Bruce v. Dean

• Citation: 140 S.E. 277
• Court: Supreme Court of Virginia
• Decision Date: 17 November 1927
• Parties: BRUCE. v. DEAN.

140 S.E. 277

BRUCE.

v.DEAN.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Nov. 17, 1927.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Greene County.

Suit by William F. Dean, Jr., administrator of Raymond Stanton Dean, deceased, against L. H. Bruce, committee of L. Gruver Meadows. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Geo. S. Harnsberger and Geo. N. Conrad, both of Harrisonburg, for appellant.

Chas. A, Hammer, of Harrisonburg, for appellee.

CHICHESTER, J. This is a suit instituted on August 4, 1925, by William F. Dean, Jr., administrator of Raymond S. Dean, deceased, against L. H. Bruce, committee of L. Gruver Meadows, for the purpose of having declared voluntary, "fraudulent, and void, so far as the complainant's demands are concerned, " a certain deed of trust, bearing date July 18, 1925, from L. Gruver Meadows to the Church of the Brethren Industrial School.

The trust deed, which complainant seeks to have set aside conveyed all the real estate owned by Meadows (subject to certain deeds of trust, mentioned in the bill, but with which we are not concerned) to the grantee named in the deed, in the trust that the "property shall be used, or its proceeds used, by the party of the second part in defraying the expenses of the maintenance, education, and rearing the six children of the party of the first part, " naming them, all children of the grantor, and all infants.

The facts which formed the basis of the proceeding here before the court are, in the main, undisputed, and are embodied in the following statement:

It Gruver Meadows was indicted in May, 1925, for the murder of Raymond Stanton Dean and Serena Meadows, his wife. He alleged, as his reason for the double homicide, that Dean was unduly intimate with his wife. On the trial for murdering his wife, on June 30, he was convicted of murder in the first degree, and on July 20 was sentenced to life imprisonment. As a result of the death of the mother and the life imprisonment of the father, the six children, ranging in age from 1¹/₂ years to 12 years, were left without either parent to care for and support them. There were no relatives who were willing to look after these infants and an uncle carried them to the Church of the Brethren Industrial School, located in Greene county, where they have been since that time. The Industrial School is a subsidiary of, and is controlled by, "the General Mission Board of the Church of the Brethren, " a corporation.

A few days after the children were brought to Industrial School, the principal of the school asked for compensation for their care and maintenance, and thereupon assurances were given the superintendent by counsel for Lloyd Gruver Meadows, and later by Lloyd Gruver Meadows himself, that remuneration would be made to the Industrial School for its care and support of the children. In pursuance of this assurance Meadows did pay the Industrial School, on account of the care and maintenance of the children, $50 in cash and two cows, worth about $70, which paid for their care and support up to the time of his trial. Then, pursuant to an understanding with the school, Meadows executed the deed of trust of July 18, 1925, wherein he conveyed to the Industrial School all of the remaining equity in his estate, real and personal, after the payment of the prior liens thereon, upon the trust heretofore recited, for the maintenance of his children "at this time in the institution of the said party of the second part, in the county of Greene, and under its care, custody, and control."

In consideration of these provisions of the deed of trust, the Industrial School agreed it would rear the children and give them an education until they were able to take care of themselves.

The bill filed in the cause by the administrator of Raymond Stanton Dean charges that Meadows willfully, deliberately, and premeditatedly shot Raymond Stanton Dean, and that the administrator instituted action against Meadows in the circuit court of Greene county, on June 30, 1925, for $10,000, for the death of complainant's intestate.

The bill then sets out in detail the landed estate of Meadows, the liens thereon, charges (as stated) that the deed of trust to the Industrial School is voluntary, fraudulent, and void, and prays that it be set aside, and that Meadows' equity be held subject to any future decree of the court, etc.

All necessary persons were made parties defendant, and the trial court heard the cause upon demurrers, bill, and exhibits, the answers of the defendants, and the depositions. The court, by decree of September 20, 1926 (which appears in the margin¹), set the deed aside.

This decree is before us for review upon two main assignments of error.

(1) The circuit court erred in not sustaining the first ground of demurrer filed to the bill of complaint.

(2) The circuit court erred in not holding the deed of trust of July 18, 1925, from L. Gruver Meadows to the Industrial School trustee, as valid and for valuable consideration.

The only ground of demurrer relied on is rested upon the proposition that William P. Dean, Jr., administrator, was not, at the time of the institution of this suit to set aside the deed of trust of July 18, 1925, a creditor of L. G. Meadows, and that therefore section 5184, under which this suit was instituted (even if it was Meadows' intention, when he executed the deed, to hinder, delay, and defraud Dean's administrator in the collection of his claim for damages), had no application to the situation.

Counsel for appellant went to much pains to quote authority as to what constituted a creditor, but the authorities quoted, whatever may be their value in other jurisdictions, or to situations other than those involved in the instant case, have no application to the facts of this case in this jurisdiction.

Section 5184 of the Code of 1919 provides:

"Every gift, conveyance, assignment, or transfer of, or charge upon, any estate, * * * given with intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors, purchasers, or other persons of or from what they are or may be lawfully entitled to, shall, as to such creditors, purchasers, or other persons, * * * be void."

The language "other persons of or from what they are or may be lawfully entitled to, " etc., used in the statute, is broad enough to cover claims for damages growing out of a tort, even if the word creditors did not include such persons. But this court, on more than one occasion, has held a deed made with intent to defraud a recovery by a third person of damages in an action of tort, even before trial and judgment, as was the case here, is fraudulent and void to the same extent as a conveyance to hinder, delay, and defraud existing creditors. Johnson v. Wagner & Sons, 76 Va. at page 590; Gtreer v. Wright, 6 Grat. (47 Va.) 154, 52 Am. Dec. Ill; Harris v. Harris, 23 Grat. (64 Va.) at page 764; Consolidated Tramway Co. v. Germania Bank, 121 Va. 331 at page 335, 93 S. E. 572.

It is clear, in view of the foregoing, that there was no error in overruling the demurrer.

2. The second assignment of error involves the question as to whether the deed of July 18, 1925, was void, because it was voluntary, or because it was executed with the intention to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

It is very clear that the conveyance in this case is not voluntary, within the meaning of the law. It was not a conveyance to the children of the grantor, while he was indebted; but it was, in effect, a conveyance to a third party upon the assumption by the grantee of the obligation to support, maintain, and educate the children during theirminority. It was therefore founded upon valuable consideration.

Support, whether of the promisor or a third person is a valuable consideration. See 6 R. C. L. p. 656, § 68; Page on Contracts, vol. 1, § 297; Pellizzarro v. Reppert, 83 Iowa, 497, 50 N. W. 19; Taylor v. Crockett, 123 Mo. 300, 27 S. W. 620; Campbell v. McLaughlin (Mo. Sup.) 205 S. W. 18; Brown v. Taylor, 174 N. C. 423, 93 S. E. 983, L. R. A. 1918B, 293. It is the legal as well as the moral duty of a father to support his dependent infant children. In Mihalcoe v. Holub, 130 Va. at page 430, 107 S. E. 706, this court said:

"The rules are much the same regarding support of infant children by a father. He owes them the duty of maintenance. This, by the weight of American authorities, founded upon common sense and natural justice, is a legal and not merely a moral obligation."

'Judge Kelly, in this case, cites with approval the case of Finn v. Adams, 138 Mich. 258, 101 N. W. 533, 4 Ann. Cas. 1186, which holds that a father who is confined in the penitentiary for life is still liable for the support of his minor child.

See, also, Virginia Code, §§ 1909, 1935, 1944.

With this obligation resting upon him, Meadows contracted with the Industrial School for the maintenance, support, and education of his infant children, children who were forever deprived, by the peculiar circumstances of his case, of the fruits of any labor he may perform for all time. There was no benefit that could inure to the father by reason of the conveyance, nor was the conveyance made in response to the sentiment of affection or favor, and these facts distinguish this case from that class of cases relied on by appellee, where the moving consideration is affection or favor, or where some individual benefit accrues to the grantor while his property is beyond the reach of his creditors. We have no disposition to run counter to the principles enunciated in those cases, but the instant case presents a situation where, with a moral and legal obligation resting upon him, which he could never perform, because he was about to be deprived of bis liberty for his lifetime, the father contracted with the Industrial School to maintain his infant children, and in consideration of the obligation which it assumed to perform, he conveyed his equity in all his real estate, the value of which was not greater than, or even equal to, the obligation assumed, to the...