Bruce v. City of Colorado Springs

• Decision Date: 24 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. 08CA0239.,08CA0239.
• Citation: 200 P.3d 1140
• Parties: Douglas BRUCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, a home rule city and Colorado municipal corporation; Title-Setting Board; Patricia Kelly, Cindy Conway, and Robert Briggle, in their official capacities as members of the City Title-Setting Board, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

200 P.3d 1140

Douglas BRUCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, a home rule city and Colorado municipal corporation; Title-Setting Board; Patricia Kelly, Cindy Conway, and Robert Briggle, in their official capacities as members of the City Title-Setting Board, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 08CA0239.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. VII.

December 24, 2008.

Douglas Bruce, Pro Se.

Patricia K. Kelly, City Attorney, Thomas Marrese, Assistant City Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees.

Opinion by Judge GRAHAM.

Plaintiff, Douglas Bruce, appeals the trial court's order denying his request for relief against defendants, the City of Colorado Springs (the City); the City of Colorado Springs Title-Setting Board (the Title Board); and Patricia Kelly, Cindy Conway, and Robert Briggle, in their official capacities as members of the City of Colorado Springs Title-Setting Board, concerning the title setting of a petition for an initiated municipal ordinance. We reverse and remand.

The facts here are not in dispute. Pursuant to section 5.1.504(A) of the City of Colorado Springs Municipal Code (the City Code), plaintiff filed a petition for an initiated ordinance with the City Clerk's Office:

Enterprise Policy. City enterprises shall bill and collect charges for voluntary customer contracts only. Enterprise payments to the city shall phase out in ten or fewer equal yearly steps starting in January 2009, with equal savings for each customer contract. Future loans, gifts, and subsidies between an enterprise and the city or another enterprise are prohibited.

After a hearing, the Title Board, composed of the City Clerk, City Attorney, and Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court, refused to set a title for the proposed initiative. See City Code § 5.1.504(C) (the Title Board "shall designate and fix a petition title for the initiated petition within ten (10) working days after submission" of an initiated petition). It concluded that it was unable to determine, or convey in a title, the true meaning and intent of the petition, see id. (the title "shall correctly and fairly express the true intent and meaning of the proposed initiated petition"), in part because the initiative contained multiple subjects in violation of the single subject requirement set forth in section 5.1.503 of the City Code.

Plaintiff then filed a complaint for title setting and declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. The first cause of action alleges a denial of plaintiff's constitutional right to petition the City based on the Title Board's refusal to set a title for the proposed initiative. The complaint asserts that the petition for an initiated ordinance meets the single subject requirements and also deals with legislative rather than administrative matters. In the second cause of action, plaintiff requests that the court set the ballot title to contain the entire text of the initiative verbatim. Plaintiff's third cause of action, entitled "For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Writ of Mandamus," requests, inter alia, (1) declaratory judgment that the City's single subject ordinance is unconstitutional and thus invalid; (2) an order directing the City to comply with petition printing requirements; (3) an order enjoining the City from engaging in certain title-setting practices and mandating certain procedures; (4) an order directing the City on how its enterprises should bill and collect; and (5) a declaratory judgment that the proposed initiative contains a single subject and concerns a legislative rather than an administrative subject and an order that the proposed initiative meets legal requirements for circulation.

After the complaint was filed, the trial court stayed the matter while plaintiff pursued an appeal of the actions of the Title Board pursuant to section 5.1.504 of the City Code. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a written motion for rehearing with the City Clerk. See City Code § 5.1.504(D). The Title Board overruled the motion, and plaintiff filed an appeal with the City Clerk. See id. The appeal was heard by the City Council at a formal meeting, and the City Council upheld the Title Board's decision. See id.

Returning to the litigation, the parties urged the trial court to rule on plaintiff's complaint without a hearing, but disagreed about the trial court's standard of review. Defendants contended that the trial court should review the Title Board's refusal to set a title for an abuse of discretion pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4). Plaintiff argued that the trial court should review the legal validity of the City's single subject ordinance and the Title Board's actions under C.R.C.P. 57 and rule as a matter of law that a title must be set and the petition circulated.

The trial court rejected both positions and set the matter for a hearing, explaining,

[T]he most efficient method for resolution of the dispute is to allow the presentation of evidence and legal argument at the upcoming hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court shall include in its findings at the conclusion of the hearing its decision regarding what rule confers jurisdiction upon the court to make a determination. The court may elect to rule in the alternative, making findings with respect to the declaratory action complaint as well as findings pursuant to Rule 106. In this way, the court hopes to avoid the inefficiency of ruling in the case only to have the case remanded later to make additional findings or hold additional hearings.

The court clarified that the disputed issues of fact "shall be resolved in accordance with [C.R.C.P.] 57(i)."

After a hearing, the trial court issued a written order detailing its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court concluded that the Title Board did not err, was "justified in refusing to set a title on the proposed voter initiative," and did not abuse its "discretion in finding that the title could not be set and the initiative should be rejected." Without addressing the constitutionality of the City's single subject ordinance, the trial court denied plaintiff's "request for declaratory judgment and other injunctive relief."

In its order, the trial court stated that the parties had agreed that the single subject rule applied to the proposed municipal initiative, citing the single subject rule set forth in Colo. Const. art. V, section 1(5.5) and section 1-40-106.5, C.R.S.2008, but not the single subject requirement set forth in section 5.1.503 of the City Code. The court then determined that the proposed initiative contained multiple subjects in violation of the single subject rule and, thus, the Title Board did not err in refusing to set a title. The court also expressed concern that the proposed initiative was too vague to apprise the voters of its purpose and potential consequences.

The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, and this appeal followed.

I. Standard of Review

At the outset, plaintiff asserts that the trial court's ruling is "fatally defective" because the trial court "never defined the legal standards for its review." Although the trial court did not state clearly the standard of review in its order, we can determine from the record whether the trial court's decision should be affirmed.

Regardless of whether we apply the standard of review under C.R.C.P. 106 or the standard of review under C.R.C.P. 57, the outcome is the same. In reviewing the C.R.C.P. 57 declaratory judgment claim as a matter of law, we conclude that the case must be remanded to the trial court for a determination on the constitutionality of the City's single subject ordinance. Therefore, because we are remanding for a determination of the constitutionality of the single subject ordinance, our determination under C.R.C.P. 106 whether the Title Board abused its discretion in finding that the proposed initiative violates the single subject requirement would be premature.

II. Constitutional and Statutory Single Subject Application

Plaintiff contends, and we agree, that the trial court erred in applying the state constitutional and statutory single subject rule to a municipal matter.

Appellate courts interpret constitutional provisions as a matter of law. Bruce v. City of Colorado Springs, 129 P.3d 988, 992 (Colo.2006). We assess the intent of the voters in adopting an amendment by according the words of the provision their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We discern the meaning of a statute by also looking first to the statutory language and giving words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986).

The Colorado Constitution provides that the state title-setting board may not set the title of a proposed initiative if the initiative contains multiple subjects. Article V, section 1(5.5) sets forth the single subject requirement:

No measure shall be proposed by petition containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject shall be embraced in any measure which shall not be expressed in the title, such measure shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed. If a measure contains more than one subject, such that a ballot title cannot be fixed that clearly expresses a single subject, no title shall be set and the measure shall not be submitted to the people for adoption or rejection at the polls. In such circumstance, however, the measure may be revised and resubmitted for the fixing of a proper title without the necessity of review and comment on the revised measure in accordance with subsection (5) of this section, unless the revisions involve more than the elimination of provisions to achieve a single subject, or unless the official or officials responsible for the fixing of a title determine that the revisions are so substantial that such review and comment is in the public interest. The revision and resubmission of a...