so used, at the times in question? Century Dictionary-1889-Line: " A series of public conveyances, as coaches, steamers, packets and the like, passing to and fro between places with regularity" . Commonwealth v. Walton, 1907, 126 Ky. 523, 104 S.W. 323:" ‘ Stageline,’ ‘...
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